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Abstract
The tradeoffformulation task is to identify the central issues in a decision problem by
recognizing strategies that are inadmissible on qualitative grounds. SUDO-PLANNER
formulates tradeoffs for an example medical decision problem by proving decision-
theoretically that certain plan classes are dominated based on a knowledge base of
qualitative relations in the domain. The classical planning representation of goals as
predicates is inadequate for choice among plans that may achieve objectives in part
or with uncertainty. SUDO-PLANNER's dominance-proving architecture is a general
framework for planning for partially satisfiable goals. Dominance-proving planners
characterize the space of admissible plans by maintaining a specialization graph of
plan classes annotated with dominance conditions derived from a domain model.
Qualitative Probabilistic Networks (QPNs) are decision models expressing constraints
on the joint probability distribution over a set of variables. Qualitative influences
describe the direction of the relationship between two variables. Qualitative syn-
ergies describe interactions among influences. The probabilistic definitions of these
constraints justify sound and efficient inference procedures based on graphical manip-
ulations of the network. SUDO-PLANNER's dominance prover uses these procedures
to establish dominance relations among plan classes. SUDO-PLANNER constructs
decision models (QPNs) from a multilevel knowledge base describing the effects of
actions and relations among events. The planning process alternates between model
construction and dominance proving, producing a plan graph with dominance condi-
tions ruling out the inadmissible therapy strategies for its medical decision example.
Thesis Supervisor: Peter Szolovits
Title: Associate Professor of Computer Science and Engineering
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Tradeoff Formulation
A typical decision whether to perform surgery on a patient involves a tradeoff. The
operation might alleviate the patient's disease, but it also carries a risk of mortality
or other undesirable outcomes. Before resolving this dilemma, we might perform
a diagnostic test to assess the surgery's potential effectiveness. In contrast to the
original decision, determining how the result of the test should influence our surgical
policy presents no tradeoff. It is obvious that our willingness to operate should
increase as the test indicates surgery is more likely to be effective.
Most of the choice problems we recognize as "decisions" are tradeoff situations.
Strategies such as "operate only if the test suggests surgery will be ineffective" never
occur to us because they violate common sense.' Unfortunately, we cannot rely on
decision-making computer programs to limit themselves automatically to only the
sensible options. Given a rich enough set of actions and limited only by syntax, a
planning program is free to assemble strategies that are arbitrarily ridiculous.
The task of tradeoff formulation is to separate the "real decisions" from the trivial
1According to Minsky [92, Chapter 27], the humor of patently irrational policies such as this is
evidence of subconscious censors on nonsensical ideas.
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choices. Plans that can be ruled out on simple, uncontroversial grounds are called
inadmissible and are unworthy of serious consideration. Tradeoffs indicate potential
controversy, therefore plans involved in a tradeoff should be considered admissible
pending further investigation.
Once the tradeoffs are identified, other decision-making mechanisms must be em-
ployed to resolve them. Even when powerful decision methods are available, however,
there are several reasons to accord tradeoff formulation special status in the planning
architecture.
Epistemology. The knowledge required to formulate tradeoffs is more abstract,
robust, and modular than that needed for tradeoff resolution or decision making in
general. The situation above is described in terms of highly general concepts like
surgical mortality and effectiveness. In contrast, to resolve the tradeoff we would
need to specify the particular disease and surgery under consideration. For tradeoff
formulation, it is possible to reason at abstract levels because the conclusions are
valid in general situations.
Decision making generally requires precise assessments of such magnitudes as the
relative desirability of living with the disease compared to death. The qualitative
assertions needed for tradeoff formulation, for example, "more severe disease is less
desirable," typically hold with much greater confidence.
Qualitative assertions hold in a wide variety of contexts-diseases are bad for
patients of all ages, sizes, and shapes. The magnitude assessments, in contrast, of-
ten depend on these and other known patient features. The context-insensitivity of
qualitative properties translates to significant modularity advantages in representing
tradeoff formulation knowledge.
Ezplanation. A program strengthens its justifications by relying on the weakest
premises. An explanation of a non-tradeoff, therefore, should avoid reference to the
stronger assertions employed for tradeoff resolution. In addition to being more con-
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troversial, an argument in terms of an overly powerful mechanism fails to reflect the
salient issues in a decision. Ruling out the strategy "operate only if surgery will be
ineffective" on the basis of a low evaluation score overlooks the commonsense reason
for rejecting this policy.
Efficiency. In a large knowledge-based decision system, recognizing classes of in-
admissible plans at a high level before applying general decision methods may improve
performance. The advantages of precompiling the admissible plan space can be great
when a large fraction of the syntactically valid plans are nonsensical.
This thesis describes an implemented tradeoff formulator, called SUDO-PLANNER,
and the role of tradeoff formulation in a general architecture for planning. SUDO-
PLANNER (the Synergy-driven, Utilitarian, Dominance-Oriented Planner) employs
decision-theoretic principles to formulate tradeoffs in domains characterized by par-
tially satisfiable goals and actions with uncertain effects.
1.2 An Example
A patient with a known history of coronary artery disease (CAD) and cerebrovas-
cular disease (CVD) presents with a large abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA). 2 The
aneurysm is a dilatation of the arterial wall of the aorta, of concern because it could
rupture causing death. There is a surgical procedure to repair the AAA, but this
carries the risk of operative mortality or disability. The operation is especially risky
for this patient because the CAD increases the likelihood of a heart attack (MI, for
myocardial infarction) during AAA surgery and the CVD enhances the probability of
a stroke.
Other available actions include tests and treatments to gauge and alleviate the
2This case is taken from the files of clinical decision consultations of the Division of Clinical
Decision Making at the New England Medical Center [26]. In previous work, I have used the manual
formulation of this decision problem to illustrate mechanisms for reasoning about preferences [156].
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CAD and CVD. Table 1.1 lists the major events and actions discussed in this example.
Test
catheterization
arteriography
Assoc. Event
rupture
MI
stroke
Treatment
AAA repair
CABG
endarterectomy
Table 1.1: Events and actions associated with each disease in the example case.
The tradeoff formulation task for this case is simply to characterize the space of
reasonable therapy strategies. Although we cannot tell from the given information
whether AAA repair is recommended, we can determine that our willingness to per-
form the surgery should increase with the aneurysm's size, because larger aneurysms
are more likely to rupture. On the other hand, indications from the diagnostic tests
that the underlying diseases are worse would argue against fixing the aneurysm. From
this we can conclude, for example, that the strategy "perform AAA repair if and only
if catheterization reveals severe CAD" is inadmissible.
Some strategies include treatment of one or both of the underlying diseases before
proceeding with the AAA surgery. A coronary artery bypass graft (CABG), for
example, could be performed to treat the CAD and therefore reduce the risk of MI
during AAA repair. To alleviate the risk of stroke, the patient's CVD might be
treated with carotid endarterectomy, a procedure to clean out vessels leading to the
brain.
Our willingness to perform these treatments is positively influenced by the severity
of the underlying diseases as indicated by the test results. Therefore, there is some
threshold value (CAD 1 in Figure 1.1a) for CAD extent as measured by catheterization
beyond which CABG is recommended.3 Because CAD extent is an argument against
3To ensure that the threshold is well-defined, we assume there exists an ordered scale for CAD
extent. The discussion here and throughout the thesis also assumes that the CAD is not so extensive
as to be untreatable.
Disease
AAA
CAD
CVD
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AAA repair, the CAD threshold policy for this procedure is reversed. As shown in
Figure 1.1b, the repair should be performed if catheterization indicates CAD less than
CAD 2, but not otherwise.
II 
A
(a)
(b)
No CABG CABG
No CAD CAD
No CAD CAD1 Max CAD
AAA Repair No AAA Repair
II' 1r .
No CAD CAD2  Max CAD
Figure 1.1: Threshold policies: (a) Perform CABG if CAD is greater than CAD 1. (b)
Perform AAA repair if CAD is less than CAD2 . The accordion lines indicate that the box
widths convey no scale information.
Finally, the tradeoff formulator must take into account interactions among the
actions. The CAD threshold for an action is really a function of the other actions
performed and other observations. In this case, because CABG alleviates the CAD,
the threshold for AAA repair given CABG must be at least as high as the threshold
given No CABG. In other words, CAD 2(CABG) Ž> CAD 2(No CABG)-performing
CABG shifts the threshold to the right. Thus, if aneurysm repair is recommended
for three-vessel disease (CAD extending to three coronary vessels) without CABG, it
must also be recommended after a triple-bypass is performed.
1.3 Barriers to Tradeoff Formulation
Most research on decision formulation is oriented toward aiding human decision mak-
ers. The research on autonomous decision-making that takes formulation seriously
also tends to treat this phase as necessarily heuristic, domain-dependent, and separate
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from the task of choosing among alternatives. The common view of the formulation
task is as generator in a generate-and-test planning architecture.
The approach described here departs from the common view by treating the for-
mulation task as a formal decision problem no different from choice within a more
refined set of options. Because of this uniformity, plans are constructed according
to the same set of principles used to compare them. Nevertheless, we can exploit
the advantages mentioned above by recognizing the decisions that do not require the
precise, context-sensitive knowledge needed for tradeoff resolution.
The next three sections discuss central problems in automating the reasoning be-
hind the tradeoff formulation behavior illustrated above. The solutions incorporated
in SUDO-PLANNER represent the primary technical contributions of this work. The
problems are not specific to formulation; they arise in the broader task of planning
under uncertainty for partially satisfiable goals. I present the problems in their full
generality, even though the "SUDO solutions" that follow do not always match them
in scope. Nevertheless, while SUDO-PLANNER only plans "up to tradeoffs," some of
the mechanisms developed to deal with these problems are applicable to the broader
planning problem as well.
1.4 Uncertainty and Partial Goal Satisfaction
Classical AI robot planners solve problems by searching for a plan of action guaranteed
to transform the initial situation into one that satisfies some goal predicate. Robots
taking this approach in the real world are likely to be defeated because the classical
paradigm has nothing to say when a guaranteed plan cannot be found, or when one
does not exist. Such situations are typical for two reasons:
1. Knowledge of the world is imperfect; in practice it is not possible to guarantee
much about the result of performing actions in a given situation.
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2. Predicates on world states cannot express reasonable goals for real-world agents.
1.4.1 Problem: Uncertain Effects of Actions
The classical planning paradigm is categorical. Although there may be uncertainty
implicit in the incompleteness of the planner's theory, there is no provision for ex-
pressing anything about the degree to which an event is likely and its relationship to
other uncertain events.
Categorical planners have the luxury of deductive inference. While it is impos-
sible to derive everything true about the result of applying an action in a situation,
many logical consequences of pre- and post-conditions can be derived. When the
logical , operties of a plan provably entail the goal, the planner succeeds. Figure 1.2
diagrams this planning paradigm.
initial situation
axioms
plan axioms -- *
deductive
inference
engine
theorems about
- final situation
Figure 1.2: Categorical planning. Situations and actions are described by axioms. The
task is to find a plan that achieves the goal predicate G in the final situation.
Because the effects of actions in the world are uncertain-at least from any robot's
perspective-it is rarely possible to establish with certainty that a given plan will
ensure that its goal G holds in the final situation. Failing this, a robot must consider
the probability of achieving the goal with the various courses of action open to it.4
4McCarthy and Hayes, in the classic paper on classical planning [88, page 490], recognize that
"the formalism will eventually have to allow statements about the probabilities of events." More
often recalled from that discussion is their declaration that numerical probabilities are "epistemo-
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It would appear that taking this notion seriously alters our basic planning picture
dramatically. The robot must keep track of the various possible situations resulting
from executing a plan and their probabilities. One way to do this, illustrated in
Figure 1.3, is to relate a given plan to the likelihood that the goal is satisfied after its
execution via a probabilistic model.
initial situation
description
plan
description
probabilistic
model
distribution over
final situation
descriptions
Figure 1.3: Planning under uncertainty. A probabilistic model relates plans to outcomes.
The task is to find the plan with the greatest probability of achieving G.
A major problem with this approach is the difficulty of representing knowledge
required to generate probabilistic predictions. While research on categorical planning
has produced modular representations that associate all knowledge with individual
actions, such encodings are more difficult to create for the uncertain case. I return to
this issue in Section 1.5.
Given a probabilistic model, the task presented by Figure 1.3 may still be com-
putationally less attractive than that of Figure 1.2. In categorical planning, search
can be terminated as soon as a plan guaranteed to achieve the aspiration level G is
found. In general, optimizing is harder than satisficing [132]. The stopping criteria
for planning under uncertainty are stricter because it is rarely possible to determine
locally that a given plan maximizes the probability of goal achievement.
logically inadequate." This latter statement, however, was an objection to the proposal that the
basic knowledge representation should attach probabilities to all sentences, an objection strongly en-
dorsed in Section 1.5.1 below. It is unfortunate that subsequent work in AI planning has proceeded
virtually as if likelihood did not matter.
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We can avoid this problem by satisficing on the probability of goal satisfaction.
This approach retains the predicate representation of goals (here the predicate con-
tains statements about likelihood), but it is ultimately unsatisfactory for the reasons
presented below.
1.4.2 Problem: Goals are not Predicates
Even if the difficulties related to uncertainty could be overcome, serious obstacles to
planning within the classic framework would remain. Rarely will the robot limit its
cares to the probability of a particular goal predicate being satisfied in the plan result
state. Instead, the degree to which a goal is satisfied may vary, or several objectives
may be achieved in partial measure. Achieving a goal with probability less than unity
is one important kind of partial satisfiability, but there are others as well.
The inadequacy of a predicate representation is apparent as soon as we attempt to
express the goals relevant to our medical example. Broadly speaking, our objectives
are to maximize lifespan and achieve the best quality of life by minimizing disabilities
and other health problems. Predicates on world situations can only divide them into
situations in which the objectives are satisfied and situations in which they are not.
This binary classification cannot capture even the basic preference for longer lifespans.
Even when it is heuristically advantageous to plan according to aspiration levels, an
agent should also have access to some representation of its actual preferences.
While it may have appeared possible to salvage much of the basic planning
paradigm while admitting uncertainty, the deficiency of goal predicates undermines
the fundamental structure of the methodology. Some actual planners have tried to
patch this hole in the framework by including heuristic rules to handle anticipated
planning decisions. McDermott's NASL [89], for example, uses choice rules to arbitrate
among alternative task reduction paths that arise in planning. As McDermott recog-
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nizes, such an approach is vulnerable to harmful interactions with other eventualities
in the planning environment, as is any scheme that associates actions directly with
situations. The only way to cope with unanticipated choice contexts is to consider
explicitly the predicted effects of actions and select among the alternatives according
to a more general decision criterion.
1.4.3 Problem: Decision Theory and Planning
At this point we might reconsider whether it makes sense to adopt the planning
paradigm at all. Indeed, it may seem that I have been setting up a straw man all
along; it should have been obvious from the start that traditional planning methods
are not up to the general task of planning under uncertainty with multiple objectives.
A decision criterion of the generality required is provided by Bayesian decision the-
ory [121]. Decision theory replaces the goal predicate with a utility function mapping
outcomes to real numbers (called utilities), and prescribes maximization of expected
utility for decision making. The general picture is the same as Figure 1.3, augmented
with a utility model for evaluating the final-situation descriptions.
With or without uncertainty, planning with decision theory inherits the compu-
tational problems of the optimization task mentioned above. In practice, decision-
theoretic applications (using the methodology of decision analysis [109]) have been
possible only because the set of alternatives is manually restricted to a small collection
of strategies. This is precisely the formulation task we are trying to automate.
The space of alternatives available to an AI planner is usually specified indirectly
as those generable from a given collection of primitive actions within the syntax of a
plan language. This is typically an enormous combinatorial space, with nonsensical
plans forming a large fraction of the syntactically allowed strategies. AI planning re-
search has concentrated on techniques to construct complex strategies from primitive
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actions by searching this space.
Charniak and McDermott [13, page 523] say the following about the relationship
between decision theory and planning:
One might think that an elegant theory of this kind would have been
assimilated into robot planners, but this has so far not been the case.
The issues addressed by the two approaches are complementary. Planning
research has focused on how plans are constructed; decision theory has
focused on how they are evaluated.
Combining the two methodologies is difficult because in the ideal integration they are
mutually dependent. Conventional application of decision theory requires a restricted
plan set, but supplying one is precisely the formulation problem we are trying to
solve. Principled plan construction calls for a decision criterion with the generality
of expected utility maximization, even at the earliest formulation stages.
Previous attempts to apply decision theory to planning have avoided this appar-
ent paradox in one of two ways. The first approach employs heuristic methods to
generate a restricted plan set without reference to decision-theoretic criteria [60]. For
example, the generate-and-test architecture of ONYX [76] completely separates the
decision-theoretic evaluation module from the candidate generator. This separation
is ultimately unsatisfactory because the heuristic generator cannot justify its decisions
with respect to the agent's objectives.
The second approach adds restrictions on the form of probability and utility mod-
els to fit particular planning algorithms. For example, Feldman and Sproull [29]
present some techniques that inherently take the utility of a plan to be additive in
its steps. Prerequisites of this strength are rarely satisfied by planning problems, and
therefore cannot serve as the basis for domain-independent planning architectures.
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1.4.4 SUDO Solution: A Dominance-Proving Architecture
for Planning with Partially Satisfiable Goals
The key to resolving the paradox above is to change the perspective of the planner
from evaluating the results of individual plans to reasoning about the admissibility,
or reasonableness, of plan classes. Rather than viewing probability and utility models
as pieces of a static absolute evaluator, the SUDO-PLANNER architecture uses decision
theory to establish the relative value of plans.
initial situation
description
action
descriptions
dominance
prover
theorems about
plan class
admissibility
Figure 1.4: SUDO planning. The task is to characterize the space of admissible plans.
As illustrated in Figure 1.4, SUDO-PLANNER applies a dominance prover to char-
acterize the space of admissible plans. The dominance prover uses knowledge about
the effects of actions and the relative desirability of outcomes to derive facts about
the preferred plan. In our AAA case, for example, among the plans that include
CABG conditional on the result of catheterization, the dominance prover determines
that the condition must call for CABG to be performed whenever the indicated CAD
is more extensive than some threshold value. Nonsensical plans that include CABG
for mild CAD but not for severe CAD (all else being equal) are therefore deemed
inadmissible.
In order to express results of this sort, we need a representation for classes of
plans. The dominance result above refers to the classes "plans with catheterization"
and "plans with CABG conditional on catheterization result," among others. SUDO-
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PLANNER encodes these classes by the series of constraints that distinguish them
from other plan classes. A partial plan produced by a conventional constraint-posting
planner can be viewed as an abstract representation of the set of all plans generated
by its potential completions.
The class of plans with "CABG if catheterization result is above threshold" is
a subclass of those that include catheterization with no further restrictions. SUDO-
PLANNER maintains a plan graph that partially orders the plan classes by generality.
This data structure, annotated with results derived by the dominance prover, repre-
sents the space of admissible plans.
The concept of plan class dominance is founded on the basic decision-theoretic
notion of a preference relation. A preference order on prospective outcomes provides
the flexibility (notably absent from situation predicates) required to express the par-
tial satisfiability of goals. By appropriately constraining the preference order, we
can specify, for example, that longer lifetimes are preferred to shorter ones, and that
disabilities are undesirable.
To prove dominance, the planner needs to relate some feature of plans to the pref-
erence order on prospective outcomes, and hence to expected utility. Once identified,
this relation can be incorporated into the plan graph by recording the dominance con-
dition on the appropriate plan classes. Using the fact that dominance is inherited in
the plan graph (as well as other properties of the formal definition of dominance, pre-
sented in Section 2.3), the implications of this result are propagated to other related
plan classes.
In tradeoff formulation, the dominance prover's task is to detect inadmissible plan
classes by applying the planner's qualitative knowledge of the effects of actions. Ide-
ally, at the end of tradeoff formulation the plan graph includes dominance conditions
ruling out these strategies. Figure 1.5 shows a piece of the plan graph derived by
SUDO-PLANNER for the AAA/CAD/CVD example of Section 1.2.
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All plans
AAA repair? catheterization CABG?
II+(repair, size) repair? cath cath, CABG?
R R
II- (repair, CAD) II+(CABG, CAD)
Figure 1.5: A plan graph fragment for tradeoff formulation in the AAA/CAD/CVD ex-
ample.
Because I have not yet defined the plan and constraint languages, the plan classes
in Figure 1.5 are informally described. The graph is a partial order on its classes,
with the most general on top. Thus, the class of plans where AAA repair is under
consideration ("AAA repair?") is a subclass of the universal plan class and a su-
perclass of those in which the repair policy is a monotonically increasing function of
the aneurysm size. The R annotation on the specialization link indicates that the
dominance prover has derived a restriction relation (defined in Section 2.3), which
implies that the planner can limit its attention to policies of the specialized form.
A complete discussion of the dominance-proving architecture, including formal
definitions of the various relations mentioned here, appears in Chapter 2. The par-
ticular representations for plan classes employed by SUDO-PLANNER are introduced
in Chapter 3.
1.5 Representations for Uncertain Knowledge
The dominance-proving architecture provides a framework for planning under uncer-
tainty with partially satisfiable goals. However, the performance of the dominance
prover depends critically on effective representations for the effects of actions and
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the desirability of outcomes. We have already seen that representations from classi-
cal planning are inapplicable to reasoning about uncertain events. In this section, I
argue that traditional decision-analytic models are also insufficient for knowledge rep-
resentation, and sketch the ideas behind the qualitative probabilistic networks that
support tradeoff formulation in SUDO-PLANNER.
1.5.1 Problem: Decision Models are not Knowledge Bases
For purposes of decision making, a complete knowledge base (KB) specifies the joint
probability distribution of all relevant actions and events. A probabilistic model is a
representation from which a joint distribution (or parts thereof) can be computed in
a reasonably direct manner. Researchers in decision analysis have developed repre-
sentations called decision models, essentially probabilistic models augmented with a
specification of preferences for the joint events.
Decision models are the obvious candidate for a knowledge representation to
support planning under uncertainty. Recent advances in mechanisms for encoding
and evaluating probabilistic and decision models, particularly the belief networks
of Pearl [101, 103], have led to increasing interest in them within the AI research
community.5 From a knowledge engineering perspective, however, the idea of a deci-
sion model as a knowledge base has serious drawbacks.
The main problem is scalability. It appears feasible to build decision models
of modest size, perhaps approaching the scope of today's expert systems [2, 53].
Knowledge bases in this range constrain the problem solver to a narrow decision
context applicable only to a restricted set of selected cases. The more ambitious goal
of building planners that operate with near autonomy over a broad range of decision
SAlthough a variety of other modeling formalisms exist, belief networks and the related influence
diagram representation [61, 123] are sufficiently representative that little generality is lost by devoting
exclusive attention to them in the following arguments.
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environments calls for significantly larger knowledge bases. For example, to avoid the
manual pre-selection of cases currently required by medical expert systems, a therapy
planner would need at least the knowledge of a general practitioner to determine
which specialized domain knowledge is relevant and applicable for a given patient.
More general autonomous reasoners require a huge body of commonsense and world
knowledge, perhaps on the order of Lenat's cYc KB [80].
There are several reasons to expect that decision models will not be viable knowl-
edge representations for robot planners expected to work over a broad range of de-
cision contexts. I discuss two of them as subproblems below and describe how these
issues have influenced the design of SUDO-PLANNER.
1.5.2 Subproblem: Pre-Enumeration of Relevant Variables
Figure 1.6 depicts a belief network fragment presented by Kim and Pearl [70] to
illustrate their representation. In the problem under consideration, an agent named
Mr. Holmes gets a phone call from his neighbor reporting that his burglar alarm
has sounded. He also hears a radio announcement of an earthquake in the vicinity,
suggesting a possible cause of the alarm. The belief network models the relationship
between the proposition that the Holmes home has been burglarized and the other
factors in this situation.
Though it may be a perfectly suitable representation for this particular problem,
it is unreasonable to expect that this model fragment would be available as a piece of
some giant belief network KB supporting Mr. Holmes's generally intelligent behavior.
Such a knowledge base commits the reasoner to a pre-enumerated set of parameters
describing the relevant actions and events, and therefore could only apply to a narrow
set of anticipated situations.
Imagine a KB designed to support general problem-solving about burglar alarms
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Figure 1.6: Fragment of a belief network for the burglar alarm problem.
and earthquakes. We would expect that a reasoner able to handle the problem de-
scribed above should also behave reasonably when, for instance, some other neighbor
makes the call, the situation takes place at night rather than day, Mr. Holmes is at
some other location, or an earthquake or burglary occurred the previous day. While
it is certainly possible to identify variables and relationships to encode each of these
problem features, including all conceivably useful parameters in a static network KB
would be infeasible.
Formally, the issue is analogous to the limitations of propositional as compared to
first-order logic. If one could pre-enumerate a finite set of relevant atomic formulas,
first-order quantification constructs would be superfluous. The ability to express
facts about abstract situations without reference to complete detail, however, has
proven to be essential in knowledge representation. Instantiation mechanisms to
apply knowledge in this form to particular situations are part of every automated
reasoning program.
A small increment of generality can be obtained through the use of template
models. Templating supports a rigid form of instantiation where the parameter re-
placement paths are in effect hard-wired in advance. The set of parameters provided
is restricted, and the topology of relationships is fixed.
Mr. Holmes could not be easily realized by a template. To handle the range
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of natural problem variants mentioned above, he would be best served by a large
general body of knowledge about communication acts, news reporting, and alarm
mechanisms. The ultimate pattern of instantiation from this general knowledge to
concrete parameters for a given problem cannot be predicted.
1.5.3 SUDO Solution: Customized Model Construction
We can solve the pre-enumeration problem without dismissing decision models al-
together by dynamically constructing models in response to the problem at hand.
In this approach, the decision model is viewed as a target representation, not as a
language for the KB itself.
Aside from the basic feasibility issue, customized decision models offer important
advantages over monolithic decision-model knowledge bases. A model covering more
than a narrow body of decision contexts would be inappropriate for any particular
planning problem because the extraneous features entail an unnecessary computa-
tional burden and obscure explanations of the result. General models cannot take
advantage of simplifying features that-while present in any given decision problem-
vary from case to case.
The task of building customized models raises a wide range of issues, discussed in
Section 1.6 below.
1.5.4 Subproblem: Non-Modularity of Probabilistic Asser-
tions
The second major difficulty with decision models as KBs is the fundamental non-
modularity of probabilistic assertions [51]. Unlike logical implications, statements of
conditional probability cannot be combined without further information or assump-
tions about interactions among the conditions. Whereas in pure logical inference the
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derivation path leading to a fact is irrelevant to further conclusions, 6 under uncer-
tainty the source of belief in a proposition may strongly affect its relation to other
statements [102].
A consequence of this observation is that probabilistic assertions are highly sensi-
tive to context. The association between a symptom and a disease generally depends
on the patient's age, sex, and a host of other features. To support reasoning about the
broad mix of patients naturally arising in practice, knowledge relating the symptom
and disease must take these features into account. In the worst case (and perhaps
the typical case), the probabilistic model requires a size exponential in the number
of patient features [60, 144].
Expert systems and decision-analytic models cope with this problem by adopting
narrow scopes. Problems are described by a relatively small number of parameters
describing the important factors in the program's specialized domain. Other fea-
tures are considered irrelevant or are implicitly taken into account as "background
knowledge." The latter approach is reasonable as long as the population of cases fed
to the program is homogeneous with respect to the background features. Builders
of probabilistic systems for medical diagnosis have found that models validated for
the population of a particular community cannot be reliably transported to medical
centers with demographic differences [135].
1.5.5 SUDO Solution: A Qualitative Representation for
Uncertainty
Another way to cope with non-modularity is to isolate some relatively context-
insensitive components of probabilistic assertions and reason with these as far as
6The inadequacy of standard logical formalisms for representing real-world planning knowledge
has led AI researchers to develop nonmonotonic logics that do not have this locality property and
therefore share the modularity problems of probabilistic representations.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
possible before resorting to knowledge encoded in less convenient representations.
This approach is especially attractive for the task considered here because, as sug-
gested in Section 1.1, knowledge required for tradeoff formulation is considerably more
modular than that necessary for complete decision-making.
The Qualitative Probabilistic Network (QPN) formalism is designed to support
precisely the knowledge required for tradeoff formulation. QPNs are abstractions
of numeric probabilistic networks that encode only qualitative constraints on the
joint probability distribution over the variables. Although these constraints do not
determine probabilities uniquely, they support relative likelihood conclusions that are
sufficient for the dominance results SUDO-PLANNER uses to characterize plan class
admissibility.
QPNs contain two basic kinds of qualitative relationship. Qualitative influences
describe the direction of the relationship between two variables. Qualitative synergies
describe interactions among influences. The qualitative nature of these relationships
affords robustness through context-insensitivity. While the precise numeric magni-
tude of the relationship between a symptom and a disease tends to vary with other
factors, the direction of the relationship is often unaffected. For example, assessing
the implications of a cardiac stress test on the probability of CAD requires consid-
eration of the patient's age and smoking habits, among many other factors. On the
other hand, the direction of the relation between test parameters and coronary dis-
ease is context-independent: for any given age and smoking behavior, CAD tends to
decrease a patient's exercise tolerance.
An example of qualitative synergy is the interaction between AAA repair and
CAD in their effect on MI. Both variables have a positive influence on MI: CAD
increases the likelihood of a heart attack in any situation, and AAA repair increases
MI risk for any given patient. The positive qualitative synergy, depicted in Figure 1.7
as a boxed plus sign connecting the two nodes to MI, holds because these influences
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are mutually reinforcing. That is, the increase in MI risk due to surgery for the
aneurysm is greater for patients with more severe CAD. In other words, the expected
joint effect on MI of increasing both CAD and AAA repair is greater than the sum
of the two effects taken independently.
Figure 1.7: AAA repair and CAD are positively synergistic on MI. The rectangular node
repair is a decision variable and the circular nodes are event variables beyond the planner's
direct control.
Qualitative relations of this sort provide the basis for tradeoff formulation in SUDO-
PLANNER. Because of their comparative modularity, a KB comprised of these con-
structs is more easily scaled up than one based on precise probabilistic assertions.
Extending the KB to cover other cardiac disorders, for example, would not require
modification of the CAD/stress-test relation, nor would a relocation of the reasoning
system to a demographically dissimilar environment. This phenomenon is not merely
an artifact of applying less precision; arbitrary weakenings of the assertions would of-
fer meager modularity gains. Robustness depends on the extent to which qualitative
relations capture causal structure in the domain.
Figure 1.8 illustrates a QPN for part of our AAA example. The network consists
of four variables and the relationships among them. The decision variable repair
represents the proposition that surgery to fix the aneurysm is performed. Repair has
a negative influence on rupt, because surgery decreases the probability of aneurysm
rupture. The size of the aneurysm, on the other hand, has a positive relation to rupt.
The undesirability of ruptures is captured in the network by the negative link from
low
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rupt to the special value variable v (the hexagonal node in QPN diagrams). The
negative influence from repair to v indicates that, aside from its known beneficial
influence on ruptures, the effects of AAA surgery are undesirable.
Figure 1.8: Qualitative probabilistic network for part of the AAA example.
The network also includes two qualitative synergies. First, repair and size are
negatively synergistic on rupt. This statement means that the larger the aneurysm,
the larger the negative influence of repair on rupture probability. A symmetric per-
spective is that performing the repair lessens the positive influence of size on rupt.
Second, repair and rupt are positively synergistic on v because the negative effects of
surgery are less important when ruptures occur.
Formal probabilistic definitions of these qualitative relations, along with a de-
scription of the QPN inference mechanisms, appear in Chapter 4. Inference in QPNs
consists primarily of reduction rules for combining influences and synergies to de-
rive the relations among indirectly related variables. For this network, reducing rupt
reveals that repair and size are positively synergistic on v, which implies that the
optimal repair policy is an increasing function of size. This simple conclusion is the
dominance result derived by SUDO-PLANNER and posted on the leftmost path down
the plan graph of Figure 1.5.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.6 Constructing Decision Models
Part of our solution to the unsuitability of decision models as knowledge bases calls
for dynamically constructing models from more reasonable knowledge representations.
Previous attempts to automate the model generation task (reviewed in Section 6.5),
however, have uncovered some serious obstacles to the goal.
1.6.1 Problem: Avoid Exhaustive Model Construction
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to automated model construction is the difficulty of
avoiding exhaustive inclusion in the model of every factor in the KB. Because a
model is effectively a closed world (that is, reasoners or evaluators apply a closed-
world assumption when operating on the model), failure to include a factor is only
justified when that factor is irrelevant to the task. However, it is typically difficult to
establish that a given factor is irrelevant. In medicine, for example, it seems that any
event can be related to any other by some conceivable path of associations. It would
be surprising to find a large medical KB with significant disconnected components.
Reasoning with decision models cannot commence until the model is completed, or
"closed." An exhaustivity constraint, therefore, delays the production of any results
whatsoever from the planner. Worse, the KB could easily specify an infinite number
of potentially relevant factors for inclusion in the model.
Paradoxically, this suggests that tractable models will only be generated by pro-
grams with small knowledge bases. In contrast, human decision analysts and knowl-
edge engineers are capable of producing models and expert systems for customized
tasks despite their knowledge of neighboring domains not included in their systems.
To achieve similarly selective behavior, an automatic model builder requires a win-
nowing strategy, ideally based on sound decision-theoretic principles.
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1.6.2 SUDO Solution: Model Construction at Multiple Lev-
els of Abstraction
One powerful technique for selective model construction is abstraction. A valid ab-
straction is a license to ignore detail. Even detail that is relevant to the planning
task as a whole need not be considered for every subtask. A planner can derive use-
ful dominance results at high levels of abstraction before considering more detailed
problem features.
For example, the direct negative link from repair to v in Figure 1.8 is based on
knowledge found at the upper abstraction levels. Potentially undesirable consequences
are associated with all treatments; AAA repair inherits the qualitative influence by
virtue of its place in the action taxonomy. The more detailed description of the unde-
sirable consequences of this treatment-possible surgical mortality, MI, or stroke-is
inessential to SUDO-PLANNER's derivation of the threshold policy for aneurysm size,
discussed above.
Explicit consideration of these specific events, however, is required to solve other
pieces of this planning problem. For example, the relevance of CAD to the AAA-repair
decision becomes apparent only when we introduce the variable MI as an event along
the path from repair to v, shown in Figure 1.9.' Based on the derived implications
of CAD, SUDO-PLANNER determines whether to pursue the possibility of performing
CABG to decrease the risk of MI during AAA repair.
A planner capable of model-building at multiple levels of abstraction can tailor a
separate model for each distinct issue it faces in designing a plan. This permits the
reasoner to avoid simultaneous consideration of all the factors potentially relevant to
'The QPNs of Figures 1.8 and 1.9 are simplified for expository purposes from the networks directly
constructed by SUDO-PLANNER. They are equivalent, however, to intermediate models produced by
dominance-proving operations on the actual QPNs. The full account of SUDO-PLANNER's behavior
on this example is presented in Chapter 8.
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Figure 1.9: Explicit consideration of MI and CAD in the model.
the planning problem.
SUDO-PLANNER traverses its multilevel KB to generate a series of QPN models
for analysis. Search is driven by the goal of deriving useful qualitative synergies.
SUDO-PLANNER does not employ any sophisticated control strategies to optimize the
path of model generation. s
As illustrated by the example, abstraction is central to SUDO-PLANNER's ability to
derive useful dominance results early in the planning process. Without this feature,
planning from decision models would be infeasible for large knowledge bases.
For a complete description of the model construction algorithm, see Chapter 6.
Although the current methods are sufficient to demonstrate some interesting multi-
levelbehavior, the model construction component of SUDO-PLANNER is not the final
word in decision model generation. Experience with this task has suggested a set of
desiderata for multilevel reasoning (presented in Section 6.1) that offer perspective
on the competence of SUDO-PLANNER, the status of other AI work on abstraction,
and promising topics for further research in this area.
SAlthough attention to this issue will undoubtedly be important as the KB grows, reliance on an
optimized model generation procedure for a problem of the size demonstrated here would indicate
extreme fragility.
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1.7 SUDO-Planner Overview
1.7.1 Basic Architecture
Figure 1.10 illustrates the input/output behavior of SUDO-PLANNER. Planning prob-
lems are described in terms of changes. Assuming that current strategy is opti-
mal given current knowledge, 9 any plan modifications must be grounded in situation
changes.
model (QPN)
construction
problem
description / plan graph
dominance proving
Figure 1.10: High-level behavior of SUDO-PLANNER.
SUDO-PLANNER's reasoning process consists of a repeating cycle of model con-
struction and dominance proving. The dominance prover posts its conclusions on the
plan graph as they are derived. The undominated fringe of the plan graph represents
the space of admissible plans, which is the output of the tradeoff formulation process.
This process does not necessarily terminate at some natural point; SUDO-PLANNER
will continue to generate QPNs as long as there are potentially relevant variables in
the KB.
1.7.2 SUDO-Planner on the Running Example
For the example case, SUDO-PLANNER is told only that the variable AAA size has
changed. The initial model generated is the trivial QPN shown in Figure 1.11, which
9The application of this assumption is discussed in Section 6.4.
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says only that aneurysm growth is bad.
size : UV
Figure 1.11: Initial qualitative probabilistic network for the example.
As it evolves the model, SUDO-PLANNER derives facts about plan class dominance,
including, for example, that the AAA repair strategy should be a threshold policy
on aneurysm size. Along the way, the program encounters some subtle tradeoffs, not
resolvable by qualitative information alone. Given resolutions for these (discussed fur-
ther in Section 7.4), SUDO-PLANNER proceeds to generate further dominance results.
The QPN for this problem eventually reaches the complexity of Figure 1.12. The final
plan graph incorporates all of the conclusions mentioned informally in Section 1.2,
including the restriction relations shown in Figure 1.5.
1.7.3 Contributions of SUDO-Planner
The contributions of this research are the "SUDO solutions" presented in Sections
1.4 through 1.6. The main technical developments are in the dominance-proving
planning architecture (Chapter 2) and the qualitative probabilistic network formalism
(Chapter 4). Less tangible products of this work include:
* Identification of the tradeoff formulation task and its role in planning.
* Design and analysis of knowledge representations for plan classes, actions, and
the effects of actions.
* Exploration of issues in the automatic construction of decision models.
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Figure 1.12: Exhaustive QPN for the AAA/CAD/CVD example.
* Demonstration of representations and reasoning strategies that effectively ex-
ploit knowledge at multiple levels of abstraction.
1.8 Thesis Preview
This introductory chapter has provided a broad perspective on the tradeoff formula-
tion task, problems with current technology, and the solution approaches offered by
SUDO-PLANNER. The remainder of the dissertation provides the details.
Chapter 2 introduces a dominance-proving framework for planning with partially
satisfiable goals. Although illustrated primarily with examples from SUDO-PLANNER,
the dominance-proving architecture is presented more generally, allowing for applica-
tion to tasks other than tradeoff formulation. The chapter includes a generic spec-
ification for the architecture components, which is instantiated for the particular
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SUDO-PLANNER mechanisms in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 3 describes the representations for plans, plan classes, and actions in
SUDO-PLANNER. Discussion of the design decisions involved emphasizes the impli-
cations on computational complexity within the dominance-proving architecture of
Chapter 2.
The qualitative probabilistic network formalism is motivated, rigorously defined,
and illustrated in Chapter 4. The probabilistic semantics of qualitative influences and
synergies justify efficient, powerful QPN inference procedures, as well as decision-
theoretic results derived by SUDO-PLANNER's dominance prover. Like Chapter 2,
this chapter is presented in a self-contained fashion because the results are applicable
outside the scope of SUDO-PLANNER.
Some of the most difficult knowledge representation issues arise in specifying the
effects of actions, the subject of Chapter 5. The chapter includes detailed descriptions
of constructs for asserting effects in the SUDO-PLANNER KB, as well as discussion of
the broader epistemological issues surrounding their design.
SUDO-PLANNER's techniques for automatic model construction at multiple levels
of abstraction are presented in Chapter 6. To evaluate the performance of these
methods, I consider properties of an ideal multilevel reasoning system and compare
SUDO-PLANNER to other AI work in this area.
Chapter 7 focuses on the dominance-proving component of SUDO-PLANNER. Some
subtle tradeoffs encountered in the running medical example are presented and ana-
lyzed. The example demonstrates how SUDO-PLANNER can proceed from these ap-
parent dead ends by incorporating externally supplied tradeoff resolutions.
Chapter 8 presents SUDO-PLANNER's complete analysis of the running example.
Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation with a summary, a discussion of limita-
tions, and some speculation about further developments and the outlook for SUDO-
PLANNER.
Chapter 2
A Dominance-Proving
Architecture for Planning
I have argued above (Section 1.4) that the classical planning framework is inadequate
because goal predicates are not expressive enough for choice in the face of partially
satisfiable goals. Decision theory, in contrast, offers a sufficiently general plan se-
lection criterion, but says nothing about constructing plans from descriptions of the
effects of component actions. In this chapter, I present a framework for applying the
flexible decision-theoretic criterion in a constructive context by integrating a domi-
nance prover into the planning process.
Dominance-proving planners reason about possible courses of action by establish-
ing preference properties of classes of plans. The basic dominance-proving architec-
ture represents a general approach to planning for partially satisfiable goals. The
particular knowledge representations and dominance proving techniques employed by
SUDO-PLANNER, developed in subsequent chapters, apply specifically to tradeoff for-
mulation. In this chapter, I characterize the architecture abstractly, independent of
this or any other specialized planning task. The architecture is illustrated with a brief
discussion of SUDO-PLANNER's components. The final sections of the chapter discuss
general planning issues within this framework.
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2.1 The Plan Graph
Let Q be the set of all syntactically valid plans, called the universal plan class. For
example, if A = {ai,..., an} is an alphabet of primitive actions, then 0 = A* is the
class of linear plans. The class of nonlinear plans is similar, extended by a partial
order on plan steps. A plan class is any set of plans, II C 0. We sometimes call II a
partial plan, to emphasize its representation as a collection of constraints incompletely
specifying the plan of interest.
We can view the planning process as one of reasoning about properties of partial
plans formed by adding constraints to candidate plan classes. The partial plans
generated during the planning process can be organized in a specialization graph
according to the subset relation. An example of a plan specialization graph appears
in Figure 2.1. The node in the graph marked "A*alA*" denotes the set of all plans
with at least one instance of action ax. The set of plans starting with ax forms a
subclass, as does the set of plans with an a, followed by an a2.
A*aA* A*a2A* A*a3A*
alA* A*ala2A* A*ala3 A* A*a2a3 A*
Figure 2.1: A plan specialization graph.
2.2 Constraint-Posting Planning
The plan graph representation of a search space supports a constraint-posting ap-
proach to planning. A constraint-posting planner-illustrated best by Stefik's MOL-
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GEN [137]-refines the plan graph incrementally until some problem is solved regard-
ing the plan to be executed. With the traditional representation of goals as predi-
cates, the problem is to identify a satisfying plan. With partially satisfiable goals,
the problem is to find the best plan. But except for some special cases where conve-
nient optimization techniques are applicable, it is not possible to determine whether
a given plan is optimal by examining it in isolation. It may be more reasonable to
answer questions about the optimal plan, without necessarily constructing a complete
description. I consider the issue of reasoning objectives for a planner further in the
description of the dominance-proving architecture in Section 2.4.1.
A constraint-posting planner can be more efficient than a planner that only eval-
uates complete plans because eliminating a partial plan prunes an entire region of
the search space. However, this advantage depends on having some justification for
the constraints based on properties of the partial plan. For example, MOLGEN knows
that for a screen operation to be useful, it must select the appropriate bacteria.
Thus, when adding a screen step to a plan, MOLGEN is justified in posting a con-
straint of the form (resists antibiotic-1 bacterium-4). Constraining the antibiotic to
a particular chemical agent would be unjustifiably specific at this stage.
By adding only the constraints that have the best justifications, a planner imple-
ments a least commitment strategy. An extreme form of least commitment propagates
only provable properties of admissible plans. In practice, however, planners have to
make guesses when no provable constraints are available. The least commitment
heuristic tends to minimize both the likelihood of wrong guesses and the extent of
backtracking required to recover from such mistakes. A policy of working on plan
classes at upper tiers of the plan graph is a form of least commitment strategy because
the partial plans there are minimally constrained.
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2.3 Dominance in the Plan Graph
A dominance-proving planner is a constraint-posting planner that justifies constraints
by determining that the plan classes they define dominate other plan classes of inter-
est. To speak meaningfully of dominance among plan classes, we need to introduce
a preference relation, >-, over plans. In categorical planning, for example, one plan is
preferred to another if it achieves the goal and the other does not. To state this in
terms of the situation calculus [88], we write:
7rl - r2 n G(result(robot, ri, s,)) A -'G(result(robot, r2, Si)) (2.1)
G is the goal predicate, defined on situations resulting from the robot performing a
plan 7r in a given situation. Here si denotes the initial situation. Two plans that
both achieve or both do not achieve the goal are equally preferred, or indifferent,
denoted by ,. The expression 7r, b 7r2 means that rrl is preferred or indifferent to
7r2. Indifference is an equivalence relation, and 7rl >- 7r2 - • 7 - r 2 A 7rl L 7r2.
The preference relation characterizes the choice criterion employed by the planner.
A planner based on expected utility takes
1rl >- 7~2 * E [u(7r,)] > E [u(7r2)]. (2.2)
The discussion of dominance that follows does not depend on any particular criterion
for plan choice. We do need to assume, however, that the non-strict preference
relation, -, is a total order on plans.' Effective dominance proving may require
further regularities in the preference relation.
A class of plans dominates another if for any plan in the second class, there is some
plan in the first that is preferred or indifferent. Formally, the dominance relation is
given by the following.
1The architecture does not require that the planner be given a complete specification of the
preference relation. Indeed, for our purposes >- is merely a formal device for defining plan class
dominance.
CHAPTER 2. A DOMINANCE-PROVING ARCHITECTURE
Definition 2.1 (D) II1 dominates 112, written D(II1, II2), iff
Vr2 E II2 3rl E 111 rI __ 7r2 (2.3)
This definition leaves open the possibility that two plan classes be mutually domi-
nating. Also, it should be emphasized that it is possible to prove dominance without
identifying the particular superior plan irl corresponding to each r2.
The strict version of dominance, D', is defined similarly, except that a particular
plan in the first class is preferred to any in the second.2
Definition 2.2 (D') II1 strictly dominates 112, D'(II,I112), iff
37r E II1 V7r 2 E112 111 > 7r2  (2.4)
Strict dominance implies dominance. In addition, the properties below follow directly
from the definitions:
D is reflexive, transitive, and complete. (2.5)
D' is anti-reflexive and transitive (and therefore anti-symmetric). (2.6)
D(IIx, I12) -D'(2II, II) (2.7)
II2 C_ I1 =l D(III, 112) (2.8)
D(III,II12) A D(II3 , II4) =i D(II 1 U 113, II2 U 14) (2.9)
D(111,113) V D(112 , 113) #• D(III U 112, 113) (2.10)
D'(IIi, II2) A D(II2, I3) = D'n(II1, 113) (2.11)
2This difference is required by the possibility of infinite plan classes with no maximal elements.
If (2.4) were exactly a strict version of (2.3), then such a class would strictly dominate itself. For the
same reason, a definition of weak dominance which merely substituted > for >- in (2.4) would not
entail the reflexive property. Assuming that every plan class has a maximal plan is unreasonable,
even if it is appropriate to require that the universal class f) does.
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These properties serve as dominance propagation rules within the plan graph.
Plan classes trivially dominate their subclasses (2.8) because adding plans to a class
can only improve its optimum. By (2.8) and the transitivity of D, dominance by
a particular class is inherited in the plan graph. Strict dominance is also inherited,
by (2.8) and (2.11). Thus, markers or links indicating dominance relations need be
stored only at the upper envelope of classes to which they apply. Application of the
union properties (2.9 and 2.10), which also hold for D', propagate dominance upwards
in the graph
A plan class is restricted by asserting that it is weakly dominated by one of its
subsets. In the MOLGEN example given above, if II is the class of plans that include
the screen operation, and 112 is the subclass defined by posting the constraint (resists
antibiotic-1 bacterium-4), then D(II2, II) asserts that 112 restricts II1. The new
dominance assertion represents progress because it lets us focus our attention on a
smaller set of plans. Deriving these restrictions is an important task of the dominance
prover.
Constraints might be posted to explore the search space even though the domi-
nance relation does not provably hold. Often, such constraints are justified by identi-
fiable assumptions that imply dominance. We can express this case by asserting the
conditional dominance relation, Ds, for S an assumption proposition.
Definition 2.3 (Conditional Dominance) Ds(1 1,112)= S -=€ D(III,112).
Normal dominance is just Dtrue. As an example of conditional dominance, sup-
pose that we are uncertain about the identity of the organism of interest: it could be
bacterium-2 or bacterium-3. For i = 2 and 3, let Si be the proposition "Bacterium-i
is the organism of interest" and II the plan class that restricts II1 to those plans
in which the resists relation holds between antibiotic-1 and bacterium-i. Then
we have Ds2 (112,II1), Ds,(113, II), and S2 V S3 . Applying Definition 2.3, we get
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D(II2,II 1) V D(1 3 , 1I1). Property 2.10 yields the result D(II2 U 11H, II).
Of particular value are conditional dominance relations where S itself contains
dominance assertions. For example, if S1 =- D(II, 7 ), then Ds, (I12, II1) asserts that
if we know the optimal plan is in II, we can further confine attention to 1I2. 3 Rea-
soning of this form can be useful for deriving restriction relations. Indeed, conditional
dominance provides an interpretation for the strategies employed by Pednault [105]
and Chapman [12] to limit the search space of their planners, discussed further in
Section 2.8.1 below.
A dominance-based reasoner can be extended straightforwardly to handle condi-
tional dominance by inserting a truth-maintenance layer between conditions (which
correspond to assumptions or justifications) and their dominance implications [19, 86].
The interesting task for the dominance prover is to come up with meaningful condi-
tions that imply useful dominance relations.
2.4 Dominance-Proving Planning
2.4.1 The Dominance-Proving Architecture
The schematic architecture of Figure 2.2 illustrates the roles of the plan graph and
dominance relation in a dominance-proving planner.
The active modules of the planner operate on the plan graph and domain model
(KB) in the following ways:
* The problem solver reasons about the relations among actions and events in the
domain model.
3In categorical planning, Ds, is the same as D (that is, Ds,(111 , II) , D(H1, 11H2)) due to the
binary nature of the preference relation (2.1).
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Figure 2.2: The basic dominance-proving architecture.
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* The constraint poster generates new plan classes by adding constraints to un-
dominated classes in the plan graph.
* The dominance prover applies knowledge from the domain model to derive dom-
inance conditions (including restrictions and conditional dominance) among the
plan classes of interest.
* The dominance propagator updates the plan graph to reflect the dominance
relation D according to its properties presented in Section 2.3.
Together, the plan graph and the modules that operate on it constitute the plan space
manager.
In this architecture, planning is not a search for a single plan to execute, but
an exploration of properties of admissible plans. A planner performs useful work by
refining the plan graph, even if it never reduces the lowest-level classes to singleton
sets. Narrowing the admissible plans to a set that contains 10400 or even an uncount-
able infinity of plans may seem like little progress. But if we can determine that all
of them contain, for instance, an appendectomy, we solve a significant problem. In
general, cardinality is not an accurate measure of the refinement of a plan class. If the
plan language includes real-valued parameters, then all but the tightest constraints
still leave an uncountable set of candidate plans. The plan class "Administer a dose
of drug X within the next minute" includes individual plans where the time the drug
is given is any point in the 60-second interval.
The prevailing view of planning as the construction of a completely specified
course of action is never totally accurate. Planners devote their resources to isolated
questions, such as whether to perform an appendectomy or what to do nezt, without
specifying all other features of the plan. A plan to obtain some bananas, for example,
is complete only with respect to a have-bananas goal; in the larger context of satisfying
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all physical and emotional needs forever, the agent never stops planning. Figuring
out how to get the bananas is a small act of refinement on THE GRAND PLAN.
The classic concept of a decision can be understood in terms of the dominance-
proving architecture as a choice among exclusive and exhaustive plan classes. De-
cisions to eat a banana or to join the Air Force are commitments to a class of
plans having a particular property, at the expense of those lacking that property.
The decision-making agent remains uncommitted to the innumerable other plan class
properties under its control.
The decision-theoretic formulation of decision-making as choice among basic plans
(called "acts" in that literature) is a gross idealization, made explicit by Savage in his
discussion of "small worlds" and "grand worlds" [121]. The plan graph representation
lets us dispense with this idealization, as far as plans are concerned.4 A dominance-
proving planner can proceed as if it were working on THE GRAND PLAN because it
needs never approach an explicit encoding of individual acts.
2.4.2 Instantiating the Architecture
The framework presented so far is an abstract model of planning for partially satis-
fiable objectives. It generalizes the case of goal predicates and applies to uncertain
situations. Rather than prove that a plan necessarily achieves a goal, as in tradi-
tional AI planning, the planner tries to prove properties of the optimal plan. These
properties define the class of admissible plans.
To instantiate the abstract model to a particular planning mechanism, one needs
to specify each of the modules of Figure 2.2 and their interfaces. In particular,
realization of a dominance-proving planner requires design of:
4That is, the plan classes refer to grand-world acts. But we cannot remove the idealization
completely; the domain models remain small worlds, after all. For further discussion of small worlds,
see Section 6.6.3.
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* A universal plan class, 0.
* A constraint language, or representation for partial plans. The set of plan
classes expressible in the constraint language is P C 2n .
* A domain modeling language, including a way to describe the effects of actions
and a representation for the preference relation, >-.
The structures described earlier-the plan graph and dominance relations-serve
mainly as theoretical machinery for analysis of this class of planners. Specifying
the languages and modules is the real work in designing a planner.
As a simple illustration, consider mathematical optimization techniques as plan-
ners from this perspective. Optimization is a special case of dominance proving where
the program tries to find a singleton dominator, often in one step. For example, if our
plan language is R" and the domain model consists of a linear objective function and a
set of linear constraints among the elements of the vector, then our dominance prover
should be a linear programming algorithm. In this case there are no partial plans.
Branch-and-bound integer programming is an example of an optimization procedure
that does make use of partial plans and explicit dominance proving.
For the example presented in Figure 2.1, the universal plan class is A*: strings
of actions in the action alphabet A. The constraint language consists of the regular
ezpressions [59] over A.5
In the development of the planning model to this point, I have not addressed the
issue of efficiency. The computational viability of a planner depends on a judicious
choice of the languages and algorithms that define it. Although it is difficult to
characterize performance at the present level of generality, we can identify a few
high-level issues critical to efficiency. First, the addition of constraints during graph
refinement cannot be arbitrary. The planner must generate constraints that relate to
SThe term A* in partial plan expressions is syntactic sugar for (al + -- + a,)*.
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the problem at hand and are meaningful to the dominance prover. Unless the prover
can establish dominance relations on the graph, refinement is irrelevant. Second,
it is important to consolidate the plan graph to avoid redundancy and further the
propagation of dominance relations. I examine this topic further in Sections 2.6
and 2.7 below.
2.5 The SUDO-Planner Architecture in Brief
The design of languages and reasoning modules for SUDO-PLANNER illustrates one
instantiation of the dominance-proving architecture. I present brief descriptions of
SUDO-PLANNER's components below; subsequent chapters specify its design in detail.
A plan is a function from observations (events the agent can test in the world)
to actions (controllable events). Any set of such functions is a plan class, but the
plan graph may contain only those classes II E P expressible in SUDO-PLANNER's
constraint language. The universal plan class is the partial plan with no constraints
(Q). A partial plan is specified by posting a series of constraints on Q. Constraints
fall in three basic categories:
* Action. Restricts the plan to include an action of the given type. For example,
we can form the plan class "plans with CABG" by posting an action constraint
of type CABG' on the universal plan class.
* Action policy. Restricts the plan's policy for the given action to have some
regular (monotonic, for example) relationship to the given observable event.
An action policy constraint of type "monotonic increasing" specifies the class
of plans where CABG is an increasing function of CAD. This plan class, ap-
6The actual type specification looks more like "CABG, presence = true," due to the particular
representation of actions in SUDO-PLANNER, described in Section 3.2. For expository reasons, in this
chapter I present only the simplified versions.
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pearing in the plan graph of Figure 1.5 under the notation II+(CABG, CAD),
corresponds to the threshold policy of Figure 1.1a. For binary actions, a mono-
tonic policy implies the existence of a threshold on the observed variable.
* Conditional action or action policy. As above, in effect only under a given
condition on observable events. To generate the class "CABG if three-vessel
disease," we would post a conditional action constraint with action CABG and
condition specifying that the observed CAD (from catheterization) is three-
vessel disease.
The plan constraint language is defined formally in Section 3.4.
The domain modeling language for SUDO-PLANNER is based on qualitative prob-
abilistic networks (QPNs). Qualitative relations serve to represent the effects of
actions, the connections among events, and preferences. Some QPN fragments for
the AAA example appear in Figures 1.7 through 1.9.
Given these representations, the next step is to specify the modules in the ar-
chitecture schematic of Figure 2.2. SUDO-PLANNER's constraint poster is a passive
module, generating plan classes opportunistically. That is, a new class is introduced
to the plan graph only when the dominance prover derives a potentially useful result
concerning that class. In contrast, a planner under heuristic control would apply an
active constraint poster to direct the search for dominance results.
SUDO-PLANNER's problem solver generates QPNs from the KB (summarized in
Section 1.6.2, discussed in depth in Chapter 6). There are two parts of the domain
model at any given time: the KB as a whole and a dynamically constructed QPN. The
problem solver uses facts from the KB to progressively modify the QPN throughout
the process of tradeoff formulation.
The dominance prover operates on QPNs rather than directly on the KB. Domi-
nance proving in SUDO-PLANNER consists of manipulating QPNs to derive qualitative
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relations with implications for plan class dominance. The central basis for deriving
dominance in QPNs is qualitative synergy between an action and an event on the value
node. Such synergies dictate action policy constraints on plan classes, as explained
in Section 4.7.3.
For example, based on a QPN generated by the problem-solver, SUDO-PLANNER
determines that CABG and CAD are positively synergistic on value. This relationship
directly implies that the optimal CABG policy is increasing in CAD severity. Let
"cath, CABG?" denote the class of plans that include catheterization and make some
commitment about whether to perform CABG. Any plan in this class that is not a
threshold policy must be inferior to some plan in II+(CABG, CAD). The situation
satisfies the condition for plan class dominance (2.3), yielding
D(II+(CABG, CAD), "cath, CABG?").
Because II+(CABG, CAD) is a subclass of "cath, CABG?" the dominance relation is
a restriction, as posted on the plan graph of Figure 1.5.
The dominance propagator records these results on the plan graph and derives
their consequences for dominance among other plan classes. For instance, adding a
new plan class intermediate between these two would modify the restrictions recorded
on the plan graph, shown in Figure 2.3.
cath, CABG? cath, CABG?
R
R intermediate II
R
II+(CABG, CAD) II+(CABG, CAD)
Figure 2.3: Dominance propagation upon insertion of an intermediate plan class.
The overall behavior of SUDO-PLANNER is best described by a superposition of
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the architecture schematics of Figures 1.10 and 2.2. The product of the process is the
plan graph reflecting dominance results SUDO-PLANNER derives from the sequence of
QPNs produced by its problem solver.
2.6 Searching the Plan Space
Different designs for the plan constraint language, knowledge representations, and
processing modules can lead to dominance-proving planners with disparate behav-
iors. Nevertheless, the common architectural skeleton provides a basis for a general
discussion of some computational issues for this family of planners.
One important generic issue concerns management of the search space. In the
dominance-proving architecture, the search space is represented by the plan graph,
and the dominance relation supplies the criterion for pruning the space.
Search in constraint-posting planners proceeds to refine the plan graph by adding
constraints to partial plans. The straightforward application of this procedure, how-
ever, can lead to considerable redundancy in search. For example, Figure 2.4a shows
a refinement to the left side of the plan graph of Figure 2.1. The new partial plan is
obtained by posting a constraint on alA* that the second action be an a2.
A*aiA* A*alA*
(a) axA* A*ala 2A* (b) aiA* A*ala 2A*
ala2A* axa2A*
Figure 2.4: Redundancy in plan graph search. (a) Posting a constraint on axA* yields
axa 2A*. (b) The same plan class is obtained by posting a constraint on A*ala2A*.
Suppose that after further reasoning the planner decides to prune away the new
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plan class based on dominance or some other criterion. The same class may be re-
introduced on refinement of the next branch of the plan graph. As illustrated in
Figure 2.4b, constraining the first A* to be empty in A*ala 2A* defines a partial plan
identical to that already pruned. A planner that did not recognize such coincidences
would duplicate much of its dominance proving and other reasoning efforts.
The chronological backtracking strategy described above is inefficient because it
cannot transfer reasoning results between contexts. Dependency-directed backtrack-
ing [136] avoids considerable redundancy by determining the most general reasons for
a failure and pruning a larger region of the search space. In our example, however,
the redundancy problem emerges on separate branches of the search space. More flex-
ible dependency-directed reasoning mechanisms, such as truth maintenance systems
(TMSs) [23, 86], are required to transfer results across arbitrary contexts.
2.6.1 Classification
The redundancy of Figure 2.4b went unrecognized because the plan graph at the first
stage (Figure 2.4a) failed to reflect all specialization relations. This suggests that
we add to the plan space manager a third module operating directly on the plan
graph, as shown in Figure 2.5. When the constraint poster generates partial plans,
the classifier situates them in the plan graph by computing their greatest lower and
least upper bounds. This classification operation is identical to that performed by
terminological knowledge representation languages like KL-ONE [8, 122].
The correct classification for axa 2A* in the plan graph of Figure 2.4 places this
class under both alA* and A*ala2A *. Consolidating the plan graph in this way avoids
redundancy in plan space search. The additional specialization links enhance pruning
and provide more pathways for propagation of dominance results throughout the plan
graph.
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Figure 2.5: The plan space manager augmented with a classifier to consolidate the plan
graph.
2.6.2 Dependency Mechanisms
In the context of plan space search, classification can be viewed as a kind of depen-
dency mechanism for minimizing duplication in reasoning. Comparison of classifica-
tion to other techniques is difficult because a precise characterization of the avoidable
redundancies is often lacking in descriptions of dependency-directed problem solvers.
From the perspective of dependency maintenance, the dominance relation serves
to define so-called nogood contexts. Planners without a notion of dominance can
consider plan classes nogood only if they are inconsistent or provably cannot achieve
the goal. Other pruning criteria must be built into the control mechanism. The
availability of nogoods based on dominance can dramatically reduce the search space.
Following the terminology used by de Kleer in describing his assumption-based
truth maintenance system (ATMS) [19], each plan class is an assumption contezt
represented in terms of the constraint language. The plan specialization graph cor-
responds to the context graph of the ATMS with context subset replaced by plan
specialization. Indeed, an implementation using an ATMS would be equivalent to
the classification scheme presented here provided that we could construct a proposi-
CHAPTER 2. A DOMINANCE-PROVING ARCHITECTURE
tional interface [20] describing the content of partial plans. In general, however, this
may not be the most convenient representation of plan classes.' As shown in Sec-
tion 2.7, a mapping of the constraint language to sets of propositions may necessitate
an unacceptable growth in the size of partial plan descriptions.
Like the assumption-based approach, the plan graph structure facilitates the ex-
ploration of multiple consistent contexts simultaneously. But contrary to the ATMS
view, we are not necessarily interested in finding all solutions (the class of all ad-
missible plans). Rather, the planner may focus on an isolated decision defined by
a particular distinction in the plan graph. Therefore, we can restrict the domain of
assumption sets that need to be considered to those explicitly created as plan classes
by the constraint poster.
2.6.3 Plan Graph Queries
Another application of classification is to answer dominance questions about plan
classes not explicitly appearing in the plan graph. At any point in the planning
process, the plan graph represents the current view of the admissible plan space. To
find out whether a given plan class is admissible, we merely classify the class in the
plan graph and propagate dominance as usual. Queries about the classes dominating
or dominated by this new class can then be answered by local inspection of its position
in the plan graph.
2.6.4 Plan Space Search: Summary
Redundancy in searching the plan space is avoided in the dominance-proving archi-
tecture by classifying plans in the plan graph as they are generated. The plan graph
'The design of SCHEMER [166, 167]-a dependency-directed interpreter for a non-deterministic
LISP-illustrates some issues in constructing a propositional interface for arbitrary dependencies.
CHAPTER 2. A DOMINANCE-PROVING ARCHITECTURE
thus serves a dual role as representation of the admissible plan space and as the main
structure for dependency maintenance.
The scheme presented here offers two benefits with respect to plan search effi-
ciency. First, the dominance relation provides a major new class of nogoods, which
may potentially shrink the search space. Second, classification of partial plans takes
advantage of dependencies that might be obscured by an interface with a propositional
TMS.
2.7 The Complexity of Subsumption
In terminological knowledge representation languages, the key operation for concept
classification is the computation of subsumption relations [7, 96]. The same applies to
classification of partial plans; the appropriate position of a plan class in the plan graph
is determined by its subsumption relations to other classes. One plan class subsumes
another if the latter must be a specialization purely by virtue of its description. We
saw above that classifying plans as they are generated minimizes the search space.8
Conversely, an optimal dependency mechanism (one that minimizes search) in effect
computes these subsumptions.
The centrality of subsumption to classification suggests that the complexity of this
operation has a large impact on the computational performance of this planning ar-
chitecture. Consequently, analyses of dominance-proving planners should emphasize
the complexity of subsumption in the chosen constraint language.
As an example, consider the plan graphs of Figures 2.1 and 2.4, where regular
expressions describe the partial plans. In general, computing subsumption of regular
8For true optimality we must also determine the most general plan class that is dominated. This
corresponds to extracting the minimal nogood assumption set, which is not generally feasible. Note
also that minimality is only with respect to a particular constraint language; slight changes may have
dramatic effects on the dominance prover's ability to derive nogood sets at high levels of generality.
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expressions is intractable.9 By restricting the constraint language to expressions that
use disjunctions and Kleene stars exclusively in A* terms, however, subsumption
can be performed in linear time (the problem is essentially string matching with
wildcards). All of the plan classes included in the figures above satisfy this restriction.
We can also analyze some more common partial plan representations in terms
of subsumption complexity. Nonlinear plans [118] are partially ordered sets of ac-
tions, used as a basic representation by numerous constraint-posting planners [12].
A nonlinear plan is actually a plan class, comprising all possible linearizations of the
partial order [21]. (A planner with a parallel execution capability (for example, a
multi-agent planner) could truly have nonlinear plan individuals. The constraint lan-
guage for such a planner would be more complex.) Unfortunately, partial order-and
hence nonlinear plan-subsumption is NP-complete.1o The exponential potential of
the computation lies in the combinatorial number of possible mappings between the
steps of the two plan classes. If, however, we can specify the correspondences between
steps (for example, which put-on in II1 corresponds to which in II2) then subsumption
is at worst quadratic. In practice we will not generally have complete correspondences,
but typically the possible mappings between steps will be constrained by one or more
of the following factors.
* Actions may only map to others of the same type.
* Compatibility among constraints on the arguments to actions.
* The planner may supply explicit identifications among steps when introducing
them in several partial plans at once.
'Hunt et al. [65] show that the equivalence problem for regular expressions is PSPACE-hard.
Equivalence can be trivially reduced to two (non-strict) subsumption operations.
"tThe proof, by reduction from EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS, was provided by Ronald L. Rivest,
personal communication.
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It is an empirical question whether these constraints will render subsumption feasible
in practice.
The intractability of nonlinear plan subsumption illustrates the potential difficulty
of specifying a propositional interface to generic dependency reasoning mechanisms
like the ATMS. In the ATMS, contexts are represented by sets of propositions,
and context subsumption is simply the subset operation. Determining whether one
context specializes another can therefore be accomplished in time at worst quadratic
in the size of the proposition sets. Given that nonlinear plan subsumption is NP-
complete, the size of the propositional representation for the plan classes must be
exponential in the partial order encoding, unless P = NP.
One should consider the effect on subsumption complexity of any proposed ex-
tension to the constraint language. For example, we could allow actions themselves
to be expressed at multiple levels of abstraction (as in the sequence low-dose steroid
therapy is-a steroid therapy is-a drug therapy) without significant cost in complexity,
as long as action subsumption itself is not expensive." I analyze the tradeoff be-
tween expressiveness and subsumption tractability for SUDO-PLANNER's constraint
language in Section 3.5.
2.8 Miscellaneous Topics
The following sections discuss some implications of the dominance-proving architec-
ture for two issues in knowledge-based planning.
"1Given a static action graph, action subsumption takes linear time in the worst case. If actions
are described more flexibly-perhaps as dynamically generated KL-ONB concepts-then subsumption
is more complex [7].
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2.8.1 Dominance-Based Knowledge Level Analysis
In his description of the knowledge level, Newell proposes that programs can be charac-
terized in terms of the content as opposed to the form of their knowledge by analyzing
their behavior with respect to principles of rationality [97]. The dominance relation
can a be useful tool for such analyses, whether or not the planner resembles the
dominance-proving architecture at the symbol level. By admitting partially satisfi-
able goals, the preference order on plans provides a more comprehensive and flexible
rationality principle than one based entirely on goal predicate satisfaction. Note that
a program may still be nondeterministic at the knowledge level because we may have
an incompletely specified preference order.
Even though the categorical preference relation does not exercise its flexibility,
the dominance relation can shed some light on classical planners. In a previous
description of this work [158], I illustrated the dominance-proving architecture by
recasting TWEAK [12] in its framework. Because TWEAK encapsulates the results
of much of the state-of-the-art in nonlinear planning, an account of this planner
embodies considerable generality.
The product of this exercise was an interpretation for TWEAK's central principle-
the "modal truth criterion" [12, page 340]-in terms of dominance in the plan graph.
TWEAK searches the plan space by posting constraints on partial plans until it finds
one that achieves its goals. The search is not exhaustive, yet TWEAK is guaranteed to
terminate with a solution if one exists. The source of its power lies in the modal truth
criterion, which justifies TWEAK's selectivity in exploring the search space. Briefly,
the criterion specifies that if a plan class contains a successful plan, then search
can be further limited to the subclasses obtained by posting particular sequences of
constraints. In our dominance-proving terminology, this is an instance of a conditional
restriction as described in Section 2.3. For a formal statement of the dominance
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condition, see the previous paper [158]. Although the details have not been worked
out, I expect that a similar interpretation could be developed for Pednault's results
for a more expressive constraint language [105].
The utility of the dominance relation as an analytical device is potentially more
significant in applications to planners that consider partially satisfiable goals. A vari-
ety of AI programs perform resource-allocation tasks, where goal satisfaction is always
a matter of degree. In general, the programs employ domain-dependent search heuris-
tics and ad hoc representations, so it is difficult to assess and compare alternative
techniques.
One well-known AI resource planner is ISIS, a program that schedules production
orders in a job shop [37, 38]. Isis constructs schedules through a heuristic constraint
relaxation process. The program is difficult to evaluate empirically because of its
large number of parameters and the lack of a performance standard for its scheduling
task. Theoretical analysis also presents a challenge because interactions among the
constraints in the program's domain are not well understood.
Recasting ISIS in terms of the dominance-proving architecture may lead to insights
about its performance. The framework of this chapter enforces a strong distinction
between the non-relaxable constraints and those that are relaxable, called "organiza-
tional goals" or "preference constraints" in ISIS terminology. The relaxable constraints
serve to define the preference relation on schedules, while the non-relaxable are part
of the domain modeling language. The partial schedules IsIs constructs during search
correspond to partial plans, as do the abstract schedule classes defined by sets of relax-
able constraints. Preferences among various relaxations induce a dominance relation
on the plan graph.
The sketchiness of this description of ISIS implies that any claims for the value
of analyses of this sort are purely speculative. Nevertheless, the dominance relation
provides a criterion for determining the soundness of ISIS's relaxation procedure, and
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classification in the plan graph is a standard for evaluating the redundancy of the
program's search for optimal production schedules.
2.8.2 On Meta-Planning
The idea of meta-planning [24, 138, 163] is to apply the machinery of a planner to
decisions about the planning process itself. Because planning algorithms are often
complicated and opaque, a declarative encoding of the goals and operators at higher
levels should lead to more understandable and modifiable planners.
It is important to distinguish two types of higher-level decisions that meta-planners
address:
1. allocation of the planner's computational resources, and
2. choice among competing plans or plan fragments.
Most of Wilensky's "meta-themes" and "meta-goals" [163, Section 2.2] relate to the
second type of decision.
Choice among competing plans is appropriately considered a "higher-level" issue
if the object-level planner lacks the basis for making this decision. This is typically
the case for traditional planners because the predicate representation of goals offers
only a crude binary distinction. Designers of planners have historically dealt with
this inadequacy by developing elaborate conflict resolution mechanisms. Wilensky's
meta-planning enterprise was an attempt to demystify these schemes.
A flexible representation for plan choice via the preference relation, however, ob-
viates the need for meta-level decision mechanisms. The meta-theme "don't waste
resources" is more accurately expressed as a dominance condition on plans that use
more resources, other things being equal. The dominance condition offers a precise
semantics for such a statement; interpretation of the meta-theme, in contrast, is not
so clear.
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The first type of high-level decision-allocation of computational resources-
remains a legitimate activity for meta-planning in the dominance-proving framework.
2.9 Summary
In this chapter I have presented and discussed a dominance-proving architecture for
planning for partially satisfiable goals. The architecture takes a constraint-posting
approach to planning, representing the search space by a plan graph that encodes
the specialization relations among the partial plans generated. Goals are defined by
a preference order over plans, which induces a dominance relation defined over plan
classes. I motivated these concepts with simple examples from MOLGEN and a more
detailed account of SUDO-PLANNER.
Redundancy in searching the plan space is minimized by classifying the partial
plans in the graph as they are generated and pruning based on dominance. Recog-
nizing the centrality of subsumption computation in classification suggests a novel
approach to analyzing the complexity implications of plan constraint languages.
The dominance-proving architecture avoids the pitfalls of goals as predicates by
adopting a more general representation for the planner's objectives. Exploiting this
flexibility in a computationally feasible manner requires careful design of the compo-
nent modules and representations that compose the dominance-proving architecture.
Chapter 3
Representations for Plans and
Actions
In this chapter I specify the representations SUDO-PLANNER employs for expressing
plan classes and actions. Section 3.1 characterizes the plan space abstractly as a
formal basis for defining the semantics of plan class constraints. The next two sec-
tions describe the action and event representations employed by SUDO-PLANNER for
both domain modeling and expressing plan classes. These specifications fulfill part of
the requirements, outlined in Section 2.4.2, for instantiating the dominance-proving
architecture in SUDO-PLANNER. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the com-
putational complexity of subsumption for SUDO-PLANNER's plan constraint language.
3.1 Plans
A plan is a specification for a course of action, directly executable by an agent.
SUDO-PLANNER does not manipulate plans directly; the dominance-proving archi-
tecture prescribes computations on plan classes only. Therefore, we can design this
type of planner without specifying an encoding for individual plans, as long as the
interpretation for plan class constraints is clear. Of course, an integrated planning
and execution system would require a complete plan language specification.
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3.1.1 Planning and Execution
Abstractly, plans are functions from observations to actions. Formally, given
O - the set of possible patterns of observation over time, and
fez, - the set of executable courses of action,
the universal plan class f consists of all functions ir : O + fle. Qeze defines the
scope of pure activity the agent is capable of performing. Plans map situations,
distinguished by their observation patterns, into activities. Intuitively, a course of
action w E ~e, specifies a set of primitive end-effector commands unconditional on
any explicitly planned observations.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationship between the planning and execution modules
in a complete agent. The plan to be executed, wu, = 7r(obs), specifies all planned
activity, including any sensing operations that enable the agent to observe obs.
World
Figure 3.1: An integrated planning and execution system.
Time is handled implicitly in this functional notation. All temporal information
must be encoded in the descriptions for observations and courses of action. This treat-
ment is unsatisfactory because it cannot enforce fundamental temporal constraints,
such as the prohibition on conditioning current activity on future events.' The per-
'For further discussion of SUDO-PLANNER's atemporality, see Section 9.2.2.
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missiveness of this syntax implies that ultimately we must decide the legality of plans
on semantic grounds. The class of legal plans, fo, is given informally by
to = {Jr E Q I r satisfies semantic constraints}. (3.1)
A more restricted plan language syntax, perhaps incorporating some of these tem-
poral and other legality constraints, would be provided for any particular integrated
planning and execution system. The context also dictates computability constraints
on 7r, perhaps requiring real-time performance. REX, a language designed for situ-
ated planning [114], is an example of the kind of representation suitable for the plans
passed to the executor in the framework of Figure 3.1.
3.1.2 Cascaded Planners
We can generalize this framework by decomposing the planning module into a series
of submodules, each of which is itself a planner. As shown in Figure 3.2, the output
of each module is a plan class, which serves as the root of the plan graph for the next
planner in the sequence. Each planner has its own constraint language, determining
the plan classes pi C 20 expressible in its plan graph. The Pi also constrain inter-
module communication: planner-j must output a plan class Ilj+l E Pj+1.
A variety of cascaded planning architectures can be defined by specifying conven-
tions regarding the plan constraint languages. For example, the condition Pi C Pi+l,
1 < i < n - 1 entails a successive refinement of the plan spaces for the cascaded
planners. On the other hand, if Pi 2 Pi+l for that range, successive planners pos-
sess cruder distinguishing abilities. Such an architecture might be appropriate for a
system in which high-level planners pass on partial results to lower-level control algo-
rithms. In general, however, the •i will overlap, reflecting divisions of labor according
to expertise or other resources.
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Figure 3.2: Cascaded planners. Planner-i maintains a plan graph with plan classes ex-
pressible in its constraint language, Pi. The output of the system, HE, is the plan class
passed to the executor.
The final planner in the chain, planner-n, produces a plan class IIE for the execu-
tor. The framework of Figure 3.1 implicitly assumes that the constraint language for
the executor admits only singleton plan classes.
PE = {{ir} 1.i E Qj
This restriction on PE is in no way essential to the view of planning and execution
presented here.
In the cascaded planning framework, SUDO-PLANNER plays the role of planner-1.
The constraint language described in Section 3.4 defines the expressible plan classes,
P1. I assume planner-2's constraint language to be sufficiently expressive so that P2
includes the admissible plan spaces output by SUDO-PLANNER.
3.2 Action Representation
In contrast to the abstract plan language discussion above, this section describes
concrete representations for actions as they appear in the SUDO-PLANNER knowledge
base. Actions play a part in defining two components of SUDO-PLANNER:
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1. Constraint language. Actions are the building blocks of plans. Plan classes are
described by constraints on the actions making up their constituent plans.
2. Domain modeling language. The effects of plans are determined by the effects
of their component actions.
This section presents the basic action representation, with an emphasis on features
necessary for the constraint language. Issues in representing the effects of actions are
the subject of Chapter 5.
3.2.1 Action Taxonomies
The knowledge base of actions is implemented in NIKL [66, 150], a terminological
knowledge representation language based on KL-ONE [8]. Action types are represented
by NIKL concepts, frame-like specifications of classes of individuals. Concepts are
defined by their position in the concept lattice and restrictions on their roles, or
associated features.2 Roles are also taxonomized, according to the generality of their
domains (concepts for which the feature is relevant) and ranges (possible values of
the feature). The eztension of an action type a, denoted X(a) is the set of actions
satisfying its specification.
The NIKL taxonomy of action concepts specifies a multilevel description of actions
that plans may include. Let action be the root of the taxonomy, a superconcept of
every other action concept ai. A = X(action) is the set of all actions. One way
to specialize partial plans in the plan graph is to specialize individual action types
included in that plan class. If II includes action al = drug-therapy, the class of
plans Il1D that replace al with aD = drug-therapy(D) is a specialization of III.
The dimension of specialization in the example above corresponds to the drug
2For an alternate action representation implemented in NIKL, see Swartout and Neches [142]. In
their scheme, plans as well as actions are represented as NIKL concepts.
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role of action al. The concept drug-therapy(D) is defined by a value restriction [8]
on that role, limiting its range to D.3 Additional specializations might restrict the
drug further (perhaps D is a family of drugs) or may include other information, such
as dosage or method of administration.4 In realistic knowledge bases the axes of
specialization are quite numerous.
Action-type abstraction is used in MOLGEN [137] and other constraint-posting
planners [95]. Although MOLGEN lab operators constitute a simple two-level hierarchy
of actions, in combination with the hierarchy of lab objects in their domain they form
a rich, multiply hierarchical action structure. From this perspective the lab objects
are merely further axes for specializing the lab operators.
As Tenenberg points out [145], this specialization form of abstraction is orthogonal
to the step-components type of abstraction hierarchy used in NOAH [118]. In NOAH
actions may be decomposed into sequences of lower-level actions, effectively viewing
each action as a sub-plan. A decomposition hierarchy associates actions by a "part-
of" rather than an "is-a" relation. SUDO-PLANNER does not explicitly support this
sort of abstraction.
Another distinct kind of abstraction is the precondition hierarchy of plan spaces
Sacerdoti introduced in ABSTRIPS [117]. Abstract actions are defined implicitly by
temporarily ignoring preconditions. Note that preconditions refer to the implications
of including an action in a plan, rather than to features intrinsic to the action. Or-
dering the preconditions imposes structure on the search space rather than on the
actions themselves.
Basing the knowledge representation on a terminological reasoner like NIKL has
3I adopt the notation ai(value-restriction) for convenience whenever the role involved is obvious
in context.
4As in planning, this specialization process never ends. Actions exist in the knowledge base
only as types; the action individuals specifying an actual plan r are required only if the planner is
integrated with an execution capability as in Section 3.1.1.
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the important advantage of dynamic flexibility. New action types may be created
at planning time by adding constraints to, specifying new features of, or combining
existing action concepts. These new action types can often be automatically classi-
fied [122]; that is, NIKL can determine the location of the new type in the existing
taxonomy. This is important because
1. an action type's place in the taxonomy determines the properties it inherits
from and supplies to other types, and
2. action subsumption is employed by the constraint language subsumption algo-
rithm of Section 3.5 to classify plan classes.
Some simple examples of dynamic action creation in SUDO-PLANNER during domi-
nance proving are described in Section 7.2.
3.2.2 Action Variables
As described in Section 3.4 below, the plan constraint language uses action types to
restrict a plan class to plans including actions with certain features. It is sometimes
convenient to refer to properties of action features directly, for example, in relating
the dosage of a drug to other characteristics of events or plans. The SUDO-PLANNER
objects denoting such features are called action variables.
Action variables are represented by pairs of NIKL concepts and roles. Drug dosage,
for example, is the combination of the action drug-therapy with its role dosage.
Other variables are constructed by pairing the concept with other roles, such as
duration and method (whether the drug is given as a pill, intravenously, or in some
other form). The notation av =_ role(ai) makes the components of an action variable
type av explicit. The domain of the action variable is the value restriction on its role
component.
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Like actions, SUDO-PLANNER action variables are types, not individuals. A tax-
onomy of action variables can be defined in terms of the concept and role taxonomies.
One action variable specializes another if and only if both the action concept and role
of the first specialize the corresponding components of the second.
For each action variable instance AV, there is a function AV(w) that returns AV's
value in the course of action w E Q,,,. If w does not commit to a value for AV, the
function is undefined.
3.2.3 SUDO-Planner Actions
Figure 3.3 illustrates the form of action definitions in NIKL. The definition of surgery
declares that it is a subconcept of action (the NIKL concept for SUDO-PLANNER's
universal action class A) and that it has a role named route with the value restriction
invasive-path-into-body. The action open-lung-biopsy is defined similarly.
A surgery is an action
with one route which is an invasive-path-into-body.
An open-lung-biopsy is a biopsy
with one route which is an open-lung-path.
Figure 3.3: Stylized NIKL definitions for the actions surgery and open-lung-biopsy.
SUDO-PLANNER uses NIKL for two types of inference: classification and inheri-
tance. Given that biopsy is a subconcept of action, and that open-lung-path is a
kind of invasive-path-into-body, NIKL's classifier can determine that an open-
lung-biopsy is a kind of surgery. Facts about surgical actions-that they re-
quire anesthesia, for example-are automatically inherited by open-lung-biopsy
and other specializations of surgery.
The SUDO-PLANNER action knowledge base includes all of the actions for the
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running AAA example. A portion of this taxonomy appears in Figure 3.4.
action (A)
treatment surgery test
vessel-repair cardiac- carotid-
catheterization arteriography
AAA-repair CABG endarterectomy
Figure 3.4: A fragment of SUDO-PLANNER's action taxonomy.
3.3 Events
The representational structures denoting events in the knowledge base are very much
like those for actions. In fact, actions in SUDO-PLANNER are a special type of event,
distinguished because they are controllable by the planner. That is, the root of the
event taxonomy, event (C), is a superconcept of action (A). The primary role of
events in the knowledge base is in the representation for the effects of actions (Chap-
ter 5). Events also serve to describe observed conditions in plan class constraints.
The event variables representation is identical to that for action variables, de-
scribed in Section 3.2.2. The extension of an event variable, X(ev), is equivalent to
the cross product of the extensions of its concept and role. The function EV(obs)
returns the value taken by an observable event variable instance EV in the obser-
vation obs. If EV is unobservable, the function is undefined. By convention, action
variables are accessible to the agent without explicit observation. That is why the
AV functions are defined in terms of 7r rather than obs even though action variables
are a special case of event variables.
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The event variable value(agent) corresponds to the special value node v in QPNs.
3.4 Constraint Language
The unconstrained plan class object denotes Q, the universal plan class. Partial
plans are constructed by adding constraints to Q or to other existing plan classes.
Representations and interpretations for the three types of SUDO-PLANNER constraints
(action constraints, action policy constraints, and conditional constraints, introduced
in Section 2.5) are presented in sequence below.
3.4.1 Action Constraints
An action constraint on a plan class asserts that an action of a specific type is in
its plans. Action types are simply the NIKL concepts appearing in SUDO-PLANNER's
action taxonomy. The constraint poster records a sequence of action constraints in
an in-list describing the action types included in the partial plan.
An in-list consisting only of a collection of types can be ambiguous, however,
due to the hierarchical nature of action types. For example, suppose the in-list is
[surgery,CABG]. Because CABG is a subconcept of surgery, any plan that in-
cludes an instance of CABG automatically satisfies both constraints. Under this
interpretation, we need some other way to express the constraint that a plan include
a CABG plus some other unidentified surgical procedure.
The solution is to associate each separate action constraint with a unique identifier.
An in-list of the form [(al, idi),..., (a,, id~)] indicates that the plan must include ac-
tions of types al,..., a, and that no single action can account for both ai and aj unless
idi = idj. If idc = id,, then there must be a single action that is both an ai and an aj.
When there is a known type ak corresponding to the conjunction of ai and aj, the two
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in-list entries can be merged into one for ak. For example, [(surgery, 1), (CABG, 1)]
is equivalent to [(CABG, 1)], but [(surgery, 1), (CABG, 2)] cannot be simplified.
Because NIKL can express conjoined concepts, we need not consider in-lists with more
than one action type having the same identifier. 5
Some action types offer little real constraint on a plan class. For example, assert-
ing that an action of type drug-therapy is in the plan isn't saying much because
the dosage could be zero. By this standard, all plans, medical or otherwise, include
a drug-therapy. In fact, they also include surgery, which (like all SUDO-PLANNER
actions) has a boolean presence role specifying whether the action is actually per-
formed. Any action constraint whose type has the null action as an instance does not
meaningfully restrict the executable plans.
In the cascaded planning architecture of Section 3.1.2, however, such action con-
straints can make a difference. In general, a plan class produced by the planner need
not commit to a policy for every available action. An action constraint restricts that
freedom, dictating that the plan class passed to the next module make some commit-
ment about the action. For example, if drug-therapy appears on a class's in-list,
any subclass passed on to the next module must specify something further about the
value of the therapy variable. In this situation, we say that drug-therapy is "under
consideration" in the plan class.
For example, in the plan graph of Figure 1.5, the partial plan "CABG?" refers to
the class of plans where CABG is under consideration. It is formed by posting an
action constraint on 0. If our semantics did not supply any force to this constraint,
the classifier should have merged the class with fl and with any other class with such
weak action constraints.
To assert that CABG should actually be performed, we must post an action
5In fact, this property renders identifiers superfluous for plan classes defined exclusively by ac-
tion constraints. The ids are retained, however, because they are indispensable for representing
conditional constraints (Section 3.4.3).
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constraint for the type CABG(true), the subconcept of CABG where the presence
role is value-restricted to true. An action constraint for CABG(false) asserts that
CABG is not performed in the plan.
3.4.2 Action Policy Constraints
An action policy constraint specifies an action variable, an event variable, and a
relationship that must hold between them. For the constraint to be operational,
the event variable must be observable at execution time. This condition is satisfied
automatically when the event variable is also an action variable because the agent
knows what actions it has performed.
The monotonicity conditions mentioned in previous chapters are the only action
policy constraints employed by SUDO-PLANNER. A monotonicity constraint is written
(6, av, ev), with 8 the direction of the relationship and av and ev the action and event
variables, respectively. Adding such a constraint to a plan class II yields the subclass
II', where
II' = {r E II I V0o, o2 E O, VEV E X(ev).
EV(ol) Ž EV(o2) =- VAV E X(av). AV(r(oi)) R6 AV(r(o2))}, (3.2)
with x R+ y defined to hold if either z > y or one of the arguments is undefined.
R_ is the inverse of R+, and Ro the conjunction of R+ and R_. In words, a plan 7r
satisfies the constraint if for every action variable AV of type av, the policy for AV
is monotonic (of the appropriate polarity) in every event variable of type ev.
Policy constraints where both variables refer to actions are split into two con-
straints, with av and ev taking on reversed roles. Because the event component of ev
is an action, the first inequality in condition (3.2) is replaced by
EV(ir(oi)) > EV(ir(o2)).
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A monotonicity constraint is ill-defined unless the action for av is under consideration
in II.
For example, the action policy constraint
(+, presence(CABG), extent(cardiac-cath-result)) (3.3)
asserts that the CABG policy is an increasing function of the CAD extent as revealed
by cardiac catheterization. 6 Because presence(CABG) is a boolean variable, this
implies that the plan is a threshold policy.
3.4.3 Conditional Constraints
Conditional constraints are action or policy constraints that have effect only un-
der some observed condition. For example, we could assert that CABG should be
performed if catheterization reveals three-vessel disease (3vd) by posting such a
constraint. Although SUDO-PLANNER's dominance prover never directly derives re-
sults about plan classes defined by conditional constraints, such constraints could be
generated if the inputs were conditioned externally.
Syntactically, constraints are conditioned by including an associated event type ej.
Unconditional constraints are implicitly associated with the universal event event.
Let ei : II denote a constraint that the plan must be in II under condition ej. The
semantics of a conditional constraint can be defined in terms of the semantics for the
corresponding unconditional constraint.
Let ir[e;] : 0 e,,,e be the partial function defined by
ir[e](o) { Ir(o) if o e X(e,)
undefined otherwise,
'The variable extent(CAD-event) is not directly observable. Its value is identical to
extent(cardiac-cath-result) if and only if catheterization is a perfect test.
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and let
II[e,] =_ {f[e,] I 7 E II}.
Note that r[event] = ir and II[event] = II.
If III is the plan class we obtain by posting a constraint on II, then the class
obtained by posting a conditional version of that constraint on II is
{7r E II I ir[ei] e II[ei]}.
The SUDO-PLANNER event taxonomy induces a relationship among conditional
constraints. If ei subsumes ej, constraints conditional on ei are also in effect under
ej. As in Section 3.4.1, identifiers on the in-lists disambiguate the meaning of separate
appearances of compatible actions. For example, the plan class
e : [(surgery, idl)]; ej: [(CABG, id2 )]
must have a surgery in addition to a CABG in event ej, unless id, = id2.
3.5 Computing Subsumption
This section presents the subsumption algorithm in three stages, extending the con-
straint language to include each type of constraint in turn. The version of Sec-
tion 3.5.2, accounting for action and policy constraints, is sufficient for expressing all
of the plan classes about which SUDO-PLANNER can derive dominance results.
3.5.1 Subsumption with Action Constraints
With only the first type of constraint, a partial plan consists of an in-list of action
types. Because each identifier is unique in an in-list (see Section 3.4.1), we can ignore
them in this part of the subsumption algorithm.
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In general, one plan class subsumes another iff the constraints on the second are
at least as strong as those on the first. Because individual action constraints restrict
the role of exactly one action in the plan, we can test this subsumption condition
action-by-action. However, we cannot tell immediately which actions constrained in
the second partial plan correspond to each mentioned in the first. Instead, we must
determine whether there is any mapping between the two in-lists such that each action
type in the first is matched with a distinct action type in the second that is at least
as specific.
For example, suppose the action taxonomy consists of action types al,..., a6 such
that ai subsumes aj iff i < j. Let II1 = [al, a2, as] and II2 = [a3, a4, a6]. Figure 3.5a
illustrates these two classes, with a link between each pair such that the upper action
type subsumes the lower. From this diagram, we can tell that II1 subsumes II2
because for each action in the former it is possible to select a distinct one in the latter
connected to it.
IIj: al a2  as 113: al a4  as
12: a3  a4  a6  114: a2  a 3  a6
(a) (b)
Figure 3.5: Plan class subsumption by bipartite matching. Links indicate that the upper
action subsumes the lower. (a) I1 subsumes 112, but (b) 113 does not subsume II4.
On the other hand, Figure 3.5b demonstrates that II3 = [al, a4, a5] does not
subsume II4 = [a2,a 3,a6], because there is no such one-to-one mapping. Action a6
can be paired with at most one of a4 and as, leaving the other unaccounted for.
To compute subsumption among plan classes II1 and II2 (represented by their in-
lists), we first construct a graph of the sort illustrated in Figure 3.5. An action type in
II's in-list is linked to every type in II2's that it subsumes. Construction of this graph
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requires O(n 2 ) action subsumption computations. This graph is bipartite because the
vertices are partitioned into two groups such that all edges connect vertices in different
groups. A matching on a bipartite graph is a collection of unconnected edges. Given
a bipartite graph, III subsumes II2 iff there is a matching that uses all of the actions
in II's in-list.
We can compute a maximum matching in a bipartite graph in 0(n5/2) time using
the algorithm of Hopcroft and Karp [58]. The subsumption holds iff the cardinality of
this matching equals the cardinality of II's in-list. Assuming that action subsumption
takes constant time, the algorithm for plan class subsumption is 0(n5 / 2).
3.5.2 Subsumption with Policy Constraints
In this section, we extend the partial plan language to include, in addition to the in-
list, a collection of monotonicity constraints of the form (8, av, ev). Because the policy
constraints do not interact with the action constraints, the subsumption algorithm is
separable into two parts. II1 subsumes 112 iff both
1. the in-list for III subsumes that of 12 according to the algorithm of Section 3.5.1,
and
2. for all monotonicity constraints (&i,1, avi,1 , evi,1) in the description of II, there
exists a (not necessarily distinct) (6j,2, avj,2, evj,2) associated with 112 such that:
(a) s,1 = 8j,2,
(b) avj,2 subsumes avi,1, and
(c) evj,2 subsumes evi,j.
Note the reversal of subsumption polarity for the variables in monotonicity con-
straints. For action constraints, it is weaker to assert that a more general action type
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is included in the plan. Under the definition of monotonic policy constraints (3.2),
in contrast, generality in the variables leads to stronger constraints. For example,
asserting that presence(vessel-repair) increases in the test result variable is more
restrictive than asserting that presence(CABG) does.
Pairwise comparison of monotonicity constraints is sufficient as long as it is not
possible for one constraint to be subsumed by a group of others without being sub-
sumed by a single member of the group. This condition would be violated if such
a group subsumption were possible for action and event variables. For example, if
X(avi) C X(av2 )U X(av3) but X(avi) = X(av2) and X(avi) V X(av3), pairwise
comparison of monotonicity constraints would lead to an incomplete subsumption
algorithm. Although this situation can be expressed with NIKL's covers relation [66],
that facility is not used in the SUDO-PLANNER knowledge base.
Because the mapping of monotonicity constraints need not be one-to-one, the sec-
ond stage of the algorithm requires only O(n ) event variable subsumptions. Taking
these primitive subsumptions as constant, the overall plan class subsumption com-
plexity remains O(nS/2).
3.5.3 Subsumption with Conditionals
II subsumes II2 iff IIl[e1 ] subsumes II 2[ei] for each e, appearing in an explicit con-
ditional constraint on II1. Unfortunately, determining the effective constraints under
each condition (the II[ej]) is difficult because of interactions between monotonicity
and conditional constraints. A constraint conditional on ei may influence II[ej] even
if ei and ej have no taxonomic relation.
For example, let e2 = cardiac-cath-result(3vd). The conditional constraint
ei : CABG(true) asserts that CABG is performed if catheterization indicates three-
vessel CAD. Suppose we post this constraint in conjunction with the monotonicity
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constraint that CABG policy be increasing in CAD extent (3.3). Because the mono-
tonicity constraint implies a threshold policy and the conditional constraint tells us
that 3vd is above the threshold, we can infer the CABG policy for values of CAD
extent more severe than 3vd. CABG(true) must also be included, for instance,
under ej = cardiac-cath-result(left-main-disease).
The following algorithm ignores this potential interaction and is therefore in-
complete. It assumes that the conditional constraints are arranged in a taxonomy
according to the conditioning events. The classifier should update this taxonomy as
the constraints are posted.
The algorithm constructs a description of the partial plan class IIZ[ei] by merg-
ing the in-lists and policy constraints associated with each event subsuming ej. It
merges in-list elements as described in Section 3.4.1 and simply conjoins the policy
constraints. For each ei relevant to III, the subsumption algorithm computes II2[ei]
by classifying ej in II2's conditional event lattice and proceeding as above. If IIx[ei]
subsumes II2[ei] for all ej, then II1 subsumes II2.
Despite the separability assumption, the algorithm is sound (all derived subsump-
tions are valid) because the constraints in II2 are individually stronger than those of
II. Therefore, any properties of plans holding by virtue of constraint interactions in
IIH must also hold in II2.
The complexity of this algorithm is dominated by subsumption computations on
the conditional partial plans; the time needed to construct them can be ignored in
asymptotic analysis. In the worst case, the events are linearly arranged so that each
constraint is inherited by all successors. The complexity of the subsumption algorithm
in this situation is 0(n7/2 ).
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3.5.4 Extensions
Further work should explore the development of a complete algorithm for plan class
subsumption with conditional constraints. In addition, there are several extensions
to the constraint language that would provide significantly greater expressive power.
The constraint language cannot express relations among actions in the plan. For
example, it would be convenient to link the roles of several actions to assert that they
share a common instrument. The language would also be enriched if it permitted
expression of some kinds of temporal relations among actions.
Unfortunately, it appears that admitting any interactions or relations among dif-
ferent actions renders the problem combinatorial. The separability of action con-
straints led to a tractable algorithm because they could be matched action-by-action.
The tractability of monotonicity constraints is due to their universality. In contrast,
the intractability of nonlinear plan subsumption (see Section 2.7) lies in the addition
of an operator for constraining a transitive relation. The relation in this case is inter-
preted as step ordering; other isomorphic interpretations lead to similar intractability.
In extending the expressive power of the constraint language, caution is required to
minimize the concomitant degradation of computational feasibility.
Chapter 4
Qualitative Probabilistic Networks
The qualitative probabilistic network formalism is part of SUDO-PLANNER's domain
modeling language for representing the relationships among actions and events. This
chapter is a self-contained description of the formalism. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 describe
in detail how qualitative probabilistic networks support tradeoff formulation in SUDO-
PLANNER.
4.1 Introduction
Many knowledge representation schemes, ranging from the various flavors of "causal
networks" [100, 113, 153] to qualitative physical models [4] to belief networks [101],
model the world as a collection of states, events, or other ontological primitives
connected by links that describe their interrelationships. The representations differ
widely in the nature of the fundamental objects and in the precision and expressive-
ness of the relationship links.
Qualitative probabilistic networks (QPNs) occupy a region in representation space
where the objects are arbitrary variables, and the relationships are qualitative con-
straints on the joint probability distribution among them. This area is important
for AI research because the relation among variables is often uncertain due to in-
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complete knowledge or modeling, and because strictly numeric representations are
inappropriately precise for many applications. Excess precision leads to knowledge
bases applicable in only narrow domains and to knowledge engineering difficulties due
to diminished modularity [51, 161].
The qualitative relationships expressible in the QPN formalism are designed to
afford robustness yet permit a reasoner to deduce useful properties about optimal
assignments to the specially designated decision variables in the network. These
"useful properties" are facts that enable a planner to reduce the search space of
possible courses of action. The nature of these decision properties and the qualitative
relationships leading to them are developed in the body of this chapter.
4.1.1 Motivation
The primary purpose of qualitative probabilistic networks is to support dominance-
proving for tradeoff formulation in SUDO-PLANNER. In addition, the analysis of QPNs
offers potential benefits in two other areas.
Probabilistic semantics for a common knowledge base construct. Relations
similar in intent to those expressible in QPNs have been applied widely in AI knowl-
edge bases without serious attempts at formalization, probabilistic or otherwise. The
analysis below suggests how such constructs might be interpreted and in some cases
dictates how they must be interpreted to justify inferences drawn by associated rea-
soners.
Qualitative reasoning methods for domains where directions are not guar-
anteed, and functional relations are not deterministically fixed. Many ap-
plications of qualitative reasoning are not faithful to the underlying assumptions
behind a "qualitative differential equations" interpretation. Taking an explicit prob-
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abilistic approach reveals the possible pitfalls of such violations. This issue is discussed
further in Section 4.8.3 below.
4.1.2 Preview of the Chapter
Section 4.2 formally introduces qualitative probabilistic networks, relates them to
numeric graphical probabilistic representations, and presents an example from the
domain of digitalis therapy. The digitalis example illustrates the use of qualitative
influences, one of the two qualitative relationship types appearing in qualitative prob-
abilistic networks.
The next four sections elaborate the semantics, properties, and application of
qualitative influences. A formal probabilistic definition is motivated and developed
in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 describes inference mechanisms that are sound with re-
spect to this definition, and presents an efficient algorithm for answering queries
about the qualitative influences holding among arbitrary variables in the network.
Section 4.5 considers alternative probabilistic semantics and shows that the defini-
tion of Section 4.3 is the weakest validating the inference mechanisms of Section 4.4.
Application of these techniques to the digitalis example is the subject of Section 4.6.
The second type of relationship, qualitative synergy, is defined, defended, and
analyzed in Section 4.7. The section also presents graphical algorithms for reasoning
about synergies in QPNs similar to those for qualitative influences. Analysis of the
digitalis model enhanced with synergy assertions demonstrates that useful properties
of the preferred therapy plan follow from purely qualitative assertions.
Section 4.8 contrasts the qualitative probabilistic network representation with
related work in AI, decision theory, and statistics. The relevance of these results to
previous qualitative reasoning applications is also discussed. A perspective on the
significance of this work is offered in the final section.
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4.2 Qualitative Probabilistic Networks
4.2.1 Network Models
A network model is a graph-like structure with nodes that represent variables and
edges and hyper-edges that describe relationships among them. In a probabilistic
model, the values of variables as well as their interrelationships are uncertain, defined
by a probability distribution over the joint value space. Probabilistic network models
have attracted much recent attention in AI, for example in Pearl's work on belief
networks [101, 103] and related formalisms [14, 77, 134]. The network formalism
developed here is accurately viewed as a qualitative abstraction of influence dia-
grams [61], which are belief networks with additional constructs to support decision-
making. Some terminology, notation, and even solution concepts (by analogy) are
borrowed from Shachter's work on influence diagram evaluation [123, 124].
Formally, a qualitative probabilistic network is a pair G = (V, Q). V is the set
of variables, or vertices of the graph. Variables are associated with a set of possible
values: for example, boolean for propositional event variables, or real intervals for
continuous parameters. Unlike most numeric schemes, there is no practical require-
ment to reformulate the value spaces into discrete, finite sets. Let X(a) denote the
domain of variable a. The domain of a tuple of variables is the product space of the
individual domains, for example, X((a, b)) = X(a) x X(b). The tuple will be written
as a set when the ordering is insignificant. Subscripted symbols denote values in the
domain of a variable.
The variable set V may contain one special variable v, called the value node. The
relationship between v and the other variables in the network express preferences
among states.
It is also useful to distinguish a set D C V - {v } of decision variables. A decision-
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making program takes variables in D to be under its control and therefore focuses on
deriving the implications on v of choosing different values for them. The remainder
of the variables in the network are random variables not under direct control of the
decision maker.
Q is a set of qualitative relationships among the variables. Qualitative relationships
express constraints on the joint probability distribution over the variables. Unlike the
numeric conditional probabilities specified in belief networks and influence diagrams,
they are not generally sufficient to determine the exact distribution. In fact, in a
purely qualitative network the absolute likelihood of any joint event is completely
unconstrained! Nevertheless, the qualitative relationships are carefully designed to
justify the deduction of a class of relative likelihood conclusions that in turn imply
useful decision-making properties. Note that nothing prevents us from building hybrid
models combining qualitative relationships with those more precise, although the
present work does not pursue that possibility.
There are two types of qualitative relationships in QPNs. Qualitative influences
describe the direction of the relationship between two variables. Qualitative synergies
describe interactions among influences. These concepts form the basis of the QPN
formalism and are developed in detail below.
4.2.2 Example: The Digitalis Therapy Advisor
The development of QPN concepts is illustrated with a simple causal model taken
from Swartout's program for digitalis therapy [141]. The model, shown in Figure 4.1,
is a fragment of the knowledge base that Swartout used to re-implement the Digitalis
Therapy Advisor [44] via an automatic programmer.
In the figure the circular nodes represent random variables. The rectangular node
is a decision variable, in this case denoting the dosage of digitalis (dig) administered
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Figure 4.1: Part of the causal model for digitalis therapy. The direction on a link from a
to b indicates the effect of an increase in a on b.
to the patient. The value node v is drawn within a hexagon and represents the utility
of the outcome to the patient.
Qualitative influences among the variables are indicated by dependence links,
annotated with a sign denoting the direction of the relationship.' Thus digitalis
negatively influences conduction (con) and positively influences automaticity (aut).
The former is the desired effect of the drug, because a decrease in conduction decreases
the heart rate (hr), which is considered beneficial for patients with tachycardia, the
population of interest here. The desirability of lower heart rates is represented by
the negative influence on the value node, asserting that lower rates increase expected
utility. The increase in automaticity is an undesired side-effect of digitalis because
this variable is positively related to the probability of ventricular fibrillation (vf), a
life-threatening cardiac state. Calcium (Ca) and potassium (K) levels also influence
the level of automaticity.
There are no links into the decision variable because the digitalis dosage is con-
sidered by the model to be under direct control.
A qualitative encoding of this model is appropriate for the knowledge base of a
general digitalis therapy program because a numeric description would require addi-
'Discussion of qualitative synergies holding in this example is deferred to Section 4.7.
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tional context information or be inaccurate. While the exact probabilistic relation-
ships among these variables vary from patient to patient, the directions of the relations
are reliably taken as constant. Conclusions drawn from this model are therefore valid
for a broad class of patients.
The conclusions we would like our programs to derive from the digitalis model
are those taken for granted in the description above. For example, we unthinkingly
assumed that the effects of digitalis on conduction and of conduction on heart rate
would combine to imply that digitalis reduces the heart rate. Further, because lower
heart rates are desirable, digitalis is therapeutic along the upper path. Conversely,
it is toxic along its lower path to the value node. The tradeoff between therapy and
toxicity cannot be resolved by mere qualitative influences.
The immediate task of this chapter is to develop a semantics for these qualitative
influences that justifies the kinds of inferences we require while providing the max-
imum robustness. In the sections below, I provide such a semantics in terms of a
probabilistic definition for qualitative influences. In Section 4.5 we will see that this
definition is the weakest in a reasonable class that justifies the conclusions mentioned
above.
4.3 Qualitative Influences Defined
4.3.1 Influence Notation
The qualitative links in the digitalis model above can be represented formally as edges
in the graph annotated by sign. Let Ss(a, b, G) denote the assertion that a qualitative
influence of a on b in direction (that is, sign) 6 holds in graph G = (V, Q).
Definition 4.1 (Qualitative influence edges) S'(a, b, G) - (a, b, 8) e Q, for all
E {+,-,0,?).
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By convention, SO links are left implicit in graphical displays of the network.
They would also typically be left implicit-inferable via a closed-world assumption-
in data structures representing qualitative networks. The pred function selects only
the predecessors exerting nonzero influence on a variable.
Definition 4.2 (predecessors)
1. Pred&(a, b) if (a, b, ) E Q, for some {+,-, ?}.
2. predG(b) {a I Pre&d(a,b)}.
3. pred*(b) { (a I pred,(a, b)}, where Pred* is the transitive closure of the Pred&
relation.
Note that for all d E D, predG(d) = 0. The subscript G is omitted when its value is
clear from context.
4.3.2 Probabilistic Semantics for Qualitative Influences
Consider two variables, a and b. Informally, when a and b denote boolean events, a
qualitative influence is a statement of the form "a makes b more (or less) likely." This
binary case is easy to capture in a probabilistic assertion. Let A and A denote the
assertions a = true and a = false, respectively, and similarly, B and B.
Definition 4.3 (binary S+ ) We say "a positively influences b" (stochastically) and
write S+(a, b, G), if for all z E X(predG(b) - {a}) such that z is consistent with both
A and A, 2
Pr(BIAz) > Pr(BlAz). (4.1)
2We can safely ignore cases where the conditional probabilities are undefined because these are
impossible contexts.
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In Definition 4.3, the contezt x ranges over all consistent assignments to the variables
other than a that influence b. (Henceforth, x in a formula will be understood as
universally quantified over the values of predecessor variables.) We need to include
the ceteris paribus condition here and in the definitions below so that qualitative
relations will be applicable in situations where x is partially or totally known. If we
had stated the S+ definition in marginal terms ("on average, a positively influences
b"), it would not be valid to apply it in specific contexts.
Because of this context dependence, S + holds in a particular network; programs
that alter the structure of the network may exhibit non-monotonicity in S+ relative
to its first two arguments [45]. In the following I omit the third argument only when
the context is unambiguous or inessential.
Conditions analogous to (4.1) and those following define negative and zero influ-
ences; I omit them for brevity. So, an assertion that (4.1) holds with equality, is the
familiar concept of conditional independence of a and b given b's direct influences. We
could rule out the independent case with strict versions of S+ and S-, but discussion
is limited to non-strict influences in this work.
S? always holds. It is included explicitly only so that we can represent So implicitly
in the lack of an influence assertion.
For binary variables, Bayes's rule implies that (4.1) is equivalent to
Pr(AIBz) > Pr(A•Bz). (4.2)
In the terminology of Bayesian revision, (4.1) is a condition on posteriors, while (4.2)
is a condition on likelihoods. Notice that S+(a, b) is simply an assertion that the
likelihood ratio is greater than or equal to unity.
Formalizing the intuitive idea that "higher values of a make higher values of b
more likely" is not quite as straightforward when a and b take on more than two val-
ues. An obvious prerequisite for such statements is some interpretation of "higher."
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Therefore, we require that each random variable appearing in an S+ or S- assertion
be associated with an order > on its values. This relation has the usual interpre-
tation for numeric variables such as "potassium concentration"; for variables like
"automaticity," a measurement scale and ordering relation must be contrived.
The more troublesome part of defining positive influences is specifying what it
means to "make higher values of b more likely." Intuitively, we want a statement that
the probability distribution for b shifts toward higher values as a increases. To make
such a statement, we need an ordering on cumulative probability density functions
(CDFs) Fb over b that captures the notion of "higher."
However, probability distributions cannot be straightforwardly ordered according
to the size of the random variable. Different rankings result from comparison of
distributions by median, mean, or mean-log, for example. We require an ordering
that is robust to changes of these measures because the random variables need be
described by merely ordinal scales [71]. An assertion that calcium concentration
positively influences automaticity should hold whether calcium is measured on an
absolute or logarithmic scale, and regardless of how we measure automaticity.
An ordering criterion with the robustness we desire is first-order stochastic domi-
nance (FSD) [162]. FSD holds for CDFs Fb and Fb iff for any given value b0 of b, the
probability of obtaining b0 or less is smaller for Fb than for Fb. That is, Fb FSD Ff iff
Vbo Fb(bo) < F (bo). (4.3)
A necessary and sufficient condition for (4.3) is that for all monotonically increasing
(that is, order-preserving) functions 4,
J S(bo)dFb(bo) _ f (bo)dF,(bo). (4.4)
That is, the mean of Fb is greater than the mean of Fb for any monotonic transform
of b. For further discussion and a proof that (4.3) is equivalent to (4.4), see [33].
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We are now ready to define qualitative influences.
Definition 4.4 (S + ) Let Fb(.laix) be the CDF for b given a = ai and context z.
Then S+(a,b) iff
Val, a2. al > a2 =# Fb(.Ialx) FSD Fb(.la2 X). (4.5)
Definition 4.4 is a generalization of Definition 4.3 under the convention that true >
false for binary events.
Like (4.1), (4.5) is a condition on posteriors. To achieve the strength of (4.5),
a definition of S+ in terms of likelihoods must imply FSD of the posteriors for any
prior distribution Fb. That is, we allow that there may be a context z inducing any
distribution on b. Milgrom [90] proves that the following condition is necessary and
sufficient for (4.5) to hold for any Fb(.Ix).
fa(allbix) fa(a2 lblZ)Vax, a2, bl, b2. al > a2 A b b ( ) f(a.2 b2X) (4.6)
In (4.6), fa(.lbiz) is the probability density function for a given b1 and x.
This condition is known in statistics as the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property
(MLRP) [3]. The necessity of MLRP for (4.5) is established by the special case of
dichotomous events. That (4.6) is a generalization of (4.2) is more clearly seen by
rewriting the latter as
Pr(AIBz) Pr(AIBz)> 1 > (4.7)Pr(AIBz) - - Pr(AlB(x) 7
For a demonstration of the sufficiency of MLRP, see Milgrom [90].
It is convenient to adopt special notation for influences on the value node v. The
value node is related to its predecessors by a utility function u : X(pred(v)) --* R [69].
Definition 4.5 (U + ) The variable a positively influences utility, U+(a), iff
Val, a2. a, 2 a2s = u(a,, z) > u(a2 , x). (4.8)
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The definition of U+(a) is a special case of S+(a,v) taking into account the determin-
istic relation (a degenerate probability distribution) between v and its predecessors
in the network.
4.4 Indirect Relationships
Edges in a graph of influence links constrain the direct relationship between pairs
of variables. Our next step is to design inference mechanisms to derive the indirect
relationships that follow from patterns of local influences.
First, let us define the canonical direction between two variables to be the strongest
qualitative influence derivable from those explicitly appearing in Q. The canonical
direction can be easily computed from Q by preferring an explicit 0 to the other Ss
(which are always consistent with 0 because the conditions are non-strict), preferring
+ or - to ?, and replacing the combination of + and - with 0.
Definition 4.6 (dir) Let S = {1 I (a,b, ) E Q}. The canonical direction of influ-
ence of a on b, dir(a, b, G), is given by
SifS =, OES,or {+,-} C S
+ ifS= {+} or S= {+,?}
dir(a, b, G) =
- s= {-} or s={-,?}
? otherwise.
If dir(a, b) = ? then a and b are dependent in an unknown, varying, or context-
dependent direction.
4.4.1 Probabilistic Dependence in Graph Representations
Definition 4.7 (dep) The dependency graph, dep(G), of G = (V, Q) is
dep(G) = (V, E), where (a, b) E E iff dir(a, b, G) # 0
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The dependency graph simply encodes the pattern of nonzero influences without
distinguishing the signs on the links. Pearl [104] has characterized the expressiveness
of these graphs with respect to the dependency structure of probability distributions.
Some results of this work and terminology developed there will prove useful in ana-
lyzing the properties of QPNs.
In a directed acyclic graph representation, two variables are conditionally inde-
pendent given any set of other variables that d-separates them in the graph.
Definition 4.8 (d-separation, Pearl [101]) Two variables a and b are d-separated
by a set of variables S in a directed acyclic graph iff for every undirected path from
a to b either:
1. there is a node s E S on the path with at least one of the incident edges leading
out of s, or
2. there is a node t on the path with both incident edges leading in, and neither t
nor any of its successors are in S.
The concept of d-separation is illustrated by the network of Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Variables a and b are d-separated by {w,z} but by no other subset of
{w) , y, , z}.
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The following implication of Definition 4.8 is useful in justifying the inference rules
for QPNs presented below.
Lemma 4.9 If b V predg*(a) then a and b are d-separated in dep(G) by any S such
that predG(b) C S C pred*(b).
Proofs of this lemma and subsequent results appear in Appendix B.
Taking S = predG(b), this result is the basis for our closed-world assumption
that dir(a, b, G) = 0 if there are no explicit influences in Q. If in addition there are
no directed paths from b to a, we adopt the default influence So(a, b). In Pearl's
terminology, this assumption is valid when dep(G) is an I-map--a graph for which
all d-separations are true conditional independencies.
4.4.2 Network Transformations
We answer queries about relations among separated variables in a QPN by transform-
ing the graph into one where the variables of interest are related directly. The method
is based on Shachter's algorithm for evaluating numeric influence diagrams [123] by
repeated reductions and arc reversals. Each manipulation preserves the probabilis-
tic relationships-qualitative in our case-holding among variables in the possibly
smaller set V. Shachter [124] shows that there is a sequence of manipulations to
answer a query about the relationship among any subset of variables in the network.
The two basic network transformation operators are reduction (red) and reversal
(rev). The reduced network red(b, G) is the qualitative probabilistic network obtained
by splicing variable b out of G and adjusting qualitative influences as dictated by The-
orem 4.11 below. Network rev(a, b, G) is obtained from G by replacing (a, b, 8) E Q
with the influence (b, a, 6) and updating other influences as specified in Theorem 4.12.
The exact reduction and reversal procedures are described in Section 4.4.3 below.
Both the red and rev operations preserve essential properties of the networks. Let
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G' = (V', Q') be the result of one of these operations. Then:
* dep(G') is acyclic.
* dep(G') is an I-map.
4.4.3 Variable Reductions
It is straightforward to demonstrate for the binary case that, in the absence of direct
links from a to b, S+(a, b, G) A S+(b, c, G) =j S+(a,c, red(b,G)). The ability to per-
form inference across influence chains is an essential property of a qualitative algebra.
From the digitalis model, for example, we would like to deduce that increasing the
dose of digitalis decreases the heart rate but increases the likelihood of ventricular fib-
rillation. Indeed, most programs with models like this would make such an inference.
Fortunately, the definition offered above for S+ implies transitivity for multi-valued
as well as binary variables.
Theorem 4.10
S61(a, 6, G) A S'2(b, c, G) A So(a, c, G) = S61 6 2(a, c, r ed(b, G)),
where i E {+, -0, ?0,} and ® denotes sign multiplication, described by Table 4.1.
+ - 0 ? $ + - 0 ?
+ + - 0 ? + + ? + ?
- - + 0 ? - ? - - ?
0 0 0 0 0 0 + - 0 ?
? ? ? 0 ? ? ? ? ? ?
Table 4.1: The 9 operator for combining influence chains and the $ operator for combining
parallel influences. For example, + 0 - = -.
Application of Theorem 4.10 requires that no direct influences exist between a and
c. A more general specification of the result of variable reduction is the following:
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Theorem 4.11
S6 1(a,b , G) A S6 2(b, c, G) A S ~ (a, c, G) =ý S(6102) 63'(a, c, red(b, G)), (4.9)
where D denotes sign addition, also described in Table 4.1.
Theorem 4.10 is really a corollary of Theorem 4.11 with 83 = 0, the identity element
for e.
Using this result, we can reduce any variables from the network by computing the
new direction for each pair of immediate predecessor and successor variables. To find
the qualitative influence of a on b given a set of variables W for any a E pred*(b) and
W C pred*(b) we need only splice out all other variables in the network. Because each
application of reduction rule (4.9) reduces the number of influence edges (including
zeroes) in the network by one, the complexity of this procedure is O(IVI2).3 This
contrasts with the corresponding problem for numeric probabilistic networks, which
is NP-hard [15]. Some sample reductions are displayed in Table 4.2.
4.4.4 Influence Reversals
The procedure developed above is valid when a E pred*(b) and W C pred*(b). Some-
times, however, we may be interested in the qualitative influence of a on b when the
paths in the network run in the other direction. In such cases we need to perform one
or more reversals in the network before or after applying the methods of the previous
section.
In reversing a qualitative influence link, we must preserve the essential properties
mentioned in Section 4.4.2 above. To ensure acyclicity, we can reverse the influence
from a to b only if there are no other directed paths between them. Reversal is also
3 In the worst case, this algorithm requires fl(IV12) operations for reducing a single variable. The
overall complexity is therefore O(IV12).
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original network
a b 82( c
s b 
82
a Ss c
83 d 8
dir (a, c)
(St 0 2) e 83
(8[ 62) (83)) ( 4)
[81 0 (82 E (85 0 64))] E (83 0 84)
Table 4.2: Some sample reductions. The right column contains the expression for dir(a, c)
in the network obtained by removing nodes between a and c. Fragments (1) and (2) corre-
spond to the situations of Theorems 4.10 and 4.11, respectively.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
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precluded if a is a decision variable. To guarantee that G' = rev(a, b, G) is an I-map,
each must gain the other's predecessors:
predGs(a) = predg,(b) = predG(a) U pred(b).
The definition for S'(a, b) (4.4) explicitly refers to the predecessors of b. Therefore,
when the predecessor structure changes we need to recompute the influences that may
be affected. The following result describes the influences holding after reversal.
Theorem 4.12 Let G' = rev(a, b, G). G' inherits all the qualitative influences of G
except:
1. dir(a, b, G') is undefined.
2. dir(b, a, G') = dir(a, b, G).
3. Vw E pred, (b),
dir(w, b, G') = [dir(w, a, G) ® dir(a, b, G)] dir(w, b, G).
4. Vw E predG,(a) - {b},
dir(w, , G') = dir(w,a,G) if dir(w,b,G) = 0
r? otherwise
= dir(w, a, G) (dir(w, b, G) ?).
This transformation is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
Some information is lost in the process of reversing influences. For example,
let G" = rev(a, b, rev(a, b, G)), the network obtained by reversing an influence then
reversing it again. Application of Theorem 4.12 twice yields the result depicted in
Figure 4.4. Although the link from a to b is correct, the reversal process weakens the
other links. It may be advisable to store information about the state of influences
before reversals so that it is recoverable for subsequent reasoning with the original
relationships.
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rev 82 e
Figure 4.3: Influence reversal.
rev 2
.rev
Figure 4.4: Information lost in a double reversal of the influence from a to b.
4.5 Weaker Conditions
4.5.1 Posterior Conditions
The preceding sections establish that the FSD condition for S+ (Definition 4.4) is
sufficient to support essential inferences such as the chaining of influences. In this
section I present some simple desiderata for a qualitative influence definition that
entail the necessity of FSD for these properties. I start by specifying the form such
definitions must take. To capture the intent of "higher values of a make higher values
of b more likely" in a probabilistic semantics, it seems reasonable to restrict attention
to conditions on the posterior distribution of b for increasing values of a. Therefore,
I postulate that a definition of S+(a, b) must be of the form
Val, a 2. a, > a2 F2 • b(.Ial) R Fb(.la2X),
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where R is some relation on CDFs. This condition is exactly (4.5) with FSD replaced
by the more abstract relation.
There are two basic desiderata that severely restrict the possible Rs. First, S +
must satisfy Theorem 4.10. Without the ability to chain inferences, the qualitative
influence formalism has little computational value. Second, the condition must be a
generalization of the original specification of S + for dichotomous variables (Defini-
tion 4.3). With only two possible values this appears to be a minimal monotonicity
condition. These criteria lead to a sharp conclusion.
Theorem 4.13 Let S+(a, b) be defined by (4.10). Given the following conditions:
1. Theorem 4.10
2. For binary b, al > a2, and z,
Fb(-.a-1) R F6(.Ia 2X) * Pr(Blaiz) > Pr(Bla 2X)
the weakest R is FSD.
The force of this result is weakened somewhat by the a priori restriction of def-
initions to those having the form of (4.10). Many statistical concepts of directional
relation (based on correlation or joint expectations, for example) do not fit (4.10) yet
appear to be plausible candidates for a definition of qualitative influence. Quadrant
dependence [78] holds between a and b when4
Val, a2.a, > at2 = Fa(.Ia < a,) FSD Fb(.Ia < a2). (4.11)
Lehmann proves that quadrant dependence is necessary but not sufficient for regres-
sion dependence, which is his terminology for (4.5) without the quantification over
4This is actually the condition Lehmann proposes as a strengthening of quadrant dependence.
The basic quadrant dependence fixes al at a's maximal value.
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contexts x. As quadrant dependence is weaker, yet still exhibits transitivity,5 it seems
to be an attractive alternative to regression dependence. To justify our choice of the
latter, we must consider the decision-making implications of probabilistic models.
4.5.2 Decision-Making with Qualitative Influences
The prime motivation for adopting a probabilistic semantics is so that the behavior of
our programs can be justified by Bayesian decision theory [121]. A decision of dl over
d2 (that is, such a choice of assignments to decision variables) is valid with respect
to a QPN if the network entails greater expected utility for the former. The most
useful distinctions to make in designing a qualitative representation are those that
will support inferences about properties of the valid decisions.
For example, if U+(a) and there are no indirect paths from decision variable a to
the value node, then a choice of al over a2 is valid iff al > a2, by the definition of
U+ (4.5).6 Decision-making power is enhanced if we can deduce new influences on
utility from chains of influences in the network. Our definition of qualitative influence
is necessary as well as sufficient for such inferences.
Theorem 4.14 Suppose U6'(b, G) and U0(a, G). A necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for U6 1s62(a, red(b, G)) is S61(a, b, G) as in Definition 4.4.
Figure 4.5 depicts this situation with 82 = +.
Theorem 4.14 demonstrates that while conditions weaker than S+, such as quad-
rant dependence, may be sufficient for propagating influences across chains, they are
not adequate to justify decisions across chains. For choosing among alternatives, the
SFor transitivity we need to quantify over contexts in (4.11). The proof parallels that for Theo-
rem 4.10.
'The existence of other paths from a to utility would leave open the possibility that the net
influence of a is negative. For example, we could summarize the therapeutic effect of digitalis
through conduction and heart rate as a direct positive influence. But this might be outweighed by
the indirect negative influence of digitalis via automaticity.
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a  b +
Figure 4.5: Chaining utility influences. The influence 61 = + in G is necessary and
sufficient for U+(a, red(b, G)).
relevant parameter is the utility function evaluated at a point; utilities conditioned on
intervals of the decision variable (as in quadrant dependence) do not have the same
decision-making import.
4.6 Back to the Digitalis Model
To summarize the discussion of qualitative influences thus far, let us return to the
digitalis example presented in Section 4.2.2. We are interested in computing the effect
of the decision variable, dig, on utility. The network of Figure 4.1 reduces to the one
depicted in Figure 4.6a, which further reduces to that of 4.6b.
dig
(a) (b)
Figure 4.6: Reduction of the digitalis model. (a) Digitalis is therapeutic in its effect on
conduction but toxic via the influence on automaticity. (b) The overall effect of digitalis
cannot be resolved with qualitative influences.
The result, not surprisingly, is ambiguous. Purely qualitative influences are too
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weak to determine optimal decisions in the presence of true tradeoffs. Nevertheless,
the QPN is sufficient to determine some influences (for example, Ca on vf), and
uncovers the source of indeterminacy in others.
In the next section, a second type of qualitative relationship is introduced: quali-
tative synergy. Synergies complement influences by providing constraint on the inter-
actions among probabilistic influences. Although synergies cannot resolve the tradeoff
of Figure 4.6b, they can provide useful facts about the relation of the optimal digitalis
dosage to other variables in the model.
4.7 Qualitative Synergy
Swartout's XPLAIN knowledge base includes the "domain principle" that if a state
variable acts synergistically with the drug to induce toxicity, then smaller doses should
be given for higher observed values of the variable [141]. This fact could be derived by
a domain-independent inference procedure given a suitable definition for qualitative
synergy. Two variables synergistically influence a third if their joint influence is
greater (in the sense of FSD) than separate, statistically independent influences. In
the digitalis example, we need to assert that digitalis acts at least independently with
Ca and K deviations in increasing automaticity. For the desired result, we also need
the fact that heart rate and ventricular fibrillation are synergistic in their influence on
utility. (This synergy is due to our indifference to heart rate-indeed it is undefined-
for patients in fibrillation. The relation of this indifference to synergy is clarified in
Section 4.7.6 below.)
Figure 4.7 illustrates the QPN for digitalis enhanced by synergy assertions. Potas-
sium (K) is omitted for simplicity; its implications are analogous (with sign reversal)
to those for calcium. Qualitative synergies are indicated by a boxed sign with multi-
ple inputs and a single output. The input variables are synergistic in the designated
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Figure 4.7: The digitalis model with synergy. A boxed sign indicates that the inputs are
qualitatively synergistic in their influence on the output.
direction in their influence on the output variable.
4.7.1 Synergy Notation
Qualitative synergies are the second type of qualitative relationship represented in Q
for a QPN G = (V, Q). As qualitative influences are directed edges augmented by
sign, qualitative synergies are directed hyper-edges with a sign label. A qualitative
synergy assertion that the variables in T C V are synergistic in direction 6 on variable
w is written Y 6(T, w,G).
Definition 4.15 (Qualitative synergy hyper-edges) Y6(T,w,G) = (T,w, ) E
Q.
4.7.2 Qualitative Synergy Defined
A formal definition of qualitative synergy must capture the informal intuition ex-
pressed above that the "joint influence is greater than separate statistically indepen-
dent influences." This will be the case when the effect of varying one variable is
enhanced by simultaneous variation of the other.
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The joint influence of two variables a and b on a third, c, is expressed by the con-
ditional cumulative distribution for c, Fc(.Iab). To compare magnitude of "influence,"
we need some reference points. One way to measure a difference in influence is to take
the difference of two conditional CDFs. Two variables are synergistic if the difference
associated with raising one is greater (in the sense of FSD) for higher values of the
second.
Definition 4.16 (qualitative synergy, Y') Variables a and b are synergistic on c
in network G, written Y+({a,b},c, G) iff
Val, a2, b, b2, Co. al > a2 A bl _ b2 =:€
Fc(colaxbx) - Fc(cola 2bxx) < F,(colaxbzz)- Fc(cola2b2x). (4.12)
Replacing < in condition (4.12) by > or = defines sub-synergy or zero synergy (Y-
and YO), respectively. If the variable set T in Y 6 (T,w, G) contains more than two
elements, the condition above holds for all pairs of variables in T.
As usual, x ranges over assignments to the other predecessors of c.
The inequality (4.12) quantified over co can be viewed as stochastic dominance of
the respective distributions of CDF differences. The condition means that raising a
from a2 to ax has a greater effect for higher values of b. Note that the inequality is
symmetric in a and b.
If So(a, c), then Yo({a,w}, c) follows immediately for any variable w E pred*(c)
because of conditional independence. With conditional independence, Fe(.|lawx) =
F,(.la2ws) for all w and x, therefore both sides of equation (4.12) are zero.
Lacking an explicit synergy assertion for two or more variables that are predeces-
sors of another, the prudent closed-world assumption is Y': no constraint on their
interaction.' Although it is reasonable to assume So in the absence of knowledge to
'In the examples of this section, all synergies are specified explicitly.
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the contrary, in this case, the variables are tied by a common immediate successor.
They are not d-separated by this successor, and interactions in situations with this
pattern are quite common.
Fortunately, there are several prototypical patterns of systematic interaction that
might alleviate the burden of specifying qualitative synergies. One that has attracted
some interest in the literature on numeric probabilistic networks is the "noisy OR
gate" model proposed by Pearl [103, Chapter 4].
In the noisy OR model, the binary-valued predecessors of a binary "effect" vari-
able are considered separate possible causes of the effect. Each "cause" variable is
associated with a parameter pi representing the probability of the effect given that
this variable is true and all other predecessors are false. We can compute the rest of
the conditional probabilities for y under the assumption that the "inhibiting events"
that prevent Y given each Zi are independent. For effect variable y with predecessors
zl ,..., z,, the conditional probabilities are:
Pr(Yjz 1 ... z,) = 1- IJ (1- pi). (4.13){iIZs}
Regardless of the magnitudes of the pis, the noisy OR model entails sub-synergy,
Y-. To see this, consider the Y- condition ((4.12) with the inequality reversed) for
the special case of binary variables. Y- ({zj, zk , y) iff:
Vz E X({zili i j Ai kIc})
Pr(YIZjZkz) - Pr(Yl|jZkZ) < Pr(YIZjZkZ) - Pr(YlZjZk,). (4.14)
Let
po = 1 (1- pi), where Z(x) = {i Zi in assignment x}.
z(Z)
Then from the noisy OR model (4.13),
Pr(YIZjZkx) - Pr(YljZk) = pApj(1 - pk), and (4.15)
Pr(YIZZkxZ) - Pr(YZj2kZx) = ppj. (4.16)
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Because 0 _ pk < 1, the expression in (4.15) is no greater than that of (4.16),
satisfying the binary Y- condition (4.14). Figure 4.8 illustrates the relation between
a numeric probabilistic network using the noisy OR model and its corresponding
QPN.
Figure 4.8: (a) The "noisy OR" model, and (b) its corresponding qualitative abstraction.
It is also easy to verify that Henrion's generalizations of the noisy OR model [52]
entail Y-. Intuitively, a noisy OR is sub-synergistic because, as with deterministic
OR gates, raising an input has less effect when other inputs are already raised. In
contrast, a model based on a probabilistic generalization of "gating conditions" (see
Rieger and Grinberg [113]) would be synergistic because an increase in one variable
enables the effect of the other. More generally, we should expect non-"?" synergy
results from canonical models because any representation that specifies an n-way
influence in terms of O(n) parameters must employ some systematic assumption
about interactions.8
4.7.3 Supermodularity, Y6, and Monotone Decisions
The Y' definition relates closely to the concept of supermodular functions [115, 146].
SDempster's rule of combination is also sub-synergistic under an analogous definition of synergy
in terms of belief functions [126]. A demonstration of this requires further assumptions regarding
how to interpret conditioning as evidence combination.
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Definition 4.17 (supermodularity, Ross [115]) A function g such that, for all
al > a2 and bl > b2:
g(ax, bl) + g(a 2, b2) - g(al, b2) + g(a2, bi) (4.17)
is called supermodular. If (4.17) holds with equality, then g is modular, and if the
inequality is reversed, g is submodular.
The most important property of supermodular functions, from our perspective,
is that they imply monotone decisions. Let the function ag(b) choose the value of a
that maximizes g for the given b.
a,(b) = arg max g(a, b).
It can be shown that a,(-) increases monotonically in b if g is supermodular (see
Ross [115, p. 6]).
The following result clarifies the connection between Y6 and supermodularity.
Lemma 4.18 Y+({a,b},c) (respectively Y- and YO) holds iff the function
e(a, b I) = (c)/fc(coIab)dco
is supermodular (submodular, modular) in a and b for all increasing functions 0 and
contezts z.
The function e0 is the expectation of c under the monotonic transform q. The
equivalence between submodularity for all c (Definition 4.16, the Y+ condition) and
supermodularity of expectations for all 4 is reminiscent of the correspondence between
the FSD condition (4.3) and increasing expectations for all 0 (4.4).
Once again, it is useful to define special notation for synergistic influences on the
value node.
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Definition 4.19 (Y6) Y (T, G) - Y(T,v, G). The direction of synergy S is +, -,
or 0 as u is supermodular, submodular, or modular under all monotonic transforms.
In the terminology of utility theory, S-modularity expresses multiattribute risk
aversion, proneness, or neutrality as 6 is -, +, or 0, respectively [27, 112]. Multiat-
tribute risk neutrality is equivalent to additive separability for u [32], as suggested by
the form of the modularity condition (4.17).
The correspondence between YJ and supermodularity is useful because of the
monotone decision property of supermodular functions. Consider the situation of
Figure 4.9. There we have Y+({a,b}) even though dir(a,v) = dir(b,v) = ?. Qual-
itative influences alone tell us nothing about which value we should choose for the
decision variable a. Positive synergy, on the other hand, implies that if b is observable,
our policy should be to choose higher values of a for greater values of the observed b.
While this still does not reveal the exact value of the optimal a, it dictates the form
that our strategy should take.
Figure 4.9: Synergistic influence on utility. Even though U?(a) and U?(b) we can deduce
that the optimal choice of a is increasing in b.
4.7.4 Propagation of Synergies in Networks
The mechanisms for deducing indirect synergies that hold in a QPN are analogous
to the network transformation techniques for qualitative influences developed in Sec-
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tion 4.4. In particular, we can extend qualitative synergies through qualitative influ-
ences by variable reduction.
Theorem 4.20 Synergies can be extended along qualitative influences by reduction
according to the following:
Y 61({a, b}, c, G) A S6 2(c, d, G) A So(a, d, G) A So(b, d, G) -
Y610 62({a, b}, d, red(c, G)).
This reduction is depicted in Figure 4.10.
\G' = r ed(c, G)
Figure 4.10: Propagation of synergy through qualitative influences. Values for dir(a, d, G')
and dir(b, d, G') follow from Theorem 4.10. The new synergy y61862 is the result of Theo-
rem 4.20.
Like Theorem 4.10, Theorem 4.20 requires that there be no direct influences among
the variables newly linked in the reduced QPN. The next result provides the reduction
rule for the more general case.
Theorem 4.21
Y 6'((a, b}, c, G) A S6 (c, d, G) A Y 6'({a, c}, d, G) A Y 6 (({b, c}, d, G)
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AS61(a,c, G) A S6"(b,c, G) A Y6"({a, b},d, G) #
y( s62 )$((63s 66)0(6461~ )@6' ({a, b}, d, r ed(c, G)). (4.18)
Theorem 4.21 generalizes Theorem 4.20 because So(a, d, G) A So(b, d, G) =- 83 = 84 =
87 = 0 by conditional independence.
Note that the signs of direct influences from a and b to d do not affect the synergy
propagation, though the signs of influences on c do. This more complicated situation
is illustrated in Figure 4.11 below.
8n. = (810 82) E
e
(83 0 86)
87
Figure 4.11: Variable reduction with parallel synergies.
A special case of this result demonstrates how to propagate synergies backwards
through qualitative influences. Upon reduction, a variable's predecessors assume its
role in all synergies, with modified signs reflecting the direction of the predecessor's
influence.
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Corollary 4.22
Y'3({a, c}, d, G) A Ss6 (b, c, G) A Yo({a, b}, c, G) A So(a, c, G) =•
Y' 8 s6 ( { a, b}, d, r ed(c, G))
The result follows from the assignment 61 = 8s = 87 = 0 in Theorem 4.21. Application
of Corollary 4.22 is illustrated in Figure 4.12.
G' = red(c, G)
Figure 4.12: Backwards propagation of synergies through qualitative influences.
For an example of the use of backwards propagation, consider a synergy relation
from the digitalis model. In the more detailed model of Figure 4.13, the effects of
variables dig (digitalis dosage) and Ca (measured serum calcium) would be mediated
by dig' and Ca', the actual concentrations of digitalis and calcium in the bloodstream.
Even though the synergy assertion is in terms of the physiological parameters, we can
deduce synergy on the practically relevant proxy variables by reduction according to
Corollary 4.22.
A canonical decision situation with the above form is the estimation problem
from statistics. The problem is to choose an estimate a of the true "state of nature"
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Figure 4.13: An elaboration of a digitalis model fragment. Variables dig and Ca represent
dosage and measurement, respectively, while the primed versions are actual concentrations.
The unprimed variables are synergistic by reduction of dig and Ca' .
0 given only an observation z that is statistically related to 0. Karlin and Rubin [67]
demonstrate that if
1. the optimal estimate is increasing in 0 (the monotone decision property of Sec-
tion 4.7.3),
2. utility decreases away from the optimum, and
3. z is related to 0 by the MLRP (the likelihood condition for S + (4.6), Sec-
tion 4.3.2),
then a and z also satisfy the monotone decision property.
By representing the estimation problem as the QPN of Figure 4.14, we see that
Corollary 4.22 is a similar result, with the monotone decision property replaced by the
stronger condition of qualitative synergy. Synergy seems justified for the estimation
problem because the relative value of a higher estimate increases with the state of
nature.
The applicability of the setup in Figure 4.14 goes well beyond estimation. Sup-
pose the state of nature 0 represents an unobservable disease severity and the decision
variable a the aggressiveness of therapy. Choosing a therapy level is similar to esti-
mating the severity of disease, as more serious conditions call for stricter treatments.
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Figure 4.14: A qualitative probabilistic network for the estimation problem.
It is essential that a program be capable of inferring the qualitative implications for
therapy of any symptom z related to disease severity in a known direction.
4.7.5 Landmark Values
The monotone decision property can be used to develop a concept of landmark values
for QPNs analogous to the landmark value concept in qualitative simulation [73].
A landmark value is any distinguished point in the domain of a variable. Their
usefulness to qualitative reasoning accrues when landmark values of several variables
correspond in a meaningful way or the point has some other qualitative significance
for the application.
In QPNs, the interesting landmarks are optimal values of decision variables and
the corresponding values of observable non-decision variables. Suppose that in the
disease-severity interpretation of Figure 4.14, the variable z represents an observable
symptom with a specially designated "normal" value of z*. There is a corresponding
landmark value of the decision variable, a*, representing the optimal level of therapy
given z = z*. The value of a* may be known to the program, especially if there is
documented experience with z-normal patients, everything else being equal. Even if
its exact value is not known, or if it depends on other variables, the a* concept has
meaning as a landmark value in terms of its optimality property.
Suppose further that a patient presents with an elevated z-value of z' > z*. The
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qualitative implication drawn from our model is that the corresponding optimal ther-
apy a' is increased, a' > a*, all else being equal. As correspondences in the quantity
space [34] are known in finer detail, the program can determine optimal strategies
with increasing precision.
4.7.6 Synergy in the Digitalis Example
To complete our discussion of qualitative synergy, let us return to the digitalis model
of Figure 4.7. As promised, I start by justifying the synergy relation between hr and
vf
Consider two heart rates, hrl > hr2, and the two values of the binary variable vf.
The synergy condition, YJ+({hr, vf}), is an instantiation of Definition 4.19:
u(hri, VF) - u(hr2, VF) 2 u(hri, ,T) - u(hr2, TF). (4.19)
Given VF, the heart rate is irrelevant (and ill-defined because ventricular fibrillation
is a state where the heart is not contracting regularly). Therefore, the left-hand side
of (4.19) is zero. For patients not in fibrillation, lower heart rates are preferable, by
U-(hr), at least within the range considered here. This implies that the right-hand
side of (4.19) is negative, satisfying the inequality.
By applying the results of Section 4.7.4, we can successively reduce any variables
positioned between the ones of interest. Figure 4.15 shows the result of removing all
but dig, Ca, and v. The final step, transformation from the fragment of Figure 4.15a
to that of 4.15b, requires parallel combination of synergies using Theorem 4.21.
The final result of the exercise is that while the value of administering digitalis is
ambiguous, by U?(dig), we can deduce that the optimal dosage is a decreasing function
of calcium, by Y7 ({ dig, Ca}). The more detailed model of Figure 4.13 showed us that
this result holds whether we are talking about the actual substance concentrations
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(h'~
Figure 4.15: Transformation of the digitalis model with synergy: (a) collapsing the ther-
apeutic pathway and consolidating the toxic, (b) final situation after reduction of vf.
in the bloodstream or about the amounts administered and measured by imperfect
means.
Inferences of this sort play a central role in therapy planning and in the devel-
opment of consultation systems via automatic programming [94, 141]. For planning,
this type of result is a constraint on the class of admissible plans, significantly pruning
the search space [158]. This is an especially useful kind of constraint for the auto-
matic generation of a consultation system because the qualitative form of the solution
corresponds to the structure of part of the target code.
The digitalis dosage d* for patients with normal calcium-a distinguished point
in the quantity space for Ca-is a landmark value as described in Section 4.7.5. Sub-
synergy implies that the dosage for a patient with calcium above normal should be
lower than d*. This is essentially the strategy of the digitalis program produced by
Swartout's XPLAIN system [141], where a domain principle mandates that dosage
should be adjusted according to "drug sensitivities." QPNs provide a more general
and principled language for encoding domain knowledge, from which policies such as
this can be derived.
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4.8 Related Work
The QPN representation and reasoning techniques presented here borrow many con-
cepts from other work in AI and decision theory. The most obvious debt is to research
in numeric probabilistic networks, especially that of Pearl [103] and Shachter [123].
This work also relates to other efforts by similarity of purpose. In the following
sections I compare it with research in qualitative probability, ordering relations on
random variables, and qualitative reasoning.
4.8.1 Qualitative Probability
The central task in designing a qualitative probability representation-indeed in the
design of a qualitative representation for anything-is choosing the important qualita-
tive distinctions to make. For example, a straightforward mapping of techniques from
qualitative physics might suggest that we carve up the [0, 1] probability scale into a
quantity space by choosing a small set of designated reference points. For example,
the set of points {.01,.05,.5,.95, .99} might be chosen as especially significant.
Such a scheme is a non-starter because it is only by coincidence that the important
qualitative thresholds for any problem will align themselves with the fixed boundaries
in the probabilistic quantity space. Furthermore, it is not clear that the types of
manipulations typically performed on probabilities will respect these boundaries in
a systematic fashion. Though I do not know of any serious proposal along these
simplistic lines, attempts to construct qualitative notions of absolute probability (see,
for example, the work of Halpern and colleagues [47, 48]) are likely to encounter
similar problems. Unlike the scales of physical parameters, the probability interval
does not appear to have values (except the endpoints) that are universally interesting
or even of special significance within a domain. And the qualification problem [130]
is inevitably important here because one can almost always think of conditions that
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would bring the probability of any non-analytic event outside any given non-universal
range.
This suggests that it might be more appropriate to base qualitative probability
concepts on relative likelihoods. A relative likelihood logic permits statements that
one formula is more likely than another [28, 39]. Absolute probability is subsumed
by a scheme of this type given a set of special formulas corresponding to canonical
chance situations (such as experiments with an idealized coin) of all probabilities.
The qualitative relationships presented here can be viewed as a special case of rel-
ative likelihood where only assertions about the comparative probability of particular
conditional events are permitted. Both S6 and Y' are limited to comparisons of the
likelihood of a given event under different conditions. For the binary case, S6 induces
a quantity space on the likelihood ratio (4.7) with a distinguished value of one.
There are three primary advantages to restricting the formalism to these special
likelihood comparisons. First, the class is closed under the reduction operations
presented in Sections 4.4 and 4.7, and thereby is supportive of tractable inference
procedures. Second, the ability to deduce decision properties suggests that these
comparisons are making some of the significant qualitative distinctions. And third,
the ceteris paribus condition in the definitions reduces the impact of the qualification
problem, as does the embedding of the formalism in closed-world networks.
The enterprise of qualitative probability is not necessarily hostile to quantita-
tive probability. In Savage's axiomatization of Bayesian decision theory [121, Chap-
ter 3], the qualitative likelihood ordering logically precedes development of quantita-
tive probability measures. 9 The existence of a numeric representation for likelihood is
only a convenient fact that simplifies much of the theory and supports some direct ap-
9Strictly speaking, the qualitative theory is more general than the quantitative one, which typi-
cally requires some sort of additivity axiom. This is not, however, a motivation for the present work
(indeed, the proofs assume additivity), which stresses advantages for knowledge representation and
computation.
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plications. The emphasis to date on numerical probability representations in applied
decision theory and AI is due more to technological history than to any fundamental
requirement that we focus exclusively on the precise extreme of the representation
spectrum.
4.8.2 Relations on Random Variables
Philosophers have long attempted to develop mathematical definitions of causality,
occasionally producing probabilistic interpretations. Motivated by a more limited
set of concerns, I have ignored in this treatment temporal properties, mechanisms,
and other issues salient to causality. These matters aside, Suppes [140] proposes
a probabilistic condition for binary events that is equivalent to S + (4.1) without
the context quantification. For multi-valued variables, Suppes suggests quadrant de-
pendence (4.11). A cause is considered spurious if the probabilistic relation can be
explained by a prior common cause. The concept of spuriousness can be partially
captured in QPNs by distinguishing qualitative influences inferred via arc reversals
(spurious) from those derivable solely from reductions along influence chains (gen-
uine). This is similar in spirit to the approach of Simon [131], and is equivalent to
the distinction emphasized by Pearl [102] between causal and evidential support.
As suggested previously, ordering of random variables has also attracted con-
siderable interest in statistics [3, 78, 115] and decision theory [162]. Milgrom [90]
demonstrates the application of MLRP to theoretical problems in informational eco-
nomics.
The key difference between the S+ definition proposed here and previous work
is that we obtain transitivity by requiring the condition to hold in all contexts.
Humphreys [64] proves a special case of Theorem 4.10 to the effect that binary quali-
tative influences along Markov chains (graphs where each node has a single predeces-
124
CHAPTER 4. QUALITATIVE PROBABILISTIC NETWORKS
sor, thereby eliminating context) can be combined by sign multiplication. In contrast,
Suppes demonstrates that the causal algebra induced by his condition-defined only
at the margin-does not possess the transitive property. A causal algebra either lack-
ing sound reduction rules like those of Section 4.4.3 or restricted to simple Markov
chains would have little value for knowledge representation.
Considerably less attention has been devoted to relations of probabilistic synergy.
The supermodularity concept of Section 4.7.3 has not, to my knowledge, previously
been interpreted in a probabilistic context. However, a constraint similar in spirit to
sub-synergy was exploited by NESTOR [14, page 102], a diagnostic program based on
probabilistic inequalities. (NESTOR used qualitative influences to bound probability
intervals as well.) And we saw in Section 4.7.2 that several canonical probabilistic
models proposed for AI programs are special cases of yV.
4.8.3 Qualitative Reasoning
It might appear at first glance that the very imprecision sanctioned by qualitative
mechanisms obviates the need to consider explicitly uncertainty underlying the mod-
els. This position, however, confounds the weakness of inferences and input speci-
fications with other kinds of variability in the model. The distinction is crucial be-
cause the latter might undermine the soundness of conclusions drawn from qualitative
knowledge bases.
The interpretation of a set of qualitative physical relationships as "qualitative
differential equations" (see Kuipers [73], for example) treats each relationship as a
constraint on some "true" functional relationship that holds over time. To assert that
b = M+(a) (in Kuipers's notation) is to claim that there exists an increasing function
f such that bt = f(at) for all t. This is incompatible with a probabilistic interpre-
tation, even though f is only loosely constrained. A qualitative influence assertion
125
CHAPTER 4. QUALITATIVE PROBABILISTIC NETWORKS
of S+(a, b), on the other hand, leaves open the possibility that the relationship is
non-deterministic (f might vary over time) and does not prohibit an increase in a
from coinciding with a decrease in b.
Application of qualitative-physics inference mechanisms in a probabilistic environ-
ment is dangerous because they tend to take as impossible what is merely unlikely.
For example, Forbus's measurement interpretation algorithm for Qualitative Process
theory [35] prunes away the qualitative behaviors that are inconsistent with obser-
vations of the system. If the dynamics of the system are really probabilistic (I do
not claim that this is the case for Forbus's application), then this step is not valid
because no behaviors are truly inconsistent. In such a situation, measurements serve
to change the likelihoods of various behaviors but never to rule them out. This dif-
ference is vital in a critical application because some highly unlikely behaviors may
nevertheless be important enough to demand attention from the reasoner.
Though we cannot prune measurement interpretations, we might be able to per-
form some pruning on the plan space using the techniques presented above. A partic-
ular measurement does not in general reveal any facts about the other model variables
with certainty, yet it may allow us to deductively conclude that some decision vari-
ables (perhaps dials in the control room) should be adjusted in particular directions.
4.9 Conclusion
4.9.1 Summary
A QPN model represents qualitative constraints on the probabilistic relationships
among a set of variables. In this chapter I have defined and analyzed two ba-
sic constraint types: qualitative influences that express direct relationships between
variables, and qualitative synergies that express interactions among influences. The
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probabilistic definitions justify sound graph-based inference procedures that answer
queries about the qualitative relationship of any subset of variables in the model.
Qualitative relationships involving the special value variable v dictate structural prop-
erties of the optimal assignment to decision variables.
Despite the ubiquity of constructs similar to qualitative influences in knowledge
representation mechanisms, there has been little study of the semantics of these state-
ments. Previous work either denies the probabilistic nature of the relationships among
variables in the model or takes for granted the ability to draw inferences by chaining
influences in the network. I have defined a positive qualitative influence of a on b as
an assertion that, in all contexts, the posterior probability distribution for b given a
is stochastically increasing (in the sense of FSD) in a. A series of results provides
theoretical support for this S' definition:
* S6 justifies reduction of variables by influence chaining. Reduction of any subset
of variables can be performed in O(IV12) time.
* S6 permits some nontrivial conclusions upon influence reversal.
* S6 is the weakest posterior condition that justifies chaining of influences.
* S6 is necessary and sufficient for chaining decisions across influences.
Two variables a and b are positively synergistic on c if the posterior distribution
for c is increased more (in the sense of FSD) upon a positive change in a for higher
values of b. This Y 6 definition has several computationally and decision-theoretically
useful properties:
* Canonical models such as the "noisy OR" often entail Y6 .
* Y6 is equivalent to supermodularity on expectation with respect to all mono-
tonic transformations.
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* Yu implies the monotone decision property.
* Synergies may be propagated forwards or backwards along qualitative influ-
ences.
Together, the two qualitative relationships provide a simple yet powerful model-
ing language. A planner is often able to derive important facts about the qualitative
structure of optimal strategies from only weak premises on the qualitative relation-
ships in the domain.
4.9.2 Discussion
Though powerful in some respects, the qualitative relationships are also quite limited.
As we saw in Section 4.6, qualitative influences are unable to resolve true tradeoffs
because parallel influences of different sign are indeterminate in combination (+ ($- =
?). Indeed, "unresolvable in a QPN" might be the best available formal definition of
a tradeoff situation.
Thus, a QPN knowledge base can support planning "up to tradeoffs." To proceed
beyond that point, we need more precise knowledge of the domain. I see no insur-
mountable barriers to the development of hybrid representations that augment QPNs
with stronger constraints, up to and including constraint to exact numeric values. As
mentioned above, features of such a hybrid scheme were explored by Cooper in the
NESTOR project [14]. While NESTOR's basic representation was probability intervals,
it applied constraints similar to qualitative influences and synergies to bound the
result of certain combination operations.
Finally, evaluation of QPNs as a knowledge representation must also take into
account the feasibility of constructing knowledge bases of reasonable complexity. For
reasons discussed above, QPNs should be substantially easier to generate than their
numeric counterparts. This prospect is explored further in the next two chapters,
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which describe SUDO-PLANNER's knowledge base and its procedure for constructing
QPNs from the KB.
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Chapter 5
Effects of Actions
The representation of effects is a central issue in planning research and is perhaps the
factor that most distinguishes different designs. The topic requires special attention
in this work because traditional representations cannot accommodate actions with
uncertain effects. Mechanisms from previous work in planning under uncertainty
have limited applicability for SUDO-PLANNER because the descriptions of effects were
not specifically designed to support dominance-proving.
The first three sections in this chapter address basic issues that loom large in
efforts to design a representation for the effects of actions. The distinction between
terminological and assertional knowledge has implications for the role of effects in
characterizing actions in a knowledge base. The frame problem remains an obstacle
in the quest for tractable action representations that are formally sound. Finally, a
realistic action representation must provide for context-dependent effects, though AI
planners have traditionally lacked this facility.
The discussion of basic issues prepares the way for a presentation of SUDO-
PLANNER's representation. Effects in SUDO-PLANNER are based on the qualitative
relations of Chapter 4. Section 5.4 describes the knowledge base constructs for speci-
fying effects and discusses some difficulties in relating them precisely to QPN seman-
tics. Section 5.5 introduces the Markov influence, a special construct that facilitates
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specification of simple temporal effect patterns. Inheritance of effect assertions in the
event taxonomy is the subject of Section 5.6. Finally, Section 5.7 describes SUDO-
PLANNER's mechanism for handling the information-gathering behavior of actions.
SUDO-PLANNER's procedure for generating QPNs from the knowledge base of effect
assertions is presented in Chapter 6.
5.1 Terminological and Assertional Knowledge
Philosophers and knowledge representation theorists sometimes emphasize the dis-
tinction between knowledge that is definitional for a concept and factual information
true only by happenstance. On the AI side, for example, Woods contrasts struc-
tural (definitional) and assertional (factual) features of semantic network represen-
tations [165, Section III.J]. The KRYPTON knowledge representation system [6] real-
izes this distinction by explicitly separating its terminological (definitional) reasoning
component ("T-box") from the assertional reasoner ("A-box").
SUDO-PLANNER's representation for actions (Section 3.2) is based on NIKL, the
T-box of KL-TWO [150]. Its taxonomy of action types, therefore, is based entirely
on terminological knowledge.' Conversely, SUDO-PLANNER uses the action defini-
tions exclusively to generate the taxonomic relations among action types. Mixing
assertional knowledge with the definitions of actions in a terminological system like
NIKL interferes with classification, thereby degrading the effectiveness of taxonomic
reasoning. Haimowitz et al. [46] recount other undesirable consequences of T-box
abuse.
In principle, actions could be defined in part by their effects. For example, we
could define treatment as an action that alleviates some disease, and its specializa-
'There is substantial room for philosophical controversy about whether the information in NIKL
concept specifications is truly definitional. All that matters for this discussion, however, is that the
reasoner interprets the specifications as definitions.
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tion CAD-treatment by value-restricting the disease role to CAD. Alternatively,
actions can be defined operationally, that is, in terms of their objects, instruments,
and procedures.
Permitting both types of definition presents a difficulty for terminological reason-
ing because the effects of operationally defined actions are typically not derivable
from their specifications. For example, CABG is in fact a CAD-treatment, but
this does not follow from its operational definition. It is unclear whether CABG
should be classified as such in the taxonomy of Figure 5.1 because this would inhibit
proper classification of its operationally defined subtypes, depending on the specifi-
cation conventions and the classification algorithm.
treatment
CAD-treatment AIDS-treatment miracle-cure
CABG AIDS-cure
Figure 5.1: A pseudo taxonomy where actions are defined by their effects.
Defining actions by their effects makes it difficult to ensure that the agent can
actually execute actions prescribed by the planner. The action type AIDS-cure in
Figure 5.1, defined as a "treatment that cures AIDS," is perfectly coherent, but it
cannot be implemented because it has no known instances (at the time of this writing).
Unless the planner realizes this, it will offer vacuous recommendations whenever it
encounters AIDS patients.
To prevent this potential fallacy, all information about the effects of actions in
SUDO-PLANNER is treated as assertional knowledge. Definitions of actions must be
"ineffective," referring only to operational features, as described above. Although
nothing in SUDO-PLANNER's representation guarantees that definitions are operational
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or that action types are instantiable and implementable, banishing effects ensures
that SUDO-PLANNER is not subject to the wishful-thinking delusion illustrated by the
AIDS-cure action.
This is not to say that any scheme using "effective" definitions will produce prac-
tically worthless plans. Given a fixed knowledge base of implementable actions de-
fined by their effects (as in the system of Swartout and Neches [142]), the planner
will produce legitimate plans. However, if we permit the planner to construct its
own action definitions dynamically from other concepts in the knowledge base (as in
SUDO-PLANNER), including effect constructs can lead to non-implementable action
types as above.
An alternative approach to the problem would be to explicitly represent and con-
sider the knowledge prerequisites associated with each action [93]. Given a descrip-
tion of the agent's knowledge, the planner could recognize its inability to implement
AIDS-cure. The "ineffective definition" principle I am advocating here is a sim-
pler, global convention that achieves the purpose of knowledge prerequisites for an
important special case.
5.2 The STRIPS Assumption
5.2.1 The Frame Problem
The classic dilemma in representing and reasoning about the effects of actions is
the frame problem [88, 130]. The frame problem has come to stand for a variety
of computational and notational complexities arising from the apparent necessity
of considering the possible change in status of every proposition for each action.
Actual planners circumvent these difficulties by restricting attention to propositions
explicitly mentioned in action specifications, a convention first applied by STRIPS [30].
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Waldinger has named this policy the "STRIPS assumption" [152]. Characterizing such
policies in a formal logic has proven to be a difficult task for AI theorists [49].
The frame problem is just as important and difficult when actions have uncertain
effects. My solution approach in the uncertain case is similar in form to traditional
techniques, with results of comparable adequacy. Actions are presumed to affect
directly only those variables explicitly referenced in their specifications. Of course,
the uncertain nature of effects requires representations quite different from those of
categorical planners, and non-effects likewise require a probabilistic interpretation.
While add and delete lists that specify the propositions changing truth value as a
result of an action are sufficient for categorical planning,2 actions with uncertain
effects must describe changes in probabilistic relations that occur when the action is
performed.
5.2.2 The STRIPS Assumption for Uncertain Effects
Generally stated, the STRIPS assumption dictates that the effect of an action on the
world model be completely determined by the direct effects specified in its descrip-
tion. We can characterize the implications of this assumption for planning under
uncertainty in terms of dependency graph concepts (see Section 4.4.1). Let S, be the
set of event variables that action variable a directly affects. The STRIPS assumption
for planning under uncertainty is that there exists an I-map G such that for all event
variables e,
a pred,(e) =* e E S,. (5.1)
Condition (5.1) has direct implications for probabilistic independence. By virtue
of G's I-mapness and Lemma 4.9, a is conditionally independent of any e ý S, given
2That is, the truth value changes are sufficient for defining modifications to the world model.
Specifying and implementing truth value change is tricky, however, because changes in status for
the sentences mentioned imply changes in their logical consequents. Lifschitz demonstrates how to
account for this correctly within the STRIPS framework [82].
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predG(e). Each variable d E predG(e), in turn, is either a direct effect of a or is
conditionally independent given its predecessors, predG(d). Ultimately, the effect of
a on e is completely determined by a's direct effects and e's relation to them. Note
that we still need to describe the interaction, if any, between a and e in their joint
effects. Section 5.3 discusses this issue further.
The probabilistic STRIPS assumption does not require that a be conditionally
independent of e given the direct effects Sa, or even by any subset of S,. In Figure 5.2,
for example, a and e are d-separated (Definition 4.8) by {s,y} but by no other variable
set. The predecessor y is necessary for conditional independence of a and e even
though y itself is unconditionally independent of a.
Figure 5.2: Action a is conditionally independent of e given S' = {s, y} but not given any
subset of its direct effects Sa = {s}.
If we enlarge the conditioning set to include predecessors of a's direct effects,
however, we get another valid independence condition. Let S' be the set of a's direct
effects plus the other variables that affect those effects:
S' = s U U predG(s)-a}
sES.
The graphical condition (5.1) implies that a is conditionally independent of e given
S:, as long as e ý Sa. In the graph of Figure 5.2, for example, S: = {s,y}.
In summary, we can formalize the STRIPS assumption under uncertainty in terms
of probabilistic conditional independence. In particular, given a dependency graph of
variables in the world model, any variable e not specified as an effect of action a must
not be directly connected to a. Under this condition there may be a probabilistic
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dependency between a and e in some situations, but this can always be described in
terms of a's and e's relations to Sa.
5.3 Context-Dependent Effects
It is not possible in general to describe the effect of an action on a single event in isola-
tion. Typically, the effect will depend on the context in which the action is performed,
including the other actions in the plan and the values of other event variables in the
world model. Consideration of context requires an effect representation expressive
enough to capture interaction among actions and events in their joint effects.
Traditional planning representations do not provide for context-dependent effects,
except through the use of preconditions. Preconditions provide only a gross form of
context dependence where the action is prohibited in designated situations. Formally,
preconditions are a special case of more general specifications of effects as a function
of the action in conjunction with the background situation.
Rather than saying an action cannot be performed in situations failing to meet a
set of preconditions, we could specify that it does not have particular effects (usually
the desired ones) unless the conditions hold. Under this interpretation, the planner
can apply put-on(a, b), for instance, in any situation, but the result aon(a, b) is condi-
tional on cleartop(a) and cleartop(b). Otherwise, the effects of put-on are undefined.
By placing the conditions on effects rather than on the action, we can employ actions
that may have many contingent effects. In addition, the planner is free to introduce
such actions into the plan without guaranteeing that the preconditions are satisfied.
Pednault has recently generalized traditional planning representations to include
"secondary preconditions" for specifying context-dependent effects [106]. While "pri-
mary" preconditions can be treated as special cases of these, there may be some utility
to keeping them conceptually distinct in a practical planning system.
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5.4 Specification of Effects
The effects of actions in SUDO-PLANNER are encoded as qualitative relations among
action and event variables. Qualitative influences describe the direct effects of an
action, and qualitative synergies describe interactions among influences, or context-
dependence (Section 5.3). Effects are specified simply by S6 (qualitative influence)
and Y 6 (qualitative synergy) assertions, with 6 E {+,-,0,?}. SO assertions are
implicit, by the probabilistic STRIPS assumption (5.1) of Section 5.2.2.
5.4.1 Semantics of Effect Assertions
An assertion of the form S6(av, ev) or Y 6(av, ev, ev 2) means that action and event
variables of types av and ev participate in the designated relation. Effects of events on
other events are similarly specified. The knowledge base construct S6 is distinguished
from the QPN predicate S6 in two ways:
1. There is no third argument. In QPNs, S' is always evaluated with respect to
some network G. S6 assertions in the knowledge base cannot refer to particular
QPNs because they are, in fact, the source of QPNs assembled during planning.
2. The variable arguments are types, not instances.
A similar distinction applies to Y'.
Despite the rigorous probabilistic definition of qualitative relations in QPNs, the
semantics of these assertions in the knowledge base are not immediately clear. The S'
definition (4.4), for example, refers explicitly to the context a composed of the "other
predecessors" of the affected variable. Without a G argument, the assertions must
be given a context-independent interpretation. And because probability distributions
over event variable types are undefined, the meaning of the qualitative relations must
derive from the process of instantiating the types to individual variables.
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A complete declarative semantics for effects in the SUDO-PLANNER knowledge base
is a topic for further research. Some properties of these assertions can be presented
in declarative form, however, and the description of the QPN construction algorithm
in Chapter 6 provides further constraint on their interpretation. Nevertheless, the
current absence of a full semantic account complicates knowledge engineering and
hinders the formal analysis of SUDO-PLANNER's model construction techniques.
5.4.2 Special Constructs
It is possible, and often useful, to introduce special knowledge base constructs to
capture regularities in the S' and Y6 relations among instantiated event variable
types. Such constructs offer notational economy by specifying patterns of effects
with a single assertion. In addition, they can be used to direct the global course of
model development through special handlers in the model construction procedure. An
example of a special effect construct (the only one implemented in SUDO-PLANNER)
is the "Markov influence" introduced in Section 5.5. By accounting for a simple but
common pattern of effect over time, Markov influences help to redress the lack of
temporal structure in SUDO-PLANNER's event representation.
5.5 Markov Influences
A Markov influence represents an effect that depends on the prior state of the affected
variable. In other words, the value of the affected event variable after an action
depends on its value before the action as well as on the value of the action variable.
For example, CABG alleviates CAD, but the distribution of final CAD states also
depends on the initial CAD value. To represent this directly in the knowledge base,
however, we would need separate concepts for "CAD before CABG" and "CAD after
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CABG." Such a scheme is infeasible because it requires distinct concepts for each
event variable in all potentially relevant temporal relationships to the action variable
instances.
Markov influences specify state change for a variable across time periods without
explicitly referring to the times involved. The form of a Markov influence assertion of
av on ev is K6 1,2 (av, ev), where 81 is the direction of influence and 62 is the direction
of synergy between av and the prior value of ev. For example, the Markov influence
of CABG on CAD is
K-'- (presence(CABG), extent(CAD-event)). (5.2)
The first "-" indicates that CABG stochastically decreases CAD, and the second
asserts that the effect is more negative the greater the extent of the patient's original
coronary disease. Figure 5.3 displays the QPN fragment generated by the Markov
influence in this example.
influences
influences
Figure 5.3: The negative Markov influence of CABG on CAD.
In interpreting K6 18 2A during QPN construction, SUDO-PLANNER modifies event
variables and their relationships and introduces any new structure required. (Sec-
tion 6.3.3 describes the interpretation procedure in detail.) For the CABG/CAD
influence (5.2), SUDO-PLANNER splits extent(CAD-event) into two QPN variables,
denoted CAD-1 and CAD-2 in the figure. It adds an influence of sign 81 (-) from
CABG to CAD-2, along with a qualitative synergy of sign 62 connecting CABG and
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CAD-1 to CAD-2. SUDO-PLANNER also introduces a positive influence from CAD-1
to CAD-2, based on the general assumption that the value of the affected event after
the action, ev 2, is positively related to its prior value evl.
The K •61A(av, ev) relationship is called a Markov influence because the split event
variable enforces a Markov independence property in the network. Specifically, influ-
encers of the original variable ev are independent of ev2 given the prior state variable
evl and the new influencer av. Similarly, variables affected by ev do not depend
on the prior value evl given the posterior value ev 2 and the variables that affect ev.
This partitioning is demonstrated in Figure 5.3 by the delegation of all influencers to
CAD-1 and all influences to CAD-2.
5.6 Inheritance of Effects
As mentioned in Section 5.4.1, effect assertions in the knowledge base refer to event
variable types, while effects in QPNs relate event variable instances. The correspon-
dence between the two is determined in part by the implications of an effect assertion
on effects among taxonomically related types. That is, some of the semantical ques-
tions raised above would be answered by an account of effect inheritance.
An effect assertion of the form S6 (evi, ev 2) has the intended interpretation that
all event variables of type ev1 have a 6 influence on some event variable of type ev 2 .
Therefore, the asserted effect also holds for any subtype of evl on any supertype of
ev2. Effects associated with their antecedent type are inherited downward in the event
variable taxonomy.
Defining the effect relation to have a universally quantified antecedent and an
existentially quantified consequent preserves the important property of closure under
transitivity. This feature is essential given the chaining inference rules for QPNs
developed in Chapter 4. An effect of evl on ev, derived from paths of effects from the
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former to the latter will have the universal/existential form if all of the component
effects are of that form.
The details of inheritance and its uses in QPN construction are deferred to Chap-
ter 6. Practical considerations in model construction as well as a set of general
desiderata for reasoning at multiple levels of abstraction (Section 6.1) justify the
interpretation for effect assertions described here.
5.7 Creating Observables
Although the emphasis in this chapter is on effects that change the world, it is also
important to consider the information value of performing actions. SUDO-PLANNER
actions generate information by creating observable event variables. An observable
event variable EV has a corresponding function EV(obs) defined for obs E O. A plan
7r cannot specify differential action on EV unless EV is observable.
An observable creation assertion of the form CO(a1 , ev) specifies that variables of
type ev are observable in plans that include ai. For example,
CO(cardiac-catheterization(true), extent(cardiac-cath-result))
asserts that performing catheterization reveals the value of the test result to the
agent. The result variable exists conceptually whether the test is performed or not,
but without the test the agent cannot see the result or use it to condition subsequent
action.
To SUDO-PLANNER's dominance prover, observability makes an event variable
eligible to appear in action policy and conditional plan class constraints. Constraints
of these types are ill-defined unless the event in question can be observed.
Observable creation places a semantic constraint on plans beyond the syntactic
specification of Section 3.1 (see the informal flo definition (3.1)). Specifically, the
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plan must order the actions so that all observables are created before they are used
as conditions. This constraint ensures that we are not implicitly conditioning an
observation on the value of the observation itself.
Observable-creating actions are called tests. The treatment of observables here
differs somewhat from the representation of information dependencies in influence
diagrams [61]. There the observability of events does not change but tests influence
the values of the observables. One way to implement this (Ross Shachter, personal
communication) is to make the observed variable EV a deterministic function of an
underlying physiologic state s and a binary variable indicating whether the test was
performed. The result is EV = s if the test is performed, with EV a noninforma-
tive constant otherwise. In the scheme employed by SUDO-PLANNER, the test action
directly causes s to be observable. The result is formally equivalent, but maintain-
ing the distinction in the knowledge base leads to a uniform interpretation of EV.
Furthermore, the separation of information-gathering and world-affecting permits the
dominance prover to apply constraints on the value of information (for example, its
non-negativity [43]) in determining plan class admissibility.
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Model Construction
Customized construction of decision models at multiple levels of abstraction is SUDO-
PLANNER's solution to the computational problems of adhering to decision-theoretic
principles (see Sections 1.5 and 1.6). This chapter explores these issues further and
describes the implemented model construction techniques. I start by outlining a
challenging set of desiderata for multilevel reasoning in the general case. Although
it does not satisfy the desiderata completely, SUDO-PLANNER constitutes a first step
towards automatic model construction from a multilevel knowledge base.
6.1 Desiderata for Reasoning at Multiple Levels
of Abstraction
As argued in Section 1.6, the interconnectivity of concepts in realistic knowledge
bases dictates that we employ abstraction to avoid the requirement for exhaustive
consideration of the KB before model analysis. Many researchers have proposed and
developed techniques for reasoning at multiple levels of abstraction (see Section 6.5.2
for a partial review of this work). In this section, I outline a set of desiderata for
multilevel reasoning schemes in the general case. Subsequent sections describe SUDO-
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PLANNER's multilevel representation and model generation procedure and evaluate
them in terms of these desiderata.
The following list contains some key features of an ideal multilevel reasoning sys-
tem.
* Non-Reductionism. Lower levels need not be strict refinements of upper levels.
The strength of conclusions can increase in either direction.
* Fluidity. The knowledge base is not strictly layered. Relationships need not
respect levels.
* Multilevel Operationality. Substantive reasoning can occur at any level. The
higher levels are not merely for control and explanation.
* Definitional Clarity. The representation has a clear semantics and the inference
procedure, a transparent description.
* Coherence. Conclusions are consistent across abstraction levels.
Conceptually, these desiderata are orthogonal. Practically, they interact considerably,
in that satisfying some may render others more or less easy to achieve. I discuss the
desiderata and their interdependencies in the sections below. I place particular em-
phasis on non-reductionism and fluidity because these have had the largest influence
on the design of SUDO-PLANNER.
6.1.1 Non-Reductionism
The simplest theoretical approach to abstraction is to regard the lower levels as re-
finements of the upper, thereby defining upper level concepts as versions of those
below that ignore certain distinctions (see Hobbs [55], for example). Indeed, the sub-
mergence of detail is the usual meaning of the term "abstraction." Enforcing this
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criterion in practice, however, can lead to infeasible information requirements and
fails to capture some known phenomena in multilevel reasoning.
Reductionism imposes a strong constraint on the knowledge in a multilevel system:
conclusions derivable at a given level must also follow from models at deeper levels.
While this property may hold in some cases, in others the local information associated
with low-level concepts will not entail conclusions as strong as those obtained from
the higher-level model. This weakness can be caused by several factors, including:
* Difficulty in expressing the stronger relationships with the "natural" vocabulary
for the more specific concepts. For example, breaking an aggregate concept into
descriptions of its components may render global properties inaccessible.
* Lack of information for instantiating the more specific concepts to obtain conclu-
sions of comparable strength. Typically, lower-level concepts are more difficult
to instantiate because they require more detail. Even though incomplete knowl-
edge may be sufficient for the conclusions, the program may require concrete
instances for tractable, "vivid" reasoning [81].
* Absence of a theory describing the relation between properties of the specific
and general concepts.
* Absence of a theory of the specific concepts themselves.
A second argument against reductionism in multilevel modeling is that it is vio-
lated in the current state of human knowledge. In medical reasoning, for example,
physiological knowledge can often resolve conflicts arising from application of empiri-
cal associations at the higher, clinical level in the presence of multiple disorders [143].
But in some areas of medicine our knowledge of physiological mechanisms is quite
weak, perhaps supporting confident prediction of only. qualitative relationships [75].
These may lead to useful conclusions in some cases, but not necessarily conclusions
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as strong as those obtained from shallower models. (They may not even reproduce
all qualitative conclusions known at the empirical level). Proceeding downwards in
the abstraction hierarchy to biochemistry almost always makes things worse because
biochemical theory and our knowledge of the biochemistry underlying physiological
processes is not strong enough to explain higher-level effects.
This phenomenon is by no means unique to medicine. Successful macroeco-
nomic models typically cannot be grounded in microeconomic foundations. Even
in physics-the pinnacle of reductionist science-more detailed descriptions do not
always lead to stronger conclusions. For example, we typically cannot derive useful
predictions from a description of a system at the quantum level.
The foregoing argument is not a philosophical objection to reductionism in prin-
ciple. Until we carry out the reduction in actuality, however, a purely reductionist
computational mechanism will not suffice for representing and reasoning about the
body of human knowledge.
6.1.2 Fluidity
The second desideratum for multilevel reasoning is that the notion of "level" be fluid
as opposed to rigid. A rigid multilevel system is one where all reasoning respects
fixed level boundaries defined by the allowable relationships between concepts.
To clarify this, let us define more precisely the components of a multilevel represen-
tation. We call the basic elements concepts and presume that concepts are arranged in
some taxonomic structure. Two concepts are tazonomically related if one is a descen-
dant of the other in the taxonomy. Taxonomic relativity is the basis for statements
that one concept is at a higher or lower abstraction level than another. Interpretation
of the taxonomic relation may vary in different representation schemes. In NIKL (and
hence SUDO-PLANNER), the taxonomies represent specialization hierarchies, where
146
CHAPTER 6. MODEL CONSTRUCTION
concept subsumption is defined with respect to an extensional semantics.
In addition to taxonomic relationships, a multilevel knowledge representation pro-
vides a set of domain relations. Depending on the purpose of the KB, these might
express causal, functional, or any other useful type of information about the concepts.
In SUDO-PLANNER, for example, I employ qualitative probabilistic relationships to
represent the effects of actions.
A multilevel KB is rigid if we can partition the concepts into a set of fixed levels,
such that:
1. All domain relations connect concepts at the same level.
2. No concepts at the same level are taxonomically related.
3. Taxonomic relations among concepts at different levels induce a total order on
the levels.
The rigidity of a given multilevel KB can be decided by an efficient algorithm. Fig-
ure 6.1 illustrates a rigid multilevel KB. Relations among concepts respect the level
boundaries as dictated above. An example of a system with a rigid KB is Patil's
ABEL program for multilevel physiological reasoning [98].
A fluid multilevel KB (see Figure 6.2) does not enforce these restrictions. Domain
relations between two taxonomically related pairs may cross, and a concept may ap-
pear in a domain relation with two or more others that are themselves taxonomically
related. A fluid scheme may impose some discipline of its own on patterns of relations,
but the restrictions are not as sweeping as those given above. Pople's CADUCEUS [107]
is an example of a fluid multilevel KB architecture.
While we can speak of relative levels in a fluid KB, the notion of an absolute level is
ill-defined. One concept is at a higher level than another if the two are taxonomically
related, otherwise they are incomparable. Concepts a and b are at the same level
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L3
Figure 6.1: A rigid multilevel knowledge base. Thick lines indicate taxonomic relations;
thinner ones denote domain relations. We can partition the KB into levels (L1, L2, L3)
such that there are no inter-level domain relations and no intra-level taxonomic relations.
a
Figure 6.2: A multilevel system with a fluid knowledge base. No partitioning into levels
is possible.
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(L2) in the rigid KB of Figure 6.1, but there is no basis for such a statement in the
fluid case of Figure 6.2.
One advantage of a rigid design is the ease of controlling multilevel reasoning with
uniform levels. A rigid KB necessitates choice of only a single global level, in contrast
to the selection of levels required for each local region of a fluid KB.
Although it complicates the control problem, the flexibility of fluid KBs has im-
portant advantages. The appropriate depth for reasoning about individual concepts
depends on the goals and characteristics of particular problems, and there is no rea-
son to expect that the same depth is appropriate throughout the knowledge base.
For example, a reasonable medical reasoning strategy might be to explore in great
detail the concepts relating to the patient's chief complaint while examining periph-
eral concepts at a higher level. A rigid multilevel reasoner can pursue this strategy
by switching between levels for different parts of the analysis. However, the rigid
reasoner can never mix concepts from distinct levels in the same model because it
cannot express inter-level relationships directly. Therefore, it cannot consider the
chief complaint and the peripheral concepts together, unless it is willing to represent
them at the same abstraction level.
Fluidity is central to SUDO-PLANNER's ability to derive useful results before ex-
haustively examining the knowledge base. The example model of Figure 1.8 includes
specific effects of AAA-repair as well as high-level effects associated with its ancestor
concept, treatment. If the level of detail of a decision model were constrained to be
uniform, reasoning could not commence until the model was translated to some com-
mon denominator. For large KBs, this requirement can impose unacceptable delays
on model analysis.
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6.1.3 Multilevel Operationality
In some multilevel reasoning systems, all conclusions are expressed in terms of the
lowest-level concepts. Structure at higher levels is used for explanation, control of
reasoning, and perhaps other purposes, but it is not operational in the same sense as
knowledge at the lower fringe.
For true multilevel behavior, all levels should enjoy the same operational status.
The full advantages of abstraction are realized only if it is possible to avoid some
low-level concepts entirely; merely postponing attention to detail provides only lim-
ited savings. The requirement that the reasoner perform all substantive inference
at the lowest level smacks of reductionism and compromises the flexibility of fluid
representations.
There are two senses in which SUDO-PLANNER's high-level reasoning is substan-
tive. First, the plan graph can express dominance results about plan classes at high
levels of abstraction. In fact, these results are more valuable than those about lower-
level plan classes because they prune more of the search space.
Second, the benefit of fluidity cited above would not be possible if substantive
reasoning were not permitted at higher levels. Reasoning about some facets of AAA-
repair at the generality of treatment--even though more specific knowledge about
the same effects is available-leads to useful dominance results at an earlier stage of
the modeling process than would otherwise be possible.
6.1.4 Definitional Clarity
The desirability of definitional clarity in a knowledge representation is self-evident,
regardless of its number of levels. Unfortunately, a precise semantics for knowledge
representation schemes is sometimes difficult to produce, as Section 5.4.1 illustrates.
In the case of multilevel reasoners, our other desiderata further complicate the task. A
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reductionist scheme is theoretically much simpler than one that violates monotonicity
of conclusion strength with refinement, and rigidity in level boundaries eliminates a
large class of interactions that would present definitional difficulties. In my view,
the flexibility advantages of fluidity and the unreality of reductionism outweigh the
current lack of clear theoretical accounts of non-reductionist, fluid multilevel reasoning
systems.
6.1.5 Coherence
The final desideratum is that the KB be coherent. A multilevel KB is coherent if the
conclusions it sanctions at different levels are logically consistent with one another.
The conclusions derivable at different abstractions can be different-weaker, stronger,
or incomparable because they refer to distinct domains-but they should not be
contradictory.
Certain controlled forms of incoherence might be tolerable if the reasoner has
special facilities to handle inter-level conflicts. For instance, some nonmonotonic in-
ference mechanisms are designed expressly to prefer specificity, overriding the conclu-
sions it derives from high-level premises in favor of more specific results (see especially
research on inheritance systems and formalisms [120, 147]).
Inter-level coherence is usually difficult to guarantee. A purely reductionist KB
is coherent by definition, though it may not always be feasible to verify reduction-
ism. Definitional clarity makes it easier to maintain coherence, but as mentioned
above, there is a strong tension between clarity and fluidity. Tension also exists be-
tween definitional clarity and nonmonotonicity [5, 49, 148], so admitting even regular
incoherence is likely to compromise other desiderata.
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6.2 Event Variable Knowledge Base
The action and event taxonomies of Chapter 3 constitute the taxonomic skeleton
of SUDO-PLANNER's multilevel knowledge base. The KB is fleshed out with effect
assertions (Section 5.4) relating actions and events across taxonomic levels.
Figure 6.3 presents a view of part of the KB supporting the running example.
Effect arcs relate the simple taxonomy of primary surgical actions at the left of the
diagram to the major event variables of interest. Among these are MI and stroke
presence, a small cluster of disease severity variables, and mortality. All paths even-
tually lead to the special utility variable, value. The qualitative relation assertions
specifying Figure 6.3 and the rest of the KB are listed in Appendix C.
value
'7 Ir
endarterectomy
Figure 6.3: Part of SUDO-PLANNER's multilevel event variable KB.
As in previous figures, thick lines represent taxonomic relationships, and thinner
ones, domain relations. Domain relation links in Figure 6.3 correspond to qualitative
influence (S6 ) assertions in the KB. Qualitative synergy and Markov influence asser-
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tions are not shown. To avoid confusion between the two uses of qualitative relations,
the diagrammatical conventions for KB graphs like Figure 6.3 differ significantly from
those used in QPN figures.
Inspection of Figure 6.3 reveals that SUDO-PLANNER's KB is fluid, as we can-
not partition the nodes into levels in a manner satisfying the rigidity conditions of
Section 6.1.2. For instance, any partitioning would require that surgery and vessel
repair be on different levels because of their taxonomic relation, and on the same level
because of their mutual links to value.
Close inspection of the KB also reveals that it is incoherent (and therefore trivially
non-reductionist). For example, there is a direct positive link from vessel repair to
stroke, yet its subconcept, endarterectomy, has a negative effect on stroke through
its influence on CVD. The apparent contradiction causes no difficulty in this case,
since SUDO-PLANNER's model construction algorithm prefers the more specific path
when considering endarterectomy. Incoherence with respect to value, on the other
hand, would present a serious problem, causing SUDO-PLANNER's dominance prover
to generate inconsistencies in the plan graph. The "?" links to value from surgery
and vessel repair are in the KB specifically to avoid this potential error.
A full discussion of coherence requires an examination of how the KB is inter-
preted by SUDO-PLANNER's model construction procedure, described in Section 6.3
below. One important characteristic of the construction procedure is its treatment
of inheritance. As described in Section 5.6, the intended meaning of an effect link
from evl to ev 2 is that each variable of type evl affects some variable of type ev 2
(the universal/existential interpretation). Therefore, event variables inherit outgoing
relation links from their taxonomic ancestors.
Figure 6.4 illustrates the use of inheritance in a fragment of the SUDO-PLANNER
KB. In the linear taxonomy at the left, aneurysm size is a kind of disease severity
variable because size is an indicator of severity for the disease "aneurysm presence."
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The variable is further specialized by restricting the location of the aneurysm to the
abdominal aorta (AAA). The same concept specialization relates the two rupture
variables. All links in the figure appear as explicit assertions in the knowledge base.
disease severity - value
Aneurysm size Aneurysm rupture .
AAA size
•+
I UA mortality
AAA rupture
Figure 6.4: Fragment of the KB relating AAA size and value. Effect links are inherited
downward in the antecedent taxonomy.
Further effect relations are implicit in the taxonomic relationships. For example,
AAA rupture positively influences mortality, by inheritance from its parent, aneurysm
rupture. In this case, inheritance provides everything that is known about the effects
of AAA rupture.
In other cases, more specific knowledge supplements or replaces inherited informa-
tion. AAA size positively influences aneurysm rupture by virtue of being an aneurysm
size, but more specifically it influences the rupture of a particular type of aneurysm,
AAA. Given the universal/existential interpretation, the local assertion is strictly
stronger than that inherited from aneurysm size.
From the perspective of the destinations of effect links, variables inherit relations
upwards in the taxonomy. For example, the link from AAA size to aneurysm rupture
could also be inherited (at the destination end) upward from AAA rupture. The
inheritance is redundant in this case, but in general could make a difference, for
instance, if the link from aneurysm size did not exist.
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A final possibility is that a direct link at one level could correspond to a more
complex set of paths at another. For example, aneurysm size (and AAA size as well)
exhibits a negative influence on value by virtue of being a disease severity. At a more
specific level, aneurysm size influences value via a path through aneurysm rupture
and mortality. Although the more detailed path leads to the same conclusion in this
case, the direct relation leads to simpler and more efficient models. On the other
hand, the detail is necessary for reasoning about interactions with other variables
that share with aneurysm size segments of their influence path to value.
6.3 Model Construction in SUDO-Planner
SUDO-PLANNER's high-level behavior is a cycle of model construction and dominance
proving, as illustrated by Figure 1.10. Figure 6.5 elaborates that view, revealing that
the model construction cycle consists of the incremental evolution of a central QPN.
From the perspective of the model constructor, the KB is an event variable graph
in the general form of Figure 6.3. At each iteration, the constructor modifies the
current QPN according to relations in the KB. The dominance prover analyzes the
modified QPN, which then forms the basis for the next cycle of model construction.
The process continues until no QPN modification operators are applicable (that is, the
KB is exhausted) or it is explicitly halted by its invoker. The invoker can interrupt the
model construction cycle at any time to inspect the plan graph, which is continually
maintained by the plan space manager.
This section explains the left-hand half of Figure 6.5 involving the process of
constructing and modifying QPNs based on KB relations. Chapter 7 explains the
dominance-proving right-hand side.
To assemble a QPN from relations in an event variable KB, the model constructor
selects a subset of the variables and links from the KB graph. Selection of this subset
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Figure 6.5: SUDO-PLANNER's model construction cycle. The QPN evolves through a
sequence of incremental modifications.
is complicated by several factors, which form some of the central issues in model
construction and modification.
Choosing variables. In a large knowledge base, it is imperative that selectivity be
exercised in assembling the set of variables. For proper focus, we require some notion
of relevance. I discuss the design of justified focus mechanisms in Section 6.4.
Choosing abstractions. Given that a particular concept is of interest, the con-
structor must decide at which taxonomic level to represent it with a QPN variable.
Changing abstractions. One way to modify a QPN is to change the abstrac-
tion level of some of its components. SUDO-PLANNER's elaboration mechanism (Sec-
tion 6.3.1) attempts to update QPN relationships appropriately when changing levels.
Multiple inheritance. An event variable may have more than one source for in-
heriting effect relationships. The constructor must include mechanisms for selecting,
merging, and resolving conflicts among inherited relationships.
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Recording and merging conclusions from different models. In an iterative
process of model modification, some of the conclusions drawn from the models might
be useful in decisions about the subsequent evolutionary path. SUDO-PLANNER ex-
ploits this opportunity in a limited fashion, described in Section 6.3.2.
Because the dominance prover continually analyzes the QPN throughout its evo-
lutionary process, each modification the model constructor applies must preserve va-
lidity. This requirement places strong constraints on the modification operators and
the KB, and in fact, it is not completely met by SUDO-PLANNER's model construction
mechanisms.
The model construction procedure includes two basic operations for modifying
QPNs. SUDO-PLANNER alternates between elaboration steps that replace existing
relationships with more detailed pathways, and backward chaining steps that extend
the model to include additional related variables. The sections below present the
procedures for these steps.
6.3.1 Elaboration
Elaboration introduces detail to a QPN. The multilevel operationality of SUDO-
PLANNER's knowledge representation permits it to reason initially at high levels of
abstraction, then refine the model to consider more specific concepts. Thanks to
the KB's fluidity, refinement need not occur all at once; instead, the constructor can
refine the QPN incrementally by elaborating individual links.
The elaboration process comprises three stages:
1. Choose a QPN link to elaborate.
2. Find a set of elaborating paths in the KB.
3. Merge the new structure into the QPN.
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The starting point for the model construction process in our running example is
the QPN of Figure 6.6a.' The initial QPN relates AAA size to value via the most
general route in the KB. In this instance, the negative link derives from the KB
relation between disease severity (an ancestor of AAA size) and value, as shown in
Figure 6.6b.
disease severity . value
AAAAAA sie
(a) (b)
Figure 6.6: (a) Initial QPN for the running example. (b) The link corresponds to the
most general effect of AAA size found in the event variable KB.
The rest of this section describes the three stages of elaboration, illustrating the
process by application to this simple QPN and to more complex networks.
Stage 1: Choose Link to Elaborate
SUDO-PLANNER selects the QPN link to elaborate in a first-in/first-out order. It
places links on a FIFO queue upon their addition to the QPN. If the queue is empty,
the elaboration operator is inapplicable.
Stage 2: Find Elaborating Paths
Given a link between two QPN variables, an elaboration is a mutually compatible col-
lection of paths connecting the corresponding variables in the KB. SUDO-PLANNER
considers paths of length one or two only, thereby limiting the rapidity of model re-
finement. The individual paths may include both explicit and inherited KB relations.
'This QPN is identical to that of Figure 1.11. SUDO-PLANNER's graphical interface drew all QPN
pictures for the running example appearing in this chapter (including Figure 6.6a).
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Two paths are compatible if their relations are valid when combined in a QPN. For
example, SUDO-PLANNER regards as incompatible combinations that contain versions
of the same variable at different taxonomic levels. True semantic compatibility is not
verifiable by the model constructor.
SUDO-PLANNER tags each link in the QPN with a pointer to the event variable in
the KB from which it was derived. The link in Figure 6.6a, for example, originated
from disease severity in the KB of Figure 6.6b. To elaborate this link, SUDO-PLANNER
searches for paths from AAA size to value that derive from origins more specific than
disease severity.
As Figure 6.7 illustrates, the search for elaborating paths in the KB graph is
bounded by the origin variable (in this case, disease severity) and the KB variable
currently appearing in the QPN (AAA size). The source of an elaborating path must
be a descendant of the origin, so that it specializes the model, and an ancestor of the
QPN variable, so the relations are inherited. The path may terminate at the current
destination or at any of its descendants.
lestination
Figure 6.7: Search for elaborating paths. The dotted lines indicate that variables a, b,
and c are sources of candidate elaborations.
There may be several candidate elaborations. Suppose, for example, that in the
KB of Figure 6.7 elaborating paths emanate from nodes a, b, and c. SUDO-PLANNER
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prefers the most general elaborations because the more specific ones remain reachable
in subsequent elaboration steps. Therefore, it removes the paths from b from consid-
eration. But since a and c are not taxonomically related, SUDO-PLANNER includes
the union of their elaborating paths.
This strategy is a form of multiple inheritance. Because there is no guarantee
that the relations inherited from different paths are consistent or compatible, this
merge operation (as well as the process of merging the elaboration into the QPN,
stage three) is a source of potential error in SUDO-PLANNER's model construction
algorithm.
The path selected to elaborate the link in our initial QPN (Figure 6.6a) is the
chain
aneurysm size --- aneurysm rupture - value. (6.1)
Aneurysm size is the most general variable that is a descendant of disease severity,
an ancestor of AAA size, and has a path of length at most two to value. (The direct
link from aneurysm rupture to value is inherited from an ancestor, not shown in the
KB fragment of Figure 6.4.) The elaboration can be interpreted as an explanation of
the original link: AAA size is undesirable because it positively influences aneurysm
rupture, which is undesirable.
Stage 3: Merge New Structure
If SUDO-PLANNER finds an elaboration, it removes the original link from the current
QPN. It then proceeds to the final stage of elaboration: merging the chosen elab-
orated paths into the model. The merge task is to determine how to modify the
variables and relationships in the QPN to include the new structure.
For our initial QPN, merging is easy. A new variable, aneurysm rupture, is intro-
duced to the QPN, and the elaboration path (6.1) simply replaces the original link.
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The KB variable aneurysm size is recorded as the origin of the first link, though the
QPN variable remains AAA size. SUDO-PLANNER adds the two new links to the
FIFO queue for possible further elaboration. Figure 6.8 displays the final result of
the elaboration step.
Figure 6.8: An elaboration of the initial QPN.
In the general case, merging is more complicated. When introducing a new vari-
able, SUDO-PLANNER must connect it to all existing QPN variables-not just those
on the new paths-according to relations encoded in the KB. Performing the update
correctly is tricky because the new variable may be connected to existing ones via
complex and possibly redundant pathways.
When a new variable is introduced to the network, SUDO-PLANNER connects it
with all existing QPN variables that are directly related to it, explicitly or via in-
heritance, in the KB. For example, the variable z is linked to current variable x
upon introduction to the QPN of Figure 6.9a. Variables z and y remain unconnected
because there is no direct link between them in the KB graph.
/
/
(a) (b)
Figure 6.9: (a) Introducing z to the network. (b) The KB contains no direct relation
between z and y, but includes a path through w, not currently in the QPN.
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Suppose, however, that the KB contains a path from z to y via variable w, which
is not represented in the current QPN. The network of Figure 6.9a then leads to the
false conclusion that y is independent of z given x. We can remedy this by introducing
w to the QPN along with z, adding the appropriate links as illustrated in Figure 6.9b.
Although safer, this policy is unsatisfactory because introduction of a single variable
is liable to trigger the migration of a large fraction of the KB into the QPN.
SUDO-PLANNER preserves the incrementalism of QPN modification by ignoring
indirect connections of the sort displayed in Figure 6.9b. Typically (and necessar-
ily to avoid unsound inferences), pathways in the KB have corresponding one-step
summaries at higher taxonomic levels. In this case, we would expect z to inherit a
direct link to y from some ancestor. To be conservative, we could add these spanning
links [107] automatically, although the implemented SUDO-PLANNER includes no KB
pre-processing. The spurious links included due to such a policy are of little conse-
quence because if truly spurious they will be removed upon subsequent elaboration.2
When possible, SUDO-PLANNER combines taxonomically related variables. If the
newly introduced variable has an ancestor in the QPN, the merge procedure tests
whether the existing relations are compatible with the specialized variable. Because
outgoing links are inherited, compatibility holds exactly when the links into the ex-
isting ancestor variable hold for the new variable. If compatible, the new replaces
the old. Otherwise, SUDO-PLANNER attempts to merge the new relations with the
old variable. Here, compatibility depends only on the outgoing relations. If the
merge fails in this direction as well, SUDO-PLANNER maintains both variables in the
QPN. The two will be merged eventually if subsequent QPN modification presents
the opportunity.
For example, the elaboration search situation of Figure 6.7 yielded paths from a
to the existing variable destination, and from c to its descendant, d. SUDO-PLANNER
2 Elaboration results in simple removal if the elaborating structure is already present in the QPN.
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first tries to replace destination with d, succeeding if all incoming links to destination
hold for d as well. Failing that, it attempts the converse merge. In this case, d
is replaceable by destination because it is a new variable with no outgoing links.
Subsequent elaboration steps will trigger the reintroduction of d, in particular when
the path from a is specialized to originate from b.
Finally, qualitative synergies are also added to the QPN during the merge stage.
Whenever a node has two or more incoming links, SUDO-PLANNER checks the knowl-
edge base for an asserted or inherited synergy among the predecessor variables. Recall
that SUDO-PLANNER interprets the absence of an explicit synergy link in the QPN as
"?" by default.
6.3.2 Backward Chaining
The QPN for the running example as developed to this point (Figure 6.8) is not very
interesting from the perspective of planning. The semantics of qualitative influences
entail that small AAAs are preferable to large ones, but tell us nothing about what
we should do about them. Furthermore, no amount of elaboration applied to this
relation sheds any light on action.
The second basic QPN modification operator, backward chaining, extends the
scope of the model. In a backward chaining step, SUDO-PLANNER searches for vari-
ables in the KB that affect a particular existing QPN variable. The mechanics of
this step are straightforward: choose a variable to extend back, find its predecessors
in the KB, and merge the new structure according to the merge procedure described
above.
The first attempt at backward chaining on the running example produces no
modification because the chosen variable, AAA size, has no predecessors. SUDO-
PLANNER next applies an elaboration step, which replaces aneurysm rupture with
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AAA rupture. Backward chaining on AAA rupture finally yields a significant QPN
modification, shown in Figure 6.10.
Figure 6.10: QPN after backward chaining on AAA rupture.
The new QPN has the same variables as that of Figure 1.8, though it lacks the
positive synergy between AAA repair and AAA rupture on value. Given this synergy,
the dominance prover could establish that AAA repair is positively synergistic with
AAA size, and therefore that the optimal repair policy is to fix the aneurysm iff it
is larger than some threshold size. However, the synergy is unavailable to SUDO-
PLANNER at this stage in QPN development. In the current model, AAA repair's
relation to value is inherited from its ancestor surgery (see the KB graph of Figure 6.3).
The synergy is simply not valid at this high level. Further elaboration of the model
combined with QPN inference yields the desired result later in the model construction
process.
The initial stage of backward chaining is the choice of a variable to extend back.
SUDO-PLANNER selects arbitrarily among the eligible, or extensible, variables. If no
variables are extensible, the backward chaining operator is inapplicable. A variable
is considered extensible if:
1. it is not a decision variable (these have no predecessors),
2. it has not already been extended back, and
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3. it is one of the specially designated focus variables, it is a successor of a focus
variable, or it is + synergistic with a focus variable on value.
I describe the concept of a focus variable and justify its use in Section 6.4.2. In-
formally, focus variables are those deemed relevant based on their role in the case
description or in plans under consideration. The heuristic application of focus vari-
ables to restrict the variables eligible for backward chaining directs the course of QPN
evolution.3 Although this control is not necessary to run the main example, a focus
mechanism of some sort is crucial for tractable model construction from large KBs.
To implement the extensibility test, SUDO-PLANNER records instances of synergy
with a focus variable as it derives them in intermediate computations of the domi-
nance prover. This is the only semantic information about domain relations (and the
only type of QPN inference) that the model construction procedure exploits. More
sophisticated application of intermediate results might improve efficiency and con-
trol, but would also exacerbate the undesirable consequences of incoherence in the
multilevel KB.
The second stage of backward chaining is to retrieve the QPN variable's predeces-
sors from the KB. SUDO-PLANNER simply traces back links in the KB graph. The
back extension does not consider inherited predecessor relations because these will be
uncovered in subsequent elaboration.
The final stage is to introduce the predecessors to the QPN. The procedure to
merge structure from backward chaining is equivalent to the merge stage for elabora-
tion described in the previous section.
The backward chaining strategy adopted by the model construction procedure
imparts special significance to the directionality of influence relations in the event
variable KB. Whether we assert that a affects b or that b affects a in the KB strongly
3The application of focus variables is similar in spirit to the use of focus objects in McAllester's
ONTIC theorem prover [87].
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influences the shape of QPNs produced by SUDO-PLANNER, even though the semantics
of qualitative influences does not dictate this choice. As Section 4.4.4 demonstrates,
QPN influences can be reversed without affecting their sign, although the reversal
may change other relations in the network. SUDO-PLANNER fails to exploit this
flexibility-in fact, the implementation never attempts to reverse influences-despite
its demonstrated usefulness in traditional decision modeling [125].
6.3.3 Variable Mitosis for Markov Influences
An important type of backward chaining occurs when the predecessor exerts a Markov
influence on the current QPN variable. As Section 5.5 describes, a Markov influence
represents an effect over time, inducing a relationship between the action and the
values of its affected variable before and after execution. To represent this situation
in a QPN, we require separate variables for the "before" and "after" values. SUDO-
PLANNER modifies the QPN by dividing the affected variable in two and updating
relations as appropriate.
The variable division process, or mitosis, is illustrated in Figure 6.11. SUDO-
PLANNER encounters a Markov influence in the process of backward chaining on
CAD eztent. The QPN fragment of Figure 6.11a displays the variables connected to
CAD eztent prior to interpreting the Markov influence.
Figure 6.11b illustrates the Markov influence itself. CABG influences CAD ez-
tent, in a manner synergistic with the prior value of the variable. The mitosis pro-
cess translates this implicit distinction among the two CAD variables to an explicit
separation in the QPN. The resulting network fragment, shown in Figure 6.11c, con-
tains the variables CAD-1 and CAD-2, denoting the CAD extent before and after
CABG, respectively. The previous predecessors of CAD-CAD history and catheter-
ization result-are attached to CAD-1, and the previous successor-MI-to CAD-2.
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CAD
History
(a) CAD + MI
Extent Presence
Cath Result
Extent
(b)
(c)
Figure 6.11: Variable mitosis. (a) The situation before mitosis. (b) The Markov influence
of CABG on CAD implicitly refers to two CAD variables. (c) The final result: CAD is
split into CAD-1 and CAD-2, and relationships are appropriately distributed among the
two.
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The Markov influence explicitly specifies the influence of CABG on CAD-2, and its
synergy with CAD-1. Implicit in all Markov influences is the positive relationship
between the "before" and "after" variables.
The split variables are divided further if they are the object of other Markov
influences. In general, the QPN may contain an arbitrary Markov chain reflecting a
temporal sequence of values of the same event variable.
The presence of multiple QPN variables corresponding to a single KB variable
complicates the model construction process slightly. When merging structure (dur-
ing elaboration or backward chaining) involving links into such a variable, SUDO-
PLANNER selects the head of the Markov chain. Structure containing paths out of
a multiply represented variable is referred to the tail variable. These conventions
preserve the Markovian character of the QPN's dependency graph.
6.3.4 The Model Construction Procedure: Conclusion
Having completed the description of SUDO-PLANNER's model construction process, we
are now in a position to evaluate it in terms of the five basic desiderata for multilevel
reasoning presented in Section 6.1. Of the five, SUDO-PLANNER scores better on
non-reductionism, fluidity, and multilevel operationality than it does on definitional
clarity and coherence. A strict judge, however, would find the system wanting with
respect to all these criteria.
The event variable KB is clearly non-reductionist and fluid. However, in adopt-
ing a style of top-down refinement, SUDO-PLANNER's model construction procedure
does not take full advantage of the flexibility offered. Because it generally does not
record intermediate results, the dominance prover is incapable of combining partial
conclusions from separate decision models. Thus SUDO-PLANNER will miss a result
following from a set of KB relations unless it incorporates those relations together in
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a QPN.
The addition of high-level spanning links as a conservative knowledge engineering
policy compromises the goal of multilevel operationality. Because SUDO-PLANNER
removes the spurious relations only upon elaboration, it ends up deriving conclusions
at a lower level than is strictly necessary.
As mentioned above, SUDO-PLANNER's event variable KB is neither well-defined
nor guaranteed to be coherent. Further study of the semantics of KB assertions would
advance definitional clarity (see Section 5.4.1), as would a more formal characteriza-
tion of the model construction procedure. A better understanding of these issues is
a prerequisite for an analysis of KB coherence.
The practical implication of this evaluation is that knowledge engineering is diffi-
cult. In my experience developing SUDO-PLANNER, the effect of KB modifications on
the sequence of models generated was often unpredictable. Rules of thumb for debug-
ging the KB, such as adding high-level single-step summaries of complex pathways,
were discovered by trial-and-error. Only later was I able to rationalize the practice
in terms of its interaction with the model construction procedure.
Some of the shortcomings of the model construction procedure are probably
amenable to incremental solutions. For example, we could increase fluidity and coher-
ence by permitting multiple, mutually exclusive relation sets at a single abstraction
level. Such an extension requires a generalization (and a formal tightening) of the
notion of compatibility regulating the merging of structure into QPNs. Section 7.5.1
discusses the possible use of spanning relations, a special case of this idea, in a qual-
itative approach to tradeoff resolution.
This critical view of SUDO-PLANNER's model construction performance does not
reflect discouragement about the task of constructing decision models from large
multilevel KBs. SUDO-PLANNER represents a first attempt to automate this task,
which was intentionally framed in terms of highly ambitious (and somewhat conflict-
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ing) desiderata in order to uncover the performance boundaries. By identifying and
emphasizing its limitations, I aim to stimulate research on improvements to SUDO-
PLANNER's approach to knowledge representation and model synthesis.
6.4 Focus of Attention
For large KBs, controlling model construction is a significant and difficult problem.
Directing model synthesis effort toward the most relevant regions of the KB requires
some sort of focus mechanism. Unfortunately, it appears to be difficult to justify a fo-
cusing strategy based on the decision-theoretic principles underlying SUDO-PLANNER.
The sections below discuss the basic issue of justified focus and present the rational-
ized, albeit unjustified, focus mechanism implemented in SUDO-PLANNER.
6.4.1 Justified Focus
In the most straightforward implementation of the model construction procedure,
SUDO-PLANNER would start from a QPN containing only the value node and pro-
ceed to apply backward chaining and elaboration steps until it exhausted the KB
or its computational resources. This unfocused approach proves unsatisfactory for
any real problem. A planner with a moderately large medical knowledge base would
be obliged to consider the advisability of actions ranging from taking blood pressure
to prophylactic heart transplants for every patient. We need a method that focuses
attention without recklessly overlooking valid therapeutic opportunities.
Ideally, we would like to ground our focus mechanism in relevance principles that
justify selectivity in the application of knowledge. A sound procedure for focus of
attention ignores only facts that are irrelevant to the task at hand [139]. For the
planning task, knowledge is irrelevant iff it has no bearing on the optimal strategy.
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One approach to justified focus assumes that at any time the agent's plan is opti-
mal given the information available at that time. Under this assumption, the planner
need consider only strategy modifications warranted by changes in its information
state. In a medical context, the planner in effect assumes that it has been the pa-
tient's physician up to the current time, so the current plan must be what it would
have recommended given the current information. When new information arrives, it
is necessary to reevaluate only those previous conclusions that depend on changed
facts [85].
This "status quo optimality" heuristic meshes well with the planning and exe-
cution model of Section 3.1. If the planner has converged on a singleton plan class
specifying the appropriate action in every contingency, then planning is finished and
only execution remains. More realistically, the planner produces plan classes speci-
fying action for only the immediate contingencies, necessitating further planning for
the unanticipated observation patterns that make up the majority of possible futures.
When an unanticipated situation occurs, the planner needs consider only its differ-
ence from an anticipated situation in adapting its corresponding plan to meet the
new situation.
Unfortunately, the focusing power of this heuristic is often disappointingly weak.
The smallest changes in situation may dictate arbitrary alterations in strategy, re-
quiring the modification of actions seemingly unrelated to the situation change. In
medicine, for example, the advisability of a therapeutic action typically depends on
the broad concept of overall state of health. For instance, consider a patient who is
a candidate for a heart transplant. Suppose that in the current situation, the plan-
ner determines that the patient narrowly qualifies for this dangerous and expensive
procedure. Next consider a new finding that is unrelated to heart disease or to any
other cardiovascular concept but that has a slight negative influence on the patient's
life expectancy. Even though its health risk is unrelated, the new finding reduces
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the potential benefit of a heart transplant because it lessens the survival time to be
gained. Because the patient is a marginal transplant candidate and the new finding
has no effect on the cost of the procedure, the observation may be grounds for reversal
of the original decision.
These kinds of situations are ubiquitous in medicine, and I suspect they are com-
mon in other domains as well. In a comprehensive KB all events are related, if only
because they all have some connection to value. This observation suggests that the
opportunities to focus a planner based on true irrelevance are rare and therefore we
need to explore other grounds for allocating reasoning resources in the planning task.
6.4.2 Focus Variables
SUDO-PLANNER employs a simple focus mechanism based partly on the status quo
optimality heuristic discussed above. The method designates particular QPN vari-
ables as focus variables, thereby controlling the invocation of backward chaining as
described in Section 6.3.2.
Initially, the set of focus variables comprises those marked as changed in the input
problem description. This is a direct reflection of the assumption described above: if
the current strategy is optimal, only changes in the status quo are relevant to planning.
SUDO-PLANNER maintains focus by adding to the list any variable that is mentioned
in dominance conditions derived in the course of planning. These variables are worthy
of further inference because new dominance results about actions and observed events
that appear in undominated plan classes refine the plan graph.
A QPN variable is eligible for backward chaining if it is synergistic with a focus
variable on value. To understand the rationale for this criterion, consider the QPN
of Figure 6.12. There, f is the sole focus variable and c is a candidate for backward
chaining. The two variables are synergistic in direction 81 on value in this reduced
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QPN, that is, Y1'({c, f}). Let d be some predecessor of c in the event variable KB,
not in the current QPN. The backward chaining criterion dictates that c be extensible
if S 1 E {+, -}, but not if 61 E {0, ?}.
D jS2
Figure 6.12: Synergy with a focus variable. Y 1({c, f}) holds in the QPN containing
variables c, f, and v. Backward chaining on c to introduce d to the network can lead to
interesting results only if 61 E {+, -}.
If S1 E {+, -}, then both c and its predecessor d are of interest to the planner.
The synergy entails a nontrivial monotone decision relation for f and c, and for f
and d as well if 62 # ?. This result could be significant for one of two reasons:
1. Variable f has changed, therefore synergy with a decision variable dictates the
direction to alter the status quo plan.
2. Variable f appears in the description of an active plan class, therefore the
monotone decision property dictates a refinement to the plan graph.
Because f is a focus variable, one of these reasons must be in force.
Conversely, if S1 V {+, -}, we gain nothing (with respect to f) by backward
chaining on c. If 61 = 0, then c is irrelevant to f, as is d. This is a strong case of
justified focus. On the other hand, if S1 = ? then c and its predecessors generally are
relevant. However, the ambiguous sign prevents SUDO-PLANNER from determining
in what way they are relevant, and further backward chaining will never resolve the
ambiguity. Hence, the model construction procedure may as well not pursue this
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path in the KB. To SUDO-PLANNER, futility serves as a focus justification on par
with irrelevance.
To implement the extensibility criterion, SUDO-PLANNER records all known syn-
ergies with focus variables (on value) as they are derived in the course of dominance
proving. The situation Figure 6.12 depicts holds for the QPN in some state of reduc-
tion, not necessarily in any constructed QPN or in the KB directly.
6.5 Related Work
Section 6.3.4 includes an evaluation of SUDO-PLANNER's model construction proce-
dure in terms of the desiderata for multilevel reasoning presented in Section 6.1. In
this section, I take a broader perspective and contrast the SUDO-PLANNER approach
with related work on model construction and multilevel reasoning. The two topics
are reviewed separately below, since SUDO-PLANNER is the first program designed to
construct decision models from a multilevel KB.
6.5.1 Decision Model Construction
Most work on decision model structuring has been carried out with the intent of aid-
ing human decision analysts (see Humphreys and McFadden [63], Keeney [68], and
von Winterfeldt [151] for a mixed sample). There is a significant demand for such
aids, especially as the availability of inexpensive, user-friendly software packages for
personal computers makes DA technology accessible to a widening group of potential
analysts. The need is particularly critical for those analysts who have less experience
with the methodology and a lower level of familiarity with the underlying decision-
theoretic concepts. In fact, we have incorporated some of the qualitative dominance
ideas from this dissertation into BUNYAN, a program for critiquing human-generated
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decision models [160]. But despite some common concerns, the issues faced in at-
tempting to fully automate the model construction task differ significantly from the
problems of aiding human modelers. In this section I discuss the few projects that
have specifically addressed themselves to automated knowledge-based formulation of
decision models.
In Holtzman's "intelligent decision systems" [57], the domain knowledge is pri-
marily in the form of a general decision model, encoded as an influence diagram with
assessment functions for each node of the graph. Constructing a model for a par-
ticular decision is largely a matter of reducing the template model that is built into
the program. This is essentially the decision-model-as-KB approach that I rejected
in Section 1.5 for reasons of scalability.
The alternative advocated in this work calls for dynamic assembly of decision mod-
els from a knowledge base of primitive components. An early example of this kind of
behavior was exhibited by a program for Hodgkins disease, described by Rutherford
et al. [116], that dynamically constructs decision trees from a KB specifying a variety
of diagnostic tests and treatments. Its flexibility lies in the possibility of modifying
the set of available tests and treatments on a case-specific basis. Hollenberg's Decision
Tree Builder (DTB) [56] also generates decision trees using a medical knowledge base
of diseases, tests, and treatments. Unlike the Hodgkins program, DTB is intended
to handle a broad range of medical decision problems. Consequently, its represen-
tations are considerably more general, and its tree generation, correspondingly more
flexible. A disease may be parameterized by attributes, which in turn may influence
the applicability of various actions as well as the values of probabilities and utilities
in the model. Tests and treatments may indicate or modify the values of disease
attributes.4 A simple control structure directs tree construction, employing a model
4Incidentally, difficulties with this mechanism first brought my attention to the problem of dis-
tinguishing the values of event variables in different temporal relation to their affecting actions
(J. P. Hollenberg, personal communication), handled by Markov influences and variable mitosis in
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of patient states for bookkeeping purposes.
With this kind of generation approach, it is extremely difficult to escape from
exhaustive consideration of a combinatorial space of plans and events. The programs
must construct strategies that include every action identified as potentially benefi-
cial, and model every event identified as potentially relevant. The desire to avoid
this behavior was the primary motivation for developing abstraction mechanisms for
SUDO-PLANNER (see Section 1.6). Control of model construction remains important
even with a multilevel representation, as discussed in Section 6.4.
The model constructor closest in spirit to SUDO-PLANNER is Breese's ALTERID
system [9, 10]. ALTERID constructs numeric influence diagrams from a KB of logical
and probabilistic assertions in response to specific queries. Aside from the contrast
in precision between qualitative and numeric probabilistic relationships, the KB lan-
guage ALTERID uses differs from SUDO-PLANNER's in two important respects:
1. SUDO-PLANNER's KB has an explicit taxonomic dimension. Relations at dif-
ferent levels of abstraction may coexist in the ALTERID KB, but they are not
treated specially by the reasoner.
2. ALTERID bundles predecessors of a variable together and permits multiple ex-
clusive groupings. Backward chaining retrieves one of the specified predecessor
sets, rather than a collection of individually asserted predecessors as in SUDo-
PLANNER.
Because the predecessors are specified and retrieved as a group, ALTERID avoids some
of the compatibility problems faced by SUDO-PLANNER. Manipulation of these com-
pound units provides the knowledge engineer with greater control over the networks
ultimately produced, at the expense of flexibility obtained by reasoning about the
individual predecessors. ALTERID's provision for multiple exclusive predecessor sets
SUDO-PLANNER (see Section 6.3.3).
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is not expressible in SUDO-PLANNER, although some exclusivity can be represented
by separating the structures by taxonomic levels. Section 7.5.1 discusses the possibil-
ity of extending SUDO-PLANNER's event variable knowledge representation to allow
alternate relation patterns at the same level of abstraction.
Finally, in previous research I considered special mechanisms for constructing the
outcome and preference portions of a decision model [156, Chapter 8]. Although
this work is largely compatible with SUDO-PLANNER, I have not included any of it
in the implementation. In particular, the facilities for choosing representations for
health outcomes based on terminological transformations [157] should be applicable
to model construction in general.
6.5.2 Abstraction
Abstraction has been studied in a variety of AI contexts. Section 3.2.1 discussed
research in planning with abstraction and its relation to SUDO-PLANNER's knowledge
representations for plans and actions. Researchers have also developed formal theories
of abstraction per se [55], intended to support a variety of AI tasks. In this section I
briefly review (in terms of the desiderata presented in Section 6.1) some approaches
toward multilevel knowledge representation within the "causal" modeling paradigm
for diagnostic reasoning. The commonality of these systems with SUDO-PLANNER
lies in their explicit use of taxonomic and domain relations; the causal nature of
the domain relation is inessential to this discussion. This appears to be a minimal
requirement for evaluation in terms of the multilevel reasoning desiderata. Direct
comparison of these programs to SUDO-PLANNER is not possible, however, as they
were designed for significantly different tasks.
In a compiled knowledge approach [11], all of the relations encoded at high levels
could in principle be derived from deeper knowledge about low-level concepts. Com-
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pilation (typically a manual operation) improves reasoning efficiency by replacing
common, complicated inference patterns by direct associations. A truly compiled KB
is necessarily reductionist. The system as a whole is not really multilevel unless the
reasoner also has access to the deep knowledge.
In Section 6.1.2, I cited ABEL [98] and CADUCEUS [107] as examples of rigid and
fluid systems, respectively. ABEL is also reductionist; it ultimately performs all of
its causal reasoning at the lowest available level of abstraction.5 Partitioning the KB
into levels improves definitional clarity and thereby enhances the prospects for co-
herence. CADUCEUs, like SUDO-PLANNER, is non-reductionist, fluid, and operational
at all levels. Although the semantics of its KB are not perfectly clear, and the KB
itself is not guaranteed to be coherent, CADUCEUS appears not to suffer as badly
in these respects as SUDO-PLANNER. Because it reasons directly from the KB, CA-
DUCEUS imposes the closed-world assumption globally, rather than locally on models
constructed from the KB. Finally, the hybrid ABEL/CADUCEUS approach that Patil
and Senyk propose [99] appears to inherit the desirable characteristics of CADUCEUS
listed above.
6.6 On Constructed Models
In this section, I step back from the specifics of QPNs and SUDO-PLANNER's methods
for constructing them to examine some fundamental questions about synthetic deci-
sion models. In particular, I look at the nature of decision models, their relation to
normative decision theory, and the implications for the model construction enterprise.
sHowever, given incomplete information, ABEL's higher levels apply knowledge based on im-
plicit assumptions not accessible to levels below. In this situation, the program can exhibit non-
reductionist behavior.
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6.6.1 Models and Closed Worlds
One plausible operational definition for "model" is "a structure on which a closed-
world assumption is invoked." In Hewitt's terminology, decision and other models
are microtheories, the closed components of an "open system" [54]. All deduction
in open systems is applied to microtheories, which are constructed by extralogical
mechanisms.
Whether or not their designers employ the terminology of models or microtheories,
systems that interleave inference under closed-world assumptions with non-logical
processing perform what I have been calling "model construction." An example is
Forbus's Qualitative Process Engine (QPE) [36], a program that constructs qualitative
process models from a KB of process descriptions and a specification of potentially
active processes. As in QPNs, derived relations among variables in qualitative process
models depend on an assumption that the set of influences is completely known.
QPE accumulates active relations in closed-world tables before assuming the closure
required to compute the net result.
6.6.2 Decision Models
The decision-theoretic formulation of a decision problem postulates an abstract set
of available acts, corresponding to the set of all plans f, and a set of possible states
of nature 0. The axioms of expected utility [108, 121] imply the existence of a utility
function u : x 0 -+ R, such that for all irl, r 2 E 0,
l'I >_ 7'2 = EO [U(xrl, 0)] _ Ee [U(r2, 0)]. (6.2)
The expected utility property (6.2) is of fundamental theoretical importance for sev-
eral reasons, including:
* It grounds the theory of subjective probability in rational decision making.
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* The existence of numerical representations is analytically convenient for math-
ematical decision theorists.
Practitioners of applied decision theory, or decision analysis (DA) [62, 109], cite an-
other implication of (6.2):
* The theory can be directly implemented in prescriptive aids for practical deci-
sion making through the assessment of formal probabilistic models and utility
functions.
A decision model is a literal translation of the theoretical entities of (6.2) to concrete
symbolic structures. In specifying decision models, decision analysts usually separate
the probability and utility components by identifying a special outcome descriptor
c (the consequence, a function of ir and 0) sufficient for describing preferences. The
utility model is then u(c) and the probabilistic model is expressed as f,(.Iir) without
explicit reference to 0.
Although modeling schemes differ in form and expressive power, all represent a
choice situation in terms of the basic decision-theoretic concepts of alternative acts,
uncertain events, and preferences. In standard DA methodology, analysts assess these
elements by interpreting real and hypothetical choices of the decision maker in terms
of (6.2). As Tversky [149] and others have noted, this procedure presumes the theory
has some descriptive validity, a matter deserving considerable skepticism.
Stated in the abstract, the components of decision theory are completely general,
and its arguments normatively compelling.6 Despite their structural correspondence,
however, the generality and normativeness of the basic decision-theoretic formulation
IThis is not to deny that the tenets of Bayesian decision theory have been and continue to be
highly controversial-in statistics and philosophy as well as AI. I will not recount the dispute here;
nevertheless, my opinion is that the majority of the objections apply to narrow applications of the
theory rather than to the fundamentals themselves. The majority of objectors, of course, have
differing opinions. For elaboration, see the discussion below and previous writings [161].
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does not automatically transfer to particular decision models. The rational agent ax-
iomatized by decision theory is an idealization; decision models can only approximate
its preferences and beliefs.
The next section explores the nature of this idealization, using Savage's concept of
a "small world." Section 6.6.4 examines the implications of these observations for the
enterprise of building computational agents based on decision-theoretic principles.
6.6.3 Small Worlds
Decision models fall short of capturing the ideal agent for two related reasons. First, as
models, they are imperfectly related to the reality they are intended to represent [133].
Second, the decision problems they model constitute only a slice of the overall decision
situation faced by the agent. This latter issue is the problem of small worlds.
Savage points out that in the decision-theoretic formulation, the ideal rational
agent [121, page 83]
... has only one decision to make in his whole life. He must, namely,
decide how to live, and this he might in principle do once and for all.
Choice of this lifelong policy is the agent's grand-world decision problem. Decision
theorists and analysts following (and including) Savage rightfully regard grand-world
decision modeling as unrealistic, and instead focus on isolated decision situations
called small worlds. The problem of small worlds is to justify this focus-to determine
when it is legitimate to apply the machinery of decision theory to isolated slices of
the grand-world decision.
Savage attacked this problem formally by describing the correspondence between
the small and grand worlds. Because the grand world is a refinement of the small
world, states in the latter map to classes of states in the former. Thus, small-world
consequences correspond to distributions over grand-world consequences. A small
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world that obeys the axioms of expected utility is called a pseudo-microcosm. Deci-
sions based on a pseudo-microcosm are valid when the utility of small-world conse-
quences is equal to their expected utility in the grand world, and the probability of
small-world states is the same as the grand-world probability of the corresponding
class. If these correspondences hold, then the small world is called a microcosm. Sav-
age shows that pseudo-microcosms need not be microcosms, though he expresses the
opinion that "the possibility of being taken in by a pseudo-microcosm that is not a
real microcosm is remote" [121, page 90].
Details of the technical criteria for determining whether a small world is microcos-
mic are inessential to the present discussion (in fact they have not been completely
characterized).7 Examination of decision modeling experience suggests that even if
the small worlds can be formally cast as microcosms, the myopic view from the small
world is likely to result in models that fail to respect features that are expressible only
in more refined worlds. For example, failure to account for portfolio effects is one way
to get "taken in by a pseudo-microcosm." Decomposing a grand-world decision into
a series of small-world choices often leads to models that do not reflect the reduction
in risk due to diversification from the perspective of the global portfolio choice.
Whether we attribute the portfolio effect distortions to pseudo-microcosmic effects
or simply to inaccurate modeling, the source of the problem lies in the isolated nature
of small-world decision making. As Section 6.6.1 notes, reasoning with decision models
requires a closed-world assumption; closing a small world is tantamount to ignoring
features relevant only in the grand world. Thus, choosing the scope of small worlds
to avoid bias is critical to the legitimacy of decision modeling. Unfortunately, the
basis for such a choice is not well-understood by decision theorists.
SUDO-PLANNER's dominance-proving architecture is unique in embracing the con-
7For a lucid presentation and a concrete example of a non-microcosmic pseudo-microcosm, see
Shafer's reexamination of Savage's arguments, as well as the commentaries on Shafer by Lindley and
Dawid [128].
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cept of grand-world decision making. A dominance-proving planner, as described
in Section 2.4.1, is a grand-world decision maker if its plan space comprises life-
long policies rather than short-term strategies. Such a plan space is conceivable
within a constraint-posting framework because-unlike the basic decision-theoretic
formulation-acts are composite objects described as combinations of primitive acts.
Decisions are distinctions among plan classes rather than selections of particular acts.
In decision theory, acts are atomic and decisions are selections. Hence, it is not pos-
sible in decision theory to make a near-term decision without either committing to
long-term decisions or proceeding as though the near-term is the only term via a small-
world construction. A constraint-posting planner, in contrast, can make a near-term
decision without the pretense that it has solved its ultimate decision problem.
We can consider SUDO-PLANNER a grand-world planner in this sense because its
universal plan class (Section 3.1) does not limit the scope of plans. In domain model-
ing, however, SUDO-PLANNER is just as dependent on small worlds as traditional DA
systems. As Figure 6.13 illustrates, the models SUDO-PLANNER constructs to evaluate
the effects of actions are small worlds. Specifically, they represent consequences at a
level of abstraction coarser than the ultra-fine grand-world ideal. It appears to me
that this relation will inevitably be approximate, and thus that small-world decision
models are unavoidable.
The tenuous relationship between decision models and the decision-theoretic ideal
is transparent when we view our models as imperfect representations of worlds that are
small to begin with. Those recognizing the problem have drawn differing conclusions
about its implications for decision-theoretic applications, in both DA and AI. In the
next section, I examine some of these arguments and present the view behind the
design of SUDO-PLANNER and its mechanisms for constructing decision models.
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(Decision Theory) (Decision Models)
Figure 6.13: SUDO-PLANNER plans in the grand world using small-world decision models.
The QPNs it generates will generally be pseudo-microcosms, faithful to the grand world
only if they are also microcosms.
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6.6.4 Constructive Decision Theory
Shafer has argued persuasively that the value of a theory of probability judgment
depends on its constructive utility, that is, on factors that determine its usefulness
for developing mental arguments, evaluating evidence, and expressing and explaining
beliefs [127, 129]. Shafer's objections to Bayesian decision theory stem in part from
its treatment of preferences and beliefs as conceptually innate and its consequent
emphasis on elicitation rather than synthesis. Moreover, in his view [128, page 485],
"the problem of small worlds serves as a demonstration of how far [Savage's] normative
approach was from a sensible, constructive approach to decision."
My conclusion in Section 1.5 that decision models are not suitable knowledge bases
is an endorsement for the constructive point of view. Once we undertake to design
agents without explicit a priori decision models, it is clear that constructive issues
will be influential. The lack of an established set of principles for decision model
construction, a constructive decision theory, increases the difficulty of this endeavor.
Although I agree with Shafer about the goals of constructive decision theory, we
diverge sharply in approach. Where Shafer has emphasized comparison of alterna-
tive probability calculi (in particular, Bayesian probability versus Dempster-Shafer
belief functions [126]), I would focus on more comprehensive representation issues
and procedures for constructing decision models from KBs. Furthermore, there is
no need to cast this effort as a new foundation for normative behavior; the rational
agent of decision theory remains a useful idealization for anchoring our constructive
concepts [161].
Perhaps the most appealing path to a constructive decision theory is to broaden
our rationality concepts to incorporate constructive factors. This is essentially the
approach of Good, who introduces "type II" rationality as the extension of Bayesian
rationality where the cost of computation is taken into account [41]. This principle
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is difficult to apply, however, as we are usually unable to precisely characterize the
necessary computation. The full analysis requires consideration of an agent's decisions
about its own cognitive make-up, which can lead to infinite regress if we are not
careful. (See Doyle for a discussion of some issues in what he calls rational self-
government [25].)
6.6.5 Constructed Models: Conclusion
Once we take into account the dynamic process of synthesizing decision models, the
overall procedure is no longer guaranteed to be normative. Nevertheless, the relation
to Bayesian decision theory is valuable as a comparative standard. Principles of model
construction can be evaluated on this basis, to the extent that we can measure the
potential distortion of alternative construction strategies.
Little research to date has addressed constructive decision-modeling issues, es-
pecially from a computational perspective. In this chapter, I have identified some
basic problems in representing and reasoning with the knowledge SUDO-PLANNER
uses for constructing QPNs. The description of SUDO-PLANNER's mechanisms repre-
sents a first step toward solving these problems and developing a set of principles for
automated decision model synthesis.
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Dominance Proving
This chapter completes the description of SUDO-PLANNER by describing its dominance
prover (the right-hand half of Figure 6.5). This module (1) derives and (2) records
dominance conditions entailed by a given QPN. The first two sections of this chapter
describe these tasks. SUDO-PLANNER's dominance prover supports planning up to
tradeoffs, but its qualitative techniques are insufficient for resolving the tradeoffs
identified. The remainder of the chapter considers approaches toward surmounting
the tradeoff barrier in ways compatible with SUDO-PLANNER's dominance-proving
architecture and its existing qualitative methods.
7.1 Reducing the QPN
The relation of QPN variables to the value node determines their decision-theoretic
properties. The dominance prover derives these properties by transforming the orig-
inal QPN to one where these relationships are direct. The reduction operator of
Chapter 4 renders indirect relations direct by removing intermediate variables from
the QPN and updating the remaining qualitative relations according to Theorems
4.11 and 4.21. Reduction is the sole QPN inference rule applied by SUDO-PLANNER's
dominance prover.
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The reduction process proceeds backwards from the value node. At each iteration,
SUDO-PLANNER chooses a predecessor w of value such that pred(w) : 0. It then
constructs red(w, G) by splicing w from the graph and recomputing the qualitative
relations for each combination of predecessors and successors of w using formulas
(4.9) and (4.18).' After each reduction, the dominance prover inspects the QPN
for decision-theoretic implications and records the results as described below. The
procedure terminates when all remaining variables have value as sole successor.
For example, at one point the model construction process produces the QPN of
Figure 7.1a. The candidates for reduction are long-term morbidity and mortality.
SUDO-PLANNER chooses one of these and reduces it, adding its predecessors to the
potential reduction candidates. The program proceeds to reduce nodes one-by-one
until it reaches the configuration of Figure 7.lb.
As shown in Section 4.4.3, reducing an arbitrary subset of the variables in a QPN
can be performed with O(IVI2) applications of the rule for updating qualitative in-
fluences (4.9), where IVI is the number of variables in the network. Each influence
update may require up to O(IVI) applications of (4.18) to compute the new syn-
ergies (one for each potentially synergistic partner), bringing the overall worst-case
complexity to O(|V13).
7.2 Recording Dominance Results
Between reductions, SUDO-PLANNER inspects the QPN for relations implying dom-
inance among plan classes. There are two ways that a QPN can manifest such im-
plications, both involving qualitative relations with the value node. First, an action
variable av may be directly related to value, U6(av) for 6 E {+, -}. If av has no other
'The implementation of these reductions is non-destructive; the original QPN is required for
modification in the model construction cycle of Chapter 6.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 7.1: (a) The QPN before reduction. (b) The completely reduced QPN.
189CHAPTER 7.
CHAPTER 7. DOMINANCE PROVING
paths to value, this implies that the optimal value of av in the plan is its maximum
or minimum value, depending on 8 (see Section 4.5.2). Second, av may be synergistic
on value with a potentially observable event variable ev, YM({av, ev}). In this case,
the optimal av policy is monotone in ev if ev is observable, by the monotone decision
property (Section 4.7.3).
Let av = r,(a2 ), the action variable describing role r3 of action concept a2. The first
case can be expressed as a dominance condition by constraining plans with actions
of type a2 to those with its subtype where rj is restricted to the extreme value of its
range. Let rs denote this extreme value, r+ for the maximum and r- the minimum.
For example, presence+ = true and dosage- = 0. The subtype of ai, written
ai(rý), is obtained by value restricting rj to r . SUDO-PLANNER creates this concept
in NIKL, which classifies it automatically in the action taxonomy.
To express the dominance result D(11 2, II1), SUDO-PLANNER must create the two
plan classes. The dominance prover defines II1 by posting an action constraint (see
Section 3.4.1) of type ai on the universal plan class Q. II2 is similarly defined by an
action constraint of type ai(r ). The plan space manager classifies both classes in the
plan graph. The U6(rj(a2 )) condition implies that any plan in II can be improved
(in a non-strict sense) by revising rj(ai) toward its extremum, therefore II2 dominates
II, by Definition 2.1. D(II2, II1) is a restriction because II2 C II1.
The second type of dominance result is the monotone policy constraint justified
by qualitative synergy. For example, in the reduced QPN of Figure 7.1b, AAA repair
is positively synergistic on value with AAA size. (The Y? synergies holding between
other pairs are implicit in the QPN graph.) Y+({AAA repair, AAA size}) implies
that the optimal AAA repair policy is increasing in AAA size, which is asserted to
be observable in the description of this particular case.
The method for recording this fact on the plan graph is analogous to the action
constraint procedure described above. Let II1 be the class of plans where AAA-
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repair is under consideration, defined by posting an action constraint of type AAA-
repair on fl. SUDO-PLANNER creates 112 from II1 by posting an additional monotone
policy constraint of the form 2
(+, presence(AAA-repair), size(AAA-event)).
The dominance condition D(1 2 , II1) asserts that plans where AAA-repair is under
consideration can be restricted to threshold policies on size(AAA-event).
SUDO-PLANNER must also ensure that the event variable in a monotone policy
constraint is observable in the plan class restricted by the dominance result. An
event variable is freely observable (observable without an explicit test action) if it is
an action variable or, like AAA size in the example above, it is asserted to be so in
a particular case. If the event variable ev in the Y/({av, ev}) condition is not freely
observable, SUDO-PLANNER retrieves from its KB the set of action types asserted to
render ev observable: {ai I CO(a1 , ev)} (see Section 5.7). As above, let II, be the
plan class where av's action type is under consideration. For each action ai in the
set of observable creators, SUDO-PLANNER generates the plan class II1,i by posting
an action constraint of type ai on II1. The dominance prover adds conditions of the
form D(112,i, III,i) to the plan graph, where II2,i is obtained from II,i by posting the
monotone policy constraint (8, av, ev).
For example, at a later point in the model construction cycle, the dominance prover
obtains the result Yjr ({AAA repair, cath result}). (The conclusion follows from AAA
repair's negative synergy with CAD and the positive relation between CAD and cath
result.) As shown in Figure 7.2, SUDO-PLANNER must ensure that the monotone
policy constraint is only in force when cath result is observable, that is, when cardiac
catheterization has in fact been performed.
2The notation role(ai) is used for KB event variables to distinguish them from their corresponding
QPN variables. For instance, presence(AAA-repair) corresponds to the QPN variable AAA
repair.
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HIl: [AAA-repair]
II1,1: [AAA-repair,cardiac-catheterization(true)]
R
[AAA-repair,cardiac-catheterization(true)]
(-, presence(AAA-repair), extent(cardiac-cath-result))
Figure 7.2: A plan graph fragment created to record a dominance result. The AAA repair
policy is decreasing in cath result whenever the latter is made observable by catheterization.
The dominance prover performs one additional task during inspection of reduced
QPNs. Any variables having known synergies with focus variables are marked as
such. As described in Section 6.3.2, this is one of the criteria for directing the course
of backward chaining in the model construction process.
7.3 The Tradeoff Barrier
The dominance-proving methods described above, in concert with the model con-
struction procedure of the previous chapter, comprise SUDO-PLANNER's algorithm
for planning up to tradeoffs. Although QPNs are powerful enough to justify an im-
portant class of commonsense decisions, the inherent weakness of the D operator
prevents SUDO-PLANNER from reaching conclusions when the contributing factors
conflict, the hallmark of a tradeoff situation.
Tradeoffs are dominance-proving dead ends for SUDO-PLANNER. Qualitative rela-
tions of sign "?" tend to proliferate, as a single unknown link renders ambiguous any
composite pathway that spans it (? 0 8 =? E 6 = ?, for any 6 # 0). If a decision
problem involves a tradeoff, so do any decisions for which it is a subproblem.
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7.3.1 Example: A Subtle Tradeoff
The seriousness of the tradeoff barrier is illustrated by a subtle tradeoff encountered
by SUDO-PLANNER in the running example. At one point in the model construction
process, the dominance prover is presented with the QPN of Figure 7.3.3 SUDO-
PLANNER's task is to derive the synergy between CAD and AAA repair on value.
Figure 7.3: A subtle tradeoff. Although AAA repair and CAD interact in their influence
on MI, SUDO-PLANNER's dominance prover cannot derive a synergy on value.
As shown in the figure, CAD and AAA repair have a direct positive synergy on MI.
This means that increasing CAD increases the risk of MI due to the AAA surgery.
While CAD increases the risk of MI in any event-a fact represented separately
by the S+(CAD, MI) link-the expected increase is greater in the case of aneurysm
surgery. Because MI is undesirable, the Y+ relation to MI is an argument for a Y-
relation on value, and therefore for avoiding AAA repair in the presence of higher
values of coronary disease. This is the justification given informally in Section 1.2 for
the conclusion that AAA repair should be a threshold policy on CAD.
This factor is highlighted by the partly reduced QPN of Figure 7.4. If we could
3The QPN depicted here is simplified for expository purposes. Figure 7.3 displays the essential
variables and qualitative relations, suppressing those that do not affect the analysis.
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ignore the direct influence of AAA repair on value, then Y ({AAA repair, CAD))
would hold by simple propagation of synergies through influences (Theorem 4.20).
Of course, we are not permitted to recklessly ignore this direct relation. Other effects
of AAA repair may interact with MI and are therefore relevant to repair policy given
CAD.
Figure 7.4: Partly reduced version of the QPN above. SUDO-PLANNER cannot derive
the synergy between AAA repair and CAD on value because of AAA repair's unresolved
synergy with MI.
Three basic factors contribute to the synergy relation between CAD and AAA
repair:
1. The positive interaction between the two variables on MI. As argued above,
the increase in surgical risk presented by CAD supports a conclusion of YE.
2. AAA rupture is negatively synergistic with MI on mortality. Intuitively, this
relation holds because a decrease in the rupture rate has a smaller impact on
survival when the patient's life expectancy is already reduced by MI. In fact,
all of the influences on mortality in this example are sub-synergistic, for the
same reason that the noisy OR model implies Y- (Section 4.7.2). In this case,
the negative synergy combined with CAD's positive influence on MI implies
that the benefit of AAA repair in reducing ruptures is less important as CAD
increases. Thus, this factor also supports Yj.
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3. On the flip side, the other influencers of mortality (such as stroke) also have less
impact when CAD and therefore MI are increased. In this respect, a greater
extent of CAD tends to decrease the mortality risk attributable to AAA repair,
thereby supporting the conclusion YJ+.
The disagreement in sign between the second and third factors above is the reason that
YJ({AAA repair, MI}) holds in the QPN of Figure 7.4 (- e + = ?). Combining this
indeterminate synergy with the other relations in the figure leads to the conclusion
YJ({AAA repair, CAD}) in the completely reduced QPN.
We cannot resolve these factors qualitatively because they represent a genuine
tradeoff. The argument that the AAA repair policy should be increasing in CAD be-
cause worse coronary disease decreases the importance of surgical risks is not spurious
in the least: there are many examples in medicine and elsewhere where "having less
to lose" is a legitimate basis for taking riskier action. Nor is this effect necessarily
subordinate to the direct interaction. If we were considering a cause of mortality that
interacted only slightly with AAA repair, this factor would hold sway.
7.3.2 Beyond the Tradeoff Barrier
This tradeoff indeed represents a dead end, preventing SUDO-PLANNER from drawing
conclusions about any events or actions affecting CAD: observed CAD history, cath
result, and CABG in this example. We know in this case that the first factor easily
outweighs the other two, but this fact is not expressible in the QPN of Figure 7.3. This
situation is particularly frustrating because given Y6({AAA repair, CAD}), SUDO-
PLANNER could go on to derive useful dominance results involving these other vari-
ables.
In the next two sections, I consider the possibility of transcending the tradeoff
barrier. Section 7.4 discusses methods for incorporating externally resolved tradeoffs
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into the tradeoff formulation process. A variety of approaches for generating these
tradeoff resolutions are investigated in Section 7.5.
7.4 Externally Resolved Tradeoffs
Though the process of tradeoff resolution may depend on precise, absolute knowledge,
the end result is essentially qualitative. The product of a tradeoff resolver is simply
the sign 6 (with 8 = ? signifying failure) of the originally indeterminate relation.
Given the resolution 5, SUDO-PLANNER can proceed from the dead end as if S had
been derived with its own qualitative methods.
7.4.1 A Black-Box Interface
Because a tradeoff formulator like SUDO-PLANNER can apply resolutions without
knowing their pedigree, QPN-based inference complements other dominance-proving
mechanisms. For example, if an external source determines that factor one (from Sec-
tion 7.3.1) prevails over factor three, SUDO-PLANNER can conclude that AAA repair
and CAD are negatively synergistic on value, and can go on to produce dominance
results depending on that fact.
As Figure 7.5 illustrates, SUDO-PLANNER regards an external tradeoff resolver
as a black box. When the attempt to add qualitative values results in ambiguity,
SUDO-PLANNER presents the situation to the resolver. If resolution is successful, the
resolver returns a non-"?" 6 and SUDO-PLANNER proceeds from there.
7.4.2 Tradeoff Stubs
I have implemented a simple stub tradeoff resolver to demonstrate SUDO-PLANNER's
ability to recover from dead ends. All qualitative relations in SUDO-PLANNER's KB
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tradeoff
SUDO situation Tradeoff
Planner Resolver
e])!t 1 S = ?
Figure 7.5: Black-box interface with an external tradeoff resolver.
are tagged with an identifier to facilitate reference to tradeoff situations. When sign
addition is indeterminate, the stub resolver consults its list of answers to see if the
present situation was anticipated. A total of five stub resolutions are required for the
running example, including the conclusion that Y7 holds in the tradeoff presented in
Section 7.3.1.
7.4.3 Resolver Candidates
Virtually any program that solves decision problems involving partially satisfiable
goals can play the role of tradeoff resolver in the diagram of Figure 7.5. The ideal
candidates are those that exploit knowledge difficult to express in SUDO-PLANNER's
representation scheme yet can report their results in its qualitative terms.
Forms of knowledge suitable for resolving medical tradeoffs range from physiolog-
ical models, like that in Long's program for heart failure [84], to representations of
clinical trial studies, as proposed by Rennels [111]. The nature of tradeoff resolution
knowledge in other domains is similarly unconstrained. Therapy predictions produced
from the heart failure program [83] take the general form of qualitative influences,
though the underlying model uses numeric relations.
The resolver's knowledge representation may itself be qualitative, though to com-
plement SUDO-PLANNER it must make different qualitative distinctions, employ sepa-
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rate knowledge sources, or apply more powerful inference techniques. The feasibility
of generating qualitative relations from other types of qualitative models is supported
by the existence of programs performing similar tasks. For example, Downing's qual-
itative sensitivity analysis [22], and Weld's comparative analysis [155] both derive
relations among variables from models describing absolute qualitative behavior.
7.5 Qualitative Tradeoff Resolution
The phrase "qualitative tradeoff resolution" is oxymoronic in the sense that qualita-
tive unresolvability is my proposed definition for a tradeoff. But the meaning of "qual-
itative" is always relative to a set of qualities, hence varying the quality basis leads
to different standards of what is qualitative. The implication for SUDO-PLANNER's
task is that tradeoffs from one perspective may be non-tradeoffs from another. A
tradeoff formulator should have the ability to select perspectives and reconcile the
consequences of alternate viewpoints.
The following sections are speculative discussions of extensions to SUDO-PLANNER
that could provide a more powerful tradeoff resolution capacity. They work by ma-
nipulating the notion of "qualitative" in one of the following ways:
1. Changing perspectives. Find another perspective or level of description in which
the tradeoff is qualitatively resolved.
2. Introducing new qualitative distinctions. Other qualitative concepts can provide
additional dominance-proving opportunities.
3. Modulating the degree of precision.
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7.5.1 Spanning Influences and Synergies
A spanning relation is a domain relation that summarizes a body of network struc-
ture by directly connecting its endpoints. In a multilevel representation, the spanning
relation coexists with the structure it summarizes at the same abstraction level. To
interpret spanning relations, a reasoner needs the ability to maintain multiple exclu-
sive views of a single relationship, perhaps using techniques similar to those employed
by ALTERID [9] or CADUCEUS [107], mentioned in Section 6.5.
Formally, a spanning influence from a to b of sign S asserts S'(a, b, G), where G
is the network where all variables on pathways between a and b have been reduced.
Spanning synergies are defined analogously. A spanning link mechanism is one that
can reason about such relationships in the same model that contains the intermediate
variables. A generalized spanning link mechanism would permit the G argument to
vary arbitrarily across simultaneously considered qualitative relations. The answer to
a query is the strongest result obtainable through transformation operators applied
to any G.
Spanning links provide a means to express in the KB information currently en-
coded in tradeoff stubs. For example, if we know that the positive influence paths
from a to b outweigh the negative ones, we can add S+(a, b) as a spanning link to
express this fact. Even if dir(a, b) = ? in the most detailed G, the spanning link can
provide the stronger answer directly.
The implementation of spanning links, particularly the necessary adaptation of
SUDO-PLANNER's model construction algorithm, presents some interesting problems.
Modifying the assertion language to encompass spanning links is itself a significant
extension, since the current representation never explicitly refers to G. It appears that
a successful treatment of spanning links will require a clarification of the semantical
issues raised in Section 5.4.1.
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7.5.2 Negligibility Reasoning
The "order of magnitude" techniques [17, 110, 154] recently investigated in qualitative
physics present another possibility for tradeoff resolution. In the case when one
parallel influence can be declared negligible with respect to another-for example,
the mildly unpleasant taste of an orally-administered drug relative to its curative
powers-indeterminacy can be avoided by simply ignoring the former when in conflict
with the latter.
Asserting that a factor is negligible means quite literally that it can be neglected
without loss of validity. Researchers in qualitative physics have formalized this no-
tion in terms of nonstandard analysis [18], an axiomatic framework for infinitesimal
quantities. In the planning task, the standard for negligibility is in a factor's effect on
the ultimate decision. Further work is required to formalize this standard in terms of
infinitesimal quantities, and to relate these quantities to the probabilities and utilities
that define QPN relations.
7.5.3 Incorporating More Precise Information
Another broad tradeoff resolution strategy is to introduce more precise forms of in-
formation into the dominance-proving process. Extending a model to include partial
or complete descriptions of the magnitudes of probabilities and utilities enlarges the
set of decidable comparisons.
At the heart of any tradeoff is an unresolvable inequality on expected utilities.
Though deciding this inequality based on an arbitrary set of constraints is intractable,
a considerable body of research on AI and decision theory addresses restricted versions
of this problem. For example, Sacks describes an algorithm for inequality proving
based on algebraic constraints [119]. Other work has focused on special properties of
classes of probabilities and utility functions (for a sampling, see [31, 50, 156, 162]).
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Researchers in qualitative reasoning have also begun to consider mechanisms that
employ precise knowledge to resolve ambiguities inherent in the original qualitative
representations [74, 164]. Work along these lines should also be applicable to quali-
tative probabilistic reasoning.
Chapter 8
The Complete Example
Our running example, the AAA/CAD/CVD case, has been presented piecemeal
throughout this report. In this chapter I assemble the fragments into a more co-
hesive, chronological description of SUDO-PLANNER's performance on this problem.
8.1 Input Specification
The case, introduced in Section 1.2, is simply stated: a patient with a known history
of CAD and CVD presents with a large AAA. From a medical perspective, of course,
this description is exceedingly sketchy. Nevertheless, the description is sufficient to
specify the relevant tradeoff formulation task, and any further information could not
be exploited by SUDO-PLANNER.
The encoding of the case for input to SUDO-PLANNER is also quite simple. The sta-
tus quo optimality heuristic of Section 6.4 dictates that the planner focus on changes
to the current state. In this case, the underlying assumption is that the current ther-
apy appropriately takes into account the patient's CAD and CVD, therefore planning
should focus on strategy modifications warranted by the new finding, AAA.' There-
'Relaxing this assumption merely entails consideration of a broader set of findings. In this
example, we could reexamine the current strategy by treating CAD and CVD as if they had just
been discovered, like the AAA. The result is a blunter focus.
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fore, the input to SUDO-PLANNER specifies that size(AAA-event) be represented in
the initial QPN, and that it be a focus variable.
The case description also specifies that the variable size(AAA-event), as well as
history(CAD-event) and history(CVD-event), is freely observable. The initial
findings of the case are eligible to appear in conditional plans without additional test
actions to reveal their values.
That is the complete SUDO-PLANNER input for the running example. Realistic
medical cases would specify many more changes and observations.
8.2 The Evolving QPN
Snapshots of the QPN in various stages of development appear throughout the pre-
vious two chapters. Figure 8.1 recapitulates the first few stages of QPN evolution,
described in Section 6.3. In the initial QPN (Figure 8.1a), AAA size negatively in-
fluences value by virtue of being a disease severity. This relationship is elaborated
in Figure 8.1b, revealing that the undesirability of the aneurysm is due to its po-
tential for rupture. Further elaboration (not shown) specializes aneurysm rupture to
AAA rupture. Backward chaining on this variable introduces AAA repair to the QPN
(Figure 8.1c), presenting the first opportunity to reason about possible action.
At this point, however, SUDO-PLANNER cannot determine anything about the
AAA repair policy because the synergy between AAA repair and AAA rupture on
value is indeterminate. A sequence of further elaboration and backward chaining
steps replaces the direct relation from AAA repair to value with a collection of paths
through such intermediate variables as stroke, MI, and mortality, which together
account for the negative effects of the vessel surgery. Most of the new structure arises
from elaboration; mortality and value are the only variables extended back in the
process. The resulting QPN is illustrated in Figure 7.1a of the previous chapter. As
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(a) AAA
(b) O
(C)
Figure 8.1: Early evolution of the QPN.
demonstrated by the reduction of Figure 7.1b, this model is sufficient to justify our
first dominance result: the AAA repair policy should be monotonically increasing in
AAA size.
Backward chaining on MI introduces CAD to the network, producing the QPN
partially depicted in Figure 7.3. As described in Section 7.3.1, SUDO-PLANNER cannot
resolve the synergy between AAA repair and CAD on value, due to a subtle tradeoff
involving the effects of CAD. This conflict is resolved by one of SUDO-PLANNER's
tradeoff stubs (Section 7.4.2), allowing the model construction process to continue.
A similar tradeoff involving CVD (introduced by backward chaining on stroke) also
requires a stub for resolution.
Resolving these synergies renders the two disease variables extensible. CVD is
the next variable selected for backward chaining. Because endarterectomy is related
to CVD by a Markov influence, the variable undergoes a mitosis process as described
in Section 6.3.3. The resulting QPN is illustrated in Figure 8.2.
204
CHAPTER 8. THE COMPLETE EXAMPLE
Figure 8.2: The QPN after backward chaining on CVD. The variable is divided in response
to the Markov influence from endarterectomy.
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By backward propagation of synergies (Corollary 4.22), SUDO-PLANNER's domi-
nance prover can establish at this point that CVD's predecessors, CVD history and
carotid arteriography result, are negatively synergistic with AAA repair on value. The
arteriography result is observable only if the test is performed; SUDO-PLANNER adds
the action variable to the QPN as shown in Figure 8.2. Figure 8.4 (next section)
illustrates the plan graph at this stage of the model-construction/dominance-proving
process.
Backward chaining on CAD leads it to undergo mitosis and introduces structure
parallel to that for CVD (see Figure 6.11). After elaboration removes a few spurious
high-level links, the KB is exhausted and the model construction cycle terminates.2
The final QPN is depicted in Figure 8.3.
8.3 Dominance Results
SUDO-PLANNER invokes the dominance prover on every QPN produced in the evo-
lutionary sequence described above. It obtains the first dominance result from the
QPN of Figure 7.1, and the next two after backward chaining on CVD to produce the
QPN of Figure 8.2. The intermediate plan graph recording these three restrictions is
shown in Figure 8.4. The restriction of II1 to II4 corresponds to the dominance result
encoded by the plan graph fragment of Figure 7.2.
As the dominance prover derives further results, it creates and classifies the nec-
essary plan classes and posts the dominance conditions on the plan graph. Figure 8.5
depicts the final plan graph, SUDO-PLANNER's terminating output for this example.
The plan graph contains dominance results corresponding to each of the intuitive
tradeoff formulation conclusions discussed in Section 1.2.
2If the KB were much larger, running the process exhaustively would be infeasible. Because
plan graph validity is invariant, however, the planner can be halted at any time for inspection of its
dominance results.
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Figure 8.3: Final QPN for the AAA/CAD/CVD example (repeated from Figure 1.12).
II : [AAA-repair]
114 II5
key:
R
1115
114 : (+, presence(AAA-repair), size(AAA-event))
IIs : (-, presence(AAA-repair), history(CVD-event))
II6 : [carotid-arteriography(true)]
II15: (-, presence(AAA-repair), extent(carotid-arteriography-result))
Figure 8.4: The plan graph after reducing the QPN of Figure 8.2. Plan classes are
described by the constraint distinguishing them from their parents.
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Il: [AAA-repair] 112 : [Endarterectomy] II13: [CABG]
114 II5 H6 117 118 119 1110 I1111 1112 1113 1114
R R R R R R R R
/A \ I \
1115 1116 1117 1118 1119 1120 1121 1122
key:
117 : (-, presence(AAA-repair), history(CAD-event))
IIs : [cardiac-catheterization(true)]
II11: (+, presence(endarterectomy), history(CVD-event))
1112: [carotid-arteriography(true)]
1113: (+, presence(CABG), history(CAD-event))
1114: [cardiac-catheterization(true)]
1116: (-, presence(AAA-repair), extent(cardiac-cath-result))
1117: (+, presence(AAA-repair), presence(endarterectomy))
1118: (+, presence(endarterectomy), presence(AAA-repair))
1119: (+, presence(AAA-repair), presence(CABG))
1120: (+, presence(CABG), presence(AAA-repair))
1121: (+, presence(endarterectomy), extent(carotid-arteriography-result))
1122: (+, presence(CABG), extent(cardiac-cath-result))
Figure 8.5: The final plan graph. Plan classes II9 and IIlo are defined by the union of their
parents' constraints. All leaf plan classes dominate (and therefore restrict) their parents.
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8.4 Performance
The entire process takes roughly two minutes of real time on a Symbolics 3650.3 The
code is not optimized, and no extensive metering has been performed to determine
the allocation of computation time. SUDO-PLANNER appears to spend most of its
time in redundant or superfluous dominance proving that could be avoided without
degrading performance.
8.5 Discussion
This example illustrates SUDO-PLANNER's tradeoff formulation performance on a re-
alistic, albeit small, medical decision problem. The program successfully plans up to
tradeoffs, failing to resolve only genuine qualitative conflicts. Some of these are quite
subtle; the competing factors became apparent to me only upon analysis of the QPN
reduction. Given resolutions for these, SUDO-PLANNER proceeds to derive all of the
desired results.
Two aspects of the example are disappointing. First is its fragility: small mod-
ifications to the KB can produce seemingly chaotic change in the course of QPN
evolution and sometimes lead to weakened dominance results or even invalid ones if
incompatible KB relations are brought into the model. I ascribe this defect to the
cognitive complexity of the model construction procedure and the difficulty of pre-
dicting the implications of closed-world assumptions. Second, SUDO-PLANNER fails
to take maximal advantage of abstraction, producing dominance results later in the
process than necessary. As mentioned in Section 6.3.4, this is a by-product of the con-
servative knowledge engineering policy of including indeterminate high-level relations
to prevent improper assumptions of independence.
'This figure assumes that the KB is pre-loaded and that the graphical display of QPNs is disabled.
209
CHAPTER 8. THE COMPLETE EXAMPLE
The AAA/CAD/CVD case is the only complete, working SUDO-PLANNER exam-
ple. In the process of implementing the program I have constructed several other
QPN examples, including the digitalis model of Chapter 4. The difficulty of knowl-
edge engineering mentioned above precluded development of a more comprehensive
KB supporting a variety of model construction examples. This is not simply the
traditional "knowledge acquisition bottleneck"; rather, it reflects the unpredictabil-
ity of SUDO-PLANNER's QPN generation procedure. Improving its robustness is a
prerequisite for widening the scope of SUDO-PLANNER.
Above all, the example serves as a demonstration of plausibility for the basic com-
ponents of the SUDO-PLANNER approach: dominance proving, QPNs, and decision
model construction from a multilevel KB. Weaknesses in SUDO-PLANNER exposed
by the example provide a starting point for efforts to improve tradeoff formulation
technology.
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Conclusion
I conclude the dissertation with an assessment of what this research has achieved and
some remarks about what remains to be accomplished.
9.1 Summary of Contributions
The two central elements of this work are the dominance-proving architecture of
Chapter 2 and the QPN formalism of Chapter 4. I have implemented these ideas in
SUDO-PLANNER, a program that formulates tradeoffs by constructing decision mod-
els from a multilevel KB of qualitative relations. The following sections summarize
these contributions, and enumerate some other products of this project scattered
throughout the thesis.
9.1.1 A Dominance-Proving Architecture for Planning with
Partially Satisfiable Goals
In the classical framework, planners search for a course of action guaranteed to achieve
a specified goal predicate. As I argue in Section 1.4, this formulation of the task is fun-
damentally inadequate to account for partial goal satisfiability, including the special
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case where the effects of actions are uncertain. Although numerous researchers have
developed planners to handle some of its aspects, no comprehensive computational
framework for the more general problem has yet emerged.
The dominance-proving architecture is an attempt to fill that void. As presented
in Chapter 2, the architecture's criterion for choice among plans is highly general; in
particular it admits a Bayesian approach to preferences and belief without imposing
ad hoc restrictions on the form of utility functions and probabilities. It goes beyond
pure decision theory, however, in addressing the assembly of plans from more primitive
descriptions of action. The architecture prescribes a division of computational labor
among three components: the plan space manager, dominance prover, and domain
problem solver. The plan graph representation of the search space supports techniques
from traditional planning, in particular hierarchical (constraint-posting) planning and
dependency maintenance.
The generality of the dominance-proving architecture precludes a final evaluation
based solely on the results of this project. SUDO-PLANNER is one instance of a
dominance-proving planner, developed specifically for the tradeoff formulation task.
Other instances, defined by alternate choices in the design of plan class representation,
domain modeling language, and dominance prover, should be expected to exhibit a
variety of planning behaviors.
9.1.2 QPNs: A Formalism for Qualitative Probabilistic In-
fluences and Synergies
Qualitative probabilistic networks are representations for constraints on probabilistic
relations among a set of variables. The formalism provides constructs for two types
of constraint:
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* Qualitative influences describe the direction of the relation between a pair of
variables.
* Qualitative synergies describe the direction of interaction among influences.
Both qualitative relations have rigorous probabilistic definitions that justify sound in-
ference procedures based on efficient network transformations. Because the semantics
for qualitative influences and synergies are based on relative, rather than absolute,
statements about conditional probabilities, QPNs can be used to derive properties of
the relative values of alternative plans. In particular, the relation of variables to the
special value variable determine qualitative properties of the optimal decision, which
can be exploited directly by a dominance-proving planner. I summarize the formal
properties of QPNs in Section 4.9.1.
Qualitative relations directly support tradeoff formulation. In fact, resolvability in
QPNs is perhaps the best available criterion for a formal tradeoff definition. As argued
in Section 1.1, knowledge for tradeoff formulation is more abstract, modular, and
robust than that required for general decision making. QPNs provide a mechanism
to exploit these properties as far as possible before resorting to the less convenient
forms of knowledge needed to solve the residual planning problem.
9.1.3 Other Contributions
In developing the main ideas above and building the SUDO-PLANNER implementation,
I have been led to address a variety of peripheral topics. Those figuring prominently
in the thesis include:
* Identification of the tradeoff formulation task and its role in planning (Sec-
tion 1.1).
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* Design and analysis of knowledge representations for plan classes, actions, and
the effects of actions (Chapters 3 and 5). Development of a subsumption algo-
rithm for the plan constraint language (Section 3.5).
* Model construction at multiple levels of abstraction (Chapter 6).
- Desiderata for multilevel reasoning (Section 6.1).
- Exploration of issues in the automatic construction of decision models
(Sections 6.4 through 6.6).
* Interpretation of the STRIPS assumption for actions with uncertain effects (Sec-
tion 5.2.2).
* A theoretical framework for decision making in Savage's "grand world" (Sec-
tion 6.6.3).
9.2 Limitations of SUDO-Planner
The design of SUDO-PLANNER reflects an emphasis on decision problems substantially
different from those typically considered in AI planning research. As such, the domain
relations expressible in its KB and the conclusions derivable by its inference procedure
are novel to the field. Conversely, SUDO-PLANNER's mechanisms fail to cope with
many issues that traditional systems handle routinely. Most of these omissions are
not critical; straightforward extensions to SUDO-PLANNER would attain the desired
capabilities. Others, however, do not have clear remedies.
In the sections below, I discuss two glaring limitations of SUDO-PLANNER's com-
petence. Several additional shortcomings of this work have been reported in foregoing
chapters:
* The limited expressive power of the plan constraint language (Section 3.5.4).
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* An unsatisfactory semantics for effect assertions in the KB (Section 5.4.1).
* The fragility of the model construction algorithm (Section 6.3.4).
9.2.1 Tradeoffs
The tradeoff barrier is an obvious boundary of SUDO-PLANNER's decision-making
abilities. Sections 7.3 through 7.5 discuss the nature of this obstacle and propose
some approaches toward overcoming it.
The subtle tradeoff of Section 7.3.1 suggests that-though close inspection reveals
that this situation contains genuinely conflicting factors-the QPN formalism does
not correspond exactly to our intuitive notion of tradeoff. Further theoretical and
empirical analysis is required to allocate blame for this mismatch to inferential weak-
ness, omission of critical qualitative distinctions, and various cognitive elements. The
first step is to develop a precise characterization of the completeness of QPN inference
mechanisms, that is, the potential for spurious ambiguity.1
9.2.2 Time
No theory of planning is complete without an adequate treatment of temporal rela-
tions among actions and events. SUDO-PLANNER's representations for plan classes,
actions, and events, however, are entirely atemporal. Failing to deal with time is one
of the major shortcomings of SUDO-PLANNER.
Most planners handle simple sequencing among actions. For typical medical de-
cision problems, such a mechanism is not nearly adequate and barely provides an
advantage over no temporal reasoning at all. For example, in patients presenting
with symptoms of appendicitis, there is a tradeoff between performing an appen-
'Kuipers has carried out an analogous analysis of qualitative simulation [73], concluding that
spurious qualitative behaviors are in fact produced by local inference schemes.
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dectomy immediately or waiting and observing the patient to better establish the
diagnosis. Waiting avoids some unnecessary surgeries while increasing the risk of un-
treated disease. In this planning problem, the ordering of actions is already known;
the task is to determine the optimal waiting time as a function of the observations.
To attack this problem with SUDO-PLANNER, one would have to treat its temporal
aspect as just another domain-dependent characteristic of the situation. Because they
enjoy no special status in the planner, references to time must be expressed within the
existing representations for action and event variables. In this case, we can include a
time-of-surgery role in the specification of the action appendectomy. The filler
for that role is a time variable whose effects can be represented via the mechanisms
described in Chapter 5.
SUDO-PLANNER does supply one construct specifically to account for time rela-
tions: the Markov influence assertion of Section 5.5. Markov influences implicitly
encode the temporal ordering among an action and the value of an event variable
before and after its application.
But even a large set of representation constructs like Markov influences combined
with vigorous use of special time-related roles is no substitute for an explicit uniform
treatment of time within the planner and in the representation for effects of actions.
Failing to recognize that the time-of-surgery role of appendectomy is related to
other temporal measures in the KB and plan graph inevitably leads to significant
missed inference opportunities.
Temporal reasoning is likely to pose special problems in the dominance-proving
architecture because of its emphasis on deriving properties of plan classes. In categor-
ical planning, plans with partial temporal descriptions require the planner to establish
that facts hold in all consistent completions, a problem known to be difficult [21]. It
remains to be seen whether techniques from traditional planning can be adapted to
this framework, or, for that matter, whether the dominance-proving task will admit
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some special solutions not available in the traditional case.
9.3 Further Work
The preceding chapters contain numerous digressions outlining plans and speculations
about future work. This section elaborates on a few of these possibilities.
9.3.1 Extending the Dominance Prover
There are a few straightforward extensions to the SUDO-PLANNER implementation
that should enlarge the dominance prover's scope without presenting conceptual dif-
ficulties. One would be to incorporate explicit reasoning about landmark values, as
described in Section 4.7.5. For example, CADo might be an important landmark value
for CAD, representing no coronary disease or perhaps the normal extent of CAD for
a given population. A medical KB would also be likely to include the value of z*,
the normal threshold value on AAA size above which AAA repair is indicated. The
threshold z* is a rule of thumb, valid as a decision criterion only for patients with no
extenuating circumstances. Thus, use of z* implicitly assumes CAD = CADo, among
other things. Suppose a patient presents with CAD worse than CADo and a AAA
smaller than z*. The patient's coronary disease is an "extenuating circumstance" for
the AAA repair decision, but we know from SUDO-PLANNER's plan graph that ex-
tensive CAD only decreases our willingness to perform aneurysm surgery. Since the
patient's AAA is below the nominal threshold, we can conclude that it is also below
the revised threshold and therefore the optimal plan does not prescribe aneurysm
repair.
The reasoning scenario presented above makes use of dominance results produced
by the current version of SUDO-PLANNER. Hence, extending SUDO-PLANNER to han-
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dle landmark values would not require changes in either the QPN formalism or the
model construction process.
A second extension of the dominance prover is the incorporation of explicit con-
ditioning of qualitative relation assertions and dominance results. Maintenance of
context-dependent conclusions (such as the conditional dominance relations of Defi-
nition 2.3) can be implemented directly in a standard TMS. SUDO-PLANNER's plan
class representation already provides for conditional constraints (Section 3.4.3), al-
though its subsumption algorithm for plan classes with conditionals is incomplete
(Section 3.5.3).
Other extensions-involving new qualitative relations, plan class constraints, or
tradeoff resolution capabilities-are more fundamental, requiring significant modi-
fications of SUDO-PLANNER's existing mechanisms. I expect that further work on
SUDO-PLANNER will explore each of these directions.
9.3.2 Temporal Representations
Designers of temporally competent dominance-proving planners need to address three
basic representation requirements. A temporal knowledge representation must include
facilities to express:
1. the temporal relation among actions and observations in plans,
2. effects of action over time, and
3. time preference for the occurrence of events, including the temporal resolution
of uncertainty [72].
The first item involves extensions of the plan constraint language, while the second
and third are the responsibility of the domain modeling language.
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There is no reason to develop languages for expressing temporal relations among
actions in a plan unless the planner has some basis for distinguishing the effects of
the different temporal patterns of action. The first step in adding temporal concepts
to SUDO-PLANNER, therefore, should be to extend the QPN formalism to include
conditions on relations among variables over time. One approach is suggested by
Cox's investigations of a temporal version of first-order stochastic dominance [16].
Because atemporal FSD is the basis for the existing QPN relations, such a condition
is a promising candidate for a smooth extension into the temporal dimension.
A contrasting approach is to add temporal structure to the event variables rather
than to the relations. This is the path taken in a representation scheme I designed for
a proposed health outcome knowledge base [157]. The KB design is organized around
a taxonomy of temporal patterns, orthogonal to the health-related characteristics
of the concepts. Given a temporal semantics for the pattern-definition constructs
(perhaps in the spirit of Allen [1]), relations on these variables have clear temporal
interpretations. The same constructs could then be applied to the specification of
temporal characteristics of actions as well.
9.3.3 Critiquing Based on the Dominance-Proving Archi-
tecture
Perhaps the most immediate application of the dominance-proving architecture should
be to critiquing systems [91, 159], programs that analyze a user's proposed plan
rather than generate solutions from scratch. A dominance-proving planner critiques
by exploring the plan-space neighborhood of the given plan or plan class. Dominance
results involving plan classes that encompass the user's proposal suggest incremental
improvements to be recommended by the critiquer.
The user's strategy focuses the dominance-proving planner on a narrow slice of
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the search space that might have received only fractional attention in unrestricted
search. Though the planner may not have gotten there in the first place, it is possible
that once there it can derive an abundance of useful results.
A proposed plan often implicitly contains resolutions of tradeoffs that would have
caused SUDO-PLANNER to hang. This might be attributable to more domain knowl-
edge, more information about the case context, or greater willingness to make as-
sumptions or guesses. Assumptions inferred from the proposal can be asserted in the
planner's KB, in much the same way as results are incorporated from black-box trade-
off resolvers in the framework of Section 7.4. Further refinements or modifications to
the plan justified by its implicit assumptions are valid dominance results that should
be reported in the critique.
We have incorporated some of these ideas in BUNYAN, a program for critiquing
medical decision trees [160]. One of BUNYAN's "critiquing principles" is to alert the
analyst to decision models that contain qualitatively dominated strategies. Although
the program does not perform explicit dominance proving, the criteria for detecting
dominance are based on qualitative probabilistic relations holding between abstract
concepts of medical decision problems.
9.3.4 Tradeoff Resolution
Section 7.5 outlines three approaches toward resolving tradeoffs in ways compatible
with SUDO-PLANNER's existing dominance-proving mechanisms:
1. Spanning relations.
2. Negligibility reasoning.
3. Higher-precision knowledge.
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Pursuit of each of these directions should be part of a full-scale assault on SUDO-
PLANNER's tradeoff barrier.
9.4 Outlook on SUDO Planning
The central task that this research attacks-planning for partially satisfiable goals-
is so pervasive, and the need for comprehensive AI approaches so acute, that partial
solutions are well worth striving for. The same holds for other major issues addressed
by SUDO-PLANNER: qualitative probability, multilevel knowledge representation, and
decision model construction. It is a virtual certainty, then, that others will take up
these problems, whether or not they adopt techniques from SUDO-PLANNER.
However, the outlook for SUDO-PLANNER: THE PROGRAM is quite dim. In this
chapter and throughout the thesis I have chronicled numerous defects of SUDO-
PLANNER that preclude it from direct application to realistic planning problems.
SUDO-PLANNER is merely a demonstration vehicle, providing an instance of the
dominance-proving architecture for planning with partially satisfiable goals, and a
testbed for the application of qualitative probabilistic networks to problems of deci-
sion making under uncertainty. Future tradeoff formulators will surely operate much
differently, as researchers discover and exploit regularities in problems and domains.
And dominance-proving planners of the future will emphasize tradeoff resolution to
the point that resemblance to SUDO-PLANNER will be slight at best.
In contrast, I find it easy to be optimistic about the prospects for SUDO-PLANNER:
THE APPROACH. The full range of dominance-proving planners has not yet been ex-
plored, nor has the variety of possible uses for QPNs. The SUDO-PLANNER experience
to date has been encouraging; however, much work remains before we can evaluate
with confidence the utility of these ideas in establishing a principled basis for auto-
mated decision making.
Appendix A
Notation
Listed below are brief descriptions of notational symbols employed in the body of
this thesis, with references to the pages where they are introduced or defined. For
symbols with more than one interpretation, the appropriate choice should always be
clear in context.
a* A landmark value of variable a, either specially designated as such or de-
termined to correspond to landmark value of some other variable (p. 119).
ai 1. An action in the action alphabet A (p. 43).
2. A generic action type (p. 71).
3. A specific value taken on by variable a: ai E X(a). Used in conditional
probability expressions as an abbreviation for the proposition a = ai
(p. 96).
ai(vr) The action type formed by value-restricting some role of a, to vr (p. 71).
ag(b) A function that returns the value of a maximizing g(a, b) (p. 113).
A 1. An alphabet of actions for a simple plan language (p. 43).
2. The proposition interpreted as a = true, where a is a boolean variable
in a QPN (p. 93).
A* The set of strings in the alphabet A, or a wildcard in a regular expression
(p. 43).
Ai The proposition a = false (p. 93).
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A The universal action class. A = X(action) (p. 71).
lA A generic set of actions. Ai = X(a,) (p. 71).
action The root of the action taxonomy (p. 71).
arg maxa The value of a that maximizes the associated expression (p. 113).
av An action variable type (p. 73).
AV An action variable instance of type av (p. 74).
AV(7r) The value of action variable instance AV in the unconditional plan ir
(p. 74).
c The consequence descriptor in decision analysis used as argument to the
utility function (p. 179).
c The minimal value of variable c (p. 228).
CO(a1 , ev) A creates-observable assertion. Performing an action of type ai renders
event variable ev observable (p. 141).
D 1. Dominance relation over plan classes (p. 46).
2. The set of decision variables in a QPN (p. 89).
D' Strict plan class dominance (p. 46).
Ds Conditional dominance relation for condition S (p. 47).
dFb(bo) The derivative of the cumulative distribution, appearing in integrals.
Equivalent to fb(bo)db (p. 95).
dep(G) The dependency graph of a QPN G (p. 97).
dir(a, b, G) The direction of influence of a on b in G (p. 97).
ej A generic event type (p. 79).
e : II A conditional plan class constraint that the plan must be in II under
condition ei (p. 79).
ek Expectation under the monotonic transform q (p. 113).
E,[g(x)] The expectation of g(z) with respect to x. Equivalent to f g(x)ff(xo)dxo(p. 179).
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E The universal event class. E = X(event) (p. 75).
'i A generic set of events. Ci = X(e1 ) (p. 79).
ev An event variable type (p. 75).
EV An event variable instance of type ev (p. 75).
EV(obs) The value taken by the observable event variable instance EV in the
observation obs (p. 75).
event The root of the event taxonomy (p. 75).
fb Probability density function for b (p. 96).
fb(bo x) Conditional probability density function for condition x evaluated at b =
bo (p. 96).
Fb Cumulative density function (CDF) for b (p. 95).
Fb(.Ix) Conditional CDF for b given x (p. 96).
FSD First-order stochastic dominance relation (p. 95).
G 1. A goal predicate (p. 18).
2. A qualitative probabilistic network (p. 89).
idi Unique identifier associated with an action type in a plan class in-list(p. 76).
K61,62 A Markov influence assertion with influence direction 61 and synergy
direction 62 (p. 139).
O The set of possible patterns of observation over time (p. 68).
obs An observation in 0 (p. 68).
p The set of plan classes expressible in the constraint language, P C 20
(p. 52).
p7 The plan classes expressible in planner-i's constraint language in the
cascaded planning architecture (p. 70).
PE The plan classes accepted by the executor (p. 70).
pred Predecessor function (p. 93).
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Q The set of qualitative relations in a QPN (p. 89).
.r The extreme value in role rj's range, maximum if 6 = + and minimum
if 6 = - (p. 190).
R A generic relation on CDFs (p. 104).
Rs Ordinal comparison relation holding for undefined terms by default
(p. 78).
R Annotation on a plan graph link indicating a restriction relation (p. 26).
•R The real numbers (p. 52).
red(b, G) The network obtained by reducing b from G (p. 99).
rev(a, b, G) The network obtained by reversing a and b in G (p. 99).
result Function returning the state resulting from performing a plan in a given
state in the situation calculus (p. 45).
role(ai) The action variable formed from concept a2 and role role (p. 73).
si The initial situation in situation calculus planning (p. 45).
Sa Set of event variables directly affected by action a (p. 134).
S" Set of event variables directly affected by action a, plus any other vari-
ables that affect those in Sa (p. 135).
S6  A qualitative influence assertion (pp. 92, 93, 96).
u The utility function (pp. 96, 179).
U6  Qualitative influences on utility (p. 96).
v The specially designated value node in a QPN (p. 89).
V The set of variables in a QPN (p. 89).
z Context variable in qualitative relation definition (p. 93).
X(a) The domain of variable a (p. 89).
X(c) The extension of a (NIKL) concept c (p. 71).
Y6 A qualitative synergy assertion (pp. 109, 110).
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YU, Qualitative synergy on utility (p. 114).
8 A qualitative direction, one of +, -, ?, or 0 (pp. 78, 92).
(8, av, ev) A monotonic policy constraint in direction 8 between av and ev (p. 78).
8 A state of nature (pp. 118, 179).
O The set of possible states of nature (p. 179).
7r A plan (p. 45, defined in Section 3.1).
ir[ei] A partial plan function defined only on the extension C& of ei (p. 79).
II A plan class or partial plan (p. 43).
II(av, ev) The plan class where av is a monotonic function (with direction 8) of ev(p. 54).
II[ei] A class of partial plan functions defined only on the extension E; of e1.(p. 80).
A monotonic transform (p. 95).
w A course of action in £,,, (p. 68).
g The universal plan class, or set of all syntactically valid plans (p. 43).
0o The set of (semantically) legal plans (p. 69).
ez,, The set of executable courses of action (p. 68).
>_ Strict preference relation over plans (p. 45).
_ Non-strict preference relation over plans (p. 45).
~ Indifference relation over plans (p. 45).
Sign multiplication operator (Table 4.1, p. 100).
E Sign addition operator (Table 4.1, p. 100).
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Proofs of QPN Results
Lemma 4.9 If b V pred*(a) then a and b are d-separated in dep(G) by any S such
that predG(b) C S C pred (b).
Proof: Two variables are d-separated iff every undirected path between them is
blocked according to one of the conditions of Definition 4.8. Every path between
a and b must pass through one of b's predecessors or one of its successors. Because
predG(b) C_ S, the paths through the predecessors are blocked by the first condition.
Consider a path through a successor of b. Let t be the first variable on the path,
starting from b, that has both incident edges leading in. Such a variable must exist
because b V pred*(a). Because it is the first, there is a directed path to it from b.
Note that every variable in the separating set S has a directed path to b because
S C pred*(b). Therefore if t or any of its successors were in S, there would be a
cycle from b through t. Because dep(G) is acyclic, t blocks the path via the second
condition of Definition 4.8. O
Theorem 4.10
S'1(a, b, G) A S'2(b, c, G) A So(a, c, G) = S6102(a, c,red(b, G)),
where 6i E {+, -, 0, ?} and ® denotes sign multiplication, described by Table 4.1.
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Proof: I will prove the case 81 = 82 = +; the others are analogous. Choose a, and a2
such that al a2, and an zo in X(pred(b) U pred(c) - {a, b}) that is consistent with
al and a2. Let F, denote the conditional CDF for c and c the minimal value of the
variable. By the definition of cumulative probability we have
F(colaixo) = o f f(bocl azo)dbodcl.
Changing the order of integration and decomposing the joint probability yields'
Fc(colaizo) = If 0 c fC(cIaibozo)fb(bolaixo)dcidbo. (B.1)
Because a and c are conditionally independent given b and z, by the So premise and
Lemma 4.9, we can remove ai from the fc expression. Rewriting the density function
as the derivative of a cumulative, we get
Fc(colaixo) = fc(cxlboxo)dcldFb(bo aizo). (B.2)
The inner integral is simply the CDF for c given bo.
Fc(colaixo) = f FC(colbozo)dFb(boa xzo). (B.3)
Because b positively influences c, the pointwise FSD condition (4.3) implies that
for any co, Fe(colbozo) is a decreasing function of bo. And S+(a,b) entails FSD of
Fb(bolaxzo) over Fb(boIa2zo). Therefore, (4.4) applies with the inequality reversed
(negating F,(colbzo) yields an increasing function), leading to the conclusion
Vco F,(colalzo) < F.(cola2zo),
implying FSD. Because al, a2, and zo were chosen arbitrarily, we have finally S+(a, c).
1If some values of bo are inconsistent with zo, then distributions of c conditioned on bo and Zo
(and therefore the right-hand sides of equations (B.1), (B.2), and (B.3)) are not well-defined. This
has no consequence, however, because the value of f&(bolaizo) in such cases will always be zero.
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Theorem 4.11
S6 (a, b, G) A S12(b, c, G) A S63 (a, c, G) . S(6106 2)3 (a, c, red(b, G)),
where $ denotes sign addition, also described in Table 4.1.
Proof: Proceed as for the proof of Theorem 4.10 to equation (B.1). Because 63 is not
generally zero, we cannot remove ai in the next two steps.
Fc(coaizxo) = F(co ajboxo)dFb(bolaizo).
Define F, as a variant where ai is fixed to al in the first term
F,.(colaizo) = J F(coIalbozo)dFb(bo aigo).
Note that Fe(colalo) = F (colalxo) and that
63 = +(-) Vco Fc(cola1bozo) < (>) F.(co a2bozo), therefore
Vco Fc(cola 2 zo) < (>) F(colazzo). (B.4)
When 63 = ? it is possible that the relation varies with co. Regardless of S3,
Fc(colalbozo) is a decreasing/increasing/non-monotonic function of b0 as 62 is +/ - /?.
For concreteness, suppose 61 = 62 = + (again, the other cases are analogous). Fol-
lowing the reasoning in the proof of Theorem 4.10 above, we get
iF(colalxo) = Fc(colaixo) FSD Fc(coIa 2zo).
If 63 = + (more generally if 63 agrees with the polarity of the FSD relation), this
result combines with (B.4) to imply FSD of the corresponding unhatted Fes, thereby
establishing the result. Without such agreement FSD may be violated, permitting us
to conclude only S?(a, c, r ed(b, G)). o
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Theorem 4.12 Let G' = rev(a, b, G). G' inherits all the qualitative influences of G
except:
1. dir(a, b, G') is undefined.
2. dir(b, a, G') = dir(a, b, G).
3. Vw E predG,(b),
dir (w, b, G') = [dir(w,a, G) ® dir(a, b, G)] E dir(w,b, G).
4. Vw E predGl(a) - {b},
dir(w,a,G') = dir(w,a, G) if dir(w, b, G) = 0
? otherwise.
Proof: First, note that all variables outside predG(a) U predc(b) retain the same set
of d-separations. Second, let us verify each relation above:
1. There is no longer an influence from a to b.
2. To show that the influence on the reversed link remains unchanged it is conve-
nient to work with the likelihood form of S', equation (4.6). Applying Bayes's
formula:
f,(adlbj) fb(bjlz)fb(bjlaiz) = a(ailbx)f
fa(aI x)
Choose four values ax > a2 and b, > b2.
fb(blaix) f,(ajIblx)fb(buIx) = g(bIb 2,) fa(ai blx)
fb(b2laiz) f- (aIlb 2z)fb(b2 |z) fa(ailb2 z)
Using the monotone likelihood property, dir(a, b, G) = +(-) implies
fb(bl1aix) fb(bl1a 2X)
fb(b21alx) (- f(bla2)
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Rearranging we get
fb(blIaxz) fb(b2 alz)
fb(bl a2X) - fb(b2 a2z)
the MLRP for b given a. As noted above (and proven by Milgrom [90]), this is
necessary and sufficient for our posterior FSD condition to hold for any prior
Fa(aolz).
3. In G, the influence of w on b is relative to a predecessor set that includes a. In
G' the influence is not so conditioned and is therefore equivalent to the influence
on b obtained by splicing a out of the network. Applying Theorem 4.11 with
the original influences yields the expression above.
4. Here we are transforming an unconditional relation to a conditional one. If
dir(w, b, G) = 0, w and b are d-separated by pred(b) in dep(G) (by Lemma 4.9),
therefore f,(wolabx) = f,(woazx) by conditional independence. In that case the
MLRP obviously holds for the conditional density iff it holds for the marginal
one. If w has nonzero influence on b in G, this independence does not hold.
Because a and w may interact significantly in their influence on b we cannot
say anything about their relation given b. For example, let the three variables
be binary with a and w marginally independent (that is, dir(w, a, G) = 0),
Pr(A) = Pr(W) = .5, Pr(BIAW) = .1, Pr(BIAW) = .2, and Pr(BIAW)= .9.
Then dir(w,a,G') can be + or - depending on whether Pr(B|AW) is less
than or greater than .45. Either possibility is consistent with an initial G with
dir(a, b) = dir(w, b)= +.
Theorem 4.13 Let S+(a,b) be defined by (4.10). Given the following conditions:
1. Theorem 4.10
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2. For binary b, al > a2, and 2,
Fb(.Iaxz) R Fb(.la 2zz) '* Pr(B aiz) Ž Pr(Bla2z) (B.5)
the weakest R is FSD.
Proof: First, note that FSD satisfies these conditions. Next, assume that R satisfies
them but R does not entail FSD. We will start with an instantiation of Theorem 4.10
and derive a contradiction. Let a, b, and c be the only variables (so we can safely ignore
x) with S+(a, b), S+(b, c), and no other direct links. For concreteness, let b range over
the unit interval [0, 1] and c be binary with Pr(CIab) = 0(b), for some 4 : [0, 1] -- [0, 1]
monotonic. The monotonicity of 4 guarantees S+(b, c) and its independence from a
validates So(a, c) in the original network. By assumption, Theorem 4.10 applies,
yielding the conclusion S+(a,c) and therefore Fc(colal) R Fc(cola2). Because c is
binary, (B.5) must hold. Using Pr(Clai) = f Pr(Cjaibo)dFb(bojla), the RHS of (B.5)
becomes
fo• (bo)dFb(bola1) > fo 0(bo)dFb(bo 1a). (B.6)
Because 4 may be any monotonic function, FSD is necessary for (B.6) and is therefore
entailed by R. O
Theorem 4.14 Suppose U'2(b, G) and Uo(a, G). A necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for U6 1s2 (a,red(b, G)) is S' (a, b, G) as in Definition 4.4.
Proof: The expected utility of ai with any z is given by
u(ai, ) = u(bo, z)dFb(boIax). (B.7)
Let us prove the case 81 = 82 = +. U+(a) is satisfied in the reduced network iff u(ai, z)
is increasing in ai. From (4.8) we know that u(bo, z) is monotonically increasing in bo.
In fact, it can be any monotonic function. Therefore, (B.7) is increasing in ai under
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the same conditions as (4.4), which is exactly the S + condition (4.5) of Definition 4.4.
Lemma 4.18 Y+({a, b}, c) (respectively Y- and YO) holds iff the function
e0(a, bz) = Jf (co)fc(colabx)dco (B.8)
is supermodular (submodular, modular) in a and b for all increasing functions 4 and
contexts z.
Proof: Choose arbitrary al > a2 , bl > b2, and x. By Definition 4.17, e4 is supermod-
ular iff
e,(a, bil~) + eo(a 2, b2jl) 2 e0(a, b2az) + eo(a 2, bi z).
Rearranging,
e,(ax, bxlz) - eo(a2, bixz) 2 eo(ai, b2lX) - eo(a 2, b2 a).
Substituting the definition of e, (B.8) and combining the integrals,
S(co) [fc(colalbix) - fc(cola 2bix)] dco (co) [fc(colalb2x) - fc(cola 2b2x)] dco
(B.9)
A necessary and sufficient condition for (B.9) to hold for any increasing function 4 is
that the bracketed distribution differences be related by FSD. (Recall the equivalence
between (4.3) and (4.4) in Section 4.3.2.) That is,
Vco F(co(labix) - Fc(cola2bix) < Fc(colaib2 ) - Fe(cola2b2 *).
This is exactly the Y+ condition of Definition 4.16. O
Theorem 4.20 Synergies can be extended along qualitative influences by reduction
according to the following.
Y61 ({a, b}, c, G) A S62 (c, d, G) A So(a, d, G) A So(b, d, G) •
Y6 1 6 2 ({a, b}, d, red(c, G)).
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Proof: Let us assume that 81 = 62 = +; the other cases are analogous. We can describe
the cumulative for d conditional on a and b by integrating over its counterpart for c.
Fd(doabx) = j fd(d I|abcoaz)fC(coIabx)dcodd (B.10)
= l fd(dIcox)ddl fc(colab)dco (B.11)
= Fd(dolcoz)fc(colabz)dco. (B.12)
In going from (B.10) to (B.11) I took advantage of the conditional independence
between d and each of a and b given c implied by the So conditions and Lemma 4.9.
Because S+(c,d), Fd(dolco) is a decreasing function of co for any do. Therefore,
equation (B.12) and Lemma 4.18 imply that Fd(doIabx) is a submodular function of a
and b for all do (a function g is submodular iff -g is supermodular). By the definition
of submodularity,
Vdo Fd(doialb•l) - Fd(dola2blz) _ Fd(dolalb2) - Fd(dola2b2X), (B.13)
which is the condition for Y+({a, b}, d) of Definition 4.16. O
Theorem 4.21
Y61({a, b}, c, G) A S62(c, d, G) A Y 6'({a, c}, d, G) A Y 6 4({b, c}, d, G)
AS 6'(a, c, G) A S'6(b, c, G) A Y'6 ({a, b}, d, G) -=
y(6106 12)E(6 306 6s)(s64 )es) 6 ({a, b}, d, r ed(c, G)).
Proof: Start as in the proof of Theorem 4.20, but do not use conditional independence.
Fd(dolab=) = fd(dol abcox)fc(colabx)dcodd,
= Fd(dojabcox)dFC(cojabx).
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As in the proof of Theorem 4.11, define Pd to be the CDF with the conditioning
variables fixed in the first term, to al and bl in this case.
Fd(dolab) = Fd(doIalblcox)dFc(cojabx).
Regardless of al and bl, Fd(dolalbicoz) has monotonicity properties determined solely
by 62. Following the reasoning of the Theorem 4.20 proof, we have the following fact
about Fd (a hatted version of (B.13)):
Vdo0 Id(doaalblx) - Pd(dola2blx) R Fd(do0alb2z)- Fd(dojazbzz), (B.14)
with R the relation <, >, =, or ? as S1 ( 62 is +, -, 0, or ?. Henceforth I will
refer to functions satisfying conditions of the form (B.14) as R-modular. Let Fd be
intermediate between Fd and Fd where only b is fixed
A(do ab) = / d(do ablcoz)dF.(colabx).
Note that Fd(dolalbi) = Fd(dolalbxz) for either bi. Therefore F is R-modular iff
Vdo •d(dolalblx) - (dola 2blz) R FA(dOjalb2z) - P(doab) . (B.15)
Using (B.14) and a little rearrangement, a sufficient condition for (B.15) is
Vdo A,(do) R A2(do), where (B.16)
Aj(do) Id(dojaAbi) - (dolIa 2bi) (B.17)
Expanding the definitions for FP and Fj,
A(do) = [Fd(dolalblco) - Fd(dola2blcoz)] dF,(cola2bzx). (B.18)
The difference inside the integral of equation (B.18) is an increasing, decreasing, or
constant function of co as 83, the synergy of a and c, is -, +, or 0. The influence of b on
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c, 86, determines an FSD relation among the Fc(colabi). Therefore, condition (B.16)
holds if 83 0 86 agrees with R, which was determined by 61 0 (2.
Another application of this line of reasoning with the roles of a and b reversed
leads to the conclusion that Fl', where
fP'(dolab) =f Fd(doal1bcoa)dF,(colabz).
is R-modular if 84085 agrees with R. Thus, agreement among these pairwise products
yields R-modularity of Fd, PF, and Fd'.
Suppose that 87 also agrees with R. Then, from the Y6 definition we have
Vdo Fd(dolalblcoz) - Fd(do a2 blcoX) R Fd(dojalb 2coz) - Fd(dola2b2coZ),
which entails the following inequality when integrating over a positive function:
Vdo J [Fd(dolalblcoz) - Fd(dola2blcoz)] dFc(cola2 bz)
R J [Fd(dojalb2coz) - Fd(dola2b2cox)] dFc(cola 2b2z).
Equivalently,
Vdo Fd(do Iab 2 c) - (dola2b2X) R .'(doIa 2b2z)- Fd(dola2b2X). (B.19)
We can transform (B.19) to a relation on Fd alone by applying some R-modularity
conditions already known and taking advantage of the equivalences among the hatted
and primed Fs for particular values of a and b. Combining (B.19) with R-modularity
of Fd',
Vdo Fd(dolalbpx) - •'(dola 2bx) + Fd(dola 2b2 X) - P(dola 2 bz z)
R Fd(dolalb2z)- Fd(dola 2b2X).
Applying R-modularity of Fd yields
Vdo 2Fd(dolalbxx) - Fd(dola2 blx) - F'(dola2bxz) + Fd(dola2b2z)
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R Fd(dojalb2z) - Fd(do a2b2z) + F'(dolalb2z),
and finally, R-modularity of F leads to the result
Vdo Fd(dolalbiz) - Fd(dola2b x) R Fa(dolalb2zX) - Fd(dola2 b2 X).
Therefore, unanimity among the terms in the new synergy expression given by the
theorem statement implies R-modularity of Fd, the condition of interest. Dissent by
any term results in a synergy of Y?, vacuously true. O
Appendix C
SUDO-Planner Knowledge Base
This appendix provides a complete description of SUDO-PLANNER's KB for the run-
ning example.
C.1 Event Taxonomy
Figure C.1 is a graphical view of the event taxonomy, which includes the action tax-
onomy fragment depicted in Figure 3.4. The taxonomy consists of NIKL concepts
representing event types. All of SUDO-PLANNER's event variables are defined by com-
bining these concepts with the NIKL roles depicted in Figure C.2. The specialization
relations in these two taxonomies define the taxonomic dimension of the event variable
KB described in Section 6.2.
C.2 Qualitative Relation Assertions
Table C.1 lists the qualitative influence (S6 ) assertions in SUDO-PLANNER's KB. A
subset of these assertions appear in graphical format in the event variable KB frag-
ment of Figure 6.3. Qualitative synergy (Y6 ) assertions are listed in Table C.2 and
Markov influences (K61' 62 ) in Table C.3.
C.3 Observable Creators
The SUDO-PLANNER KB requires only two tests for this example (see Table 1.1):
CO(cardiac-catheterization(true), extent(cardiac-cath-result)
CO(carotid-arteriography(true), extent(carotid-arteriography-result)
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I CCRROTID- ,ICICHENOTHERAPY - ICIHEP-CHENOTHERAPY
'ARTERIOCRRPHY-RESULT ICI NEDICRL-RCTION-
ICICAROIRC-CATH-RESULT
ICISURGICAL-ACTION
ICIRCTIO
ICIENDORTERECTONY
ICICABG
ICIRAA-REPRIR
ICIHEP-RESECTION
II Ir OTlDfTn--QTrCTOnGaUPu
ICITRTREHENT------•
ICI EPRTONA-THERAPY ICICARDIRC-
IC ITEST IC IDIRNOSTIC-TEST CRTHETERIZATION
ICISTROKE ICI TREATABILITY-TEST
ICiMNI ICIDISEASE-INDICATOR-TEST
ICIANESTHETIC-CX
ICIEVENT ICIUNDESIRRBLE-EVENT
ICjHORTRALITY
IcittSt I CILONG-TERH-HORBIDITYC-IN-CtRt V T ICIfOR
B
IDITY -
ICICLINICAL-EVENT I ICISHORT-TERN-NORBIDITY
ICIAGENT ICICVO-EVENT
ICI DISERSE-EVENT ICICD-EVENT
I C I RNEURYS-EVENT------ -- IC I RRA-EVENT
IclIEPATONA-EVENT
Figure C.1: SUDO-PLANNER's event taxonomy. The taxonomy also includes several event
types not used in the running example.
IRIPRESENCE--- IRIRUPTURE
IRIHISTORY
IRISEVERITY< IRISIZE
IRIVALUE
IRITIIE
Figure C.2: Roles used to define event variables in the running example.
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presence(undesirable-event)
time(undesirable-event)
severity(morbidity)
history(disease-event)
presence(treatment)
presence(surgery)
presence(surgery)
presence(surgery)
presence (vessel-repair)
presence(medical-action)
presence(anesthetic-cx)
presence(surgery)
rupture (aneurysm-event)
size(aneurysm-event)
size(AAA-event)
presence(AAA-repair)
history(CAD-event)
presence(MI)
presence (stroke)
presence (stroke)
presence(vessel-repair)
presence (vessel- repair)
presence (vessel-repair)
presence(AAA-repair)
(extent (CAD-event)
(extent (cardiac-cath-result)
history(CVD-event)
extent (CVD-event)
extent (carotid-arteriography-result)
-4
+
-4
+
+
--- 4
- 7
- 7
-- 4
+
-4
+
-4+
-4
++
+
+
+
+
value(agent)
value(agent)
value(agent)
severity(disease-event)
value(agent)
severity(short-term-morbidity)
time(mortality)
value(agent)
value(agent)
value(agent)
time(mortality)
presence(anesthetic-cx)
time(mortality)
rupture (aneurysm-event)
rupture(AAA-event)
rupture (AAA-event)
extent (CAD-event)
time(mortality)
time(mortality)
severity(long-term-morbidity)
presence(MI)
presence (stroke)
time(mortality)
time(mortality)
presence(MI)
extent (CAD-event)
extent (CVD-event)
presence(stroke)
extent (CVD-event)
Table C.1: Qualitative influences in the SUDO-PLANNER KB.
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severity(long-term-morbidity)
time(mortality)
presence(AAA-repair)
size(AAA-event)
presence(CABG)
presence(AAA-repair)
presence(endarterectomy)
-*- value(agent)
Zj-4 rupture(AAA-event)
D--+ presence(anesthetic-cx)
presence(vessel-repair)
rupture(aneurysm-event)
presence(MI)
presence(stroke)
presence(anesthetic-cx)
extent(CAD-event)
presence(AAA-repair)
presence(CABG)
presence(AAA-repair)
presence(CABG)
presence(AAA- repair)
presence(CABG)
presence(AAA-repair)
extent (CVD-event)
presence(AAA-repair)
presence(endarterectomy)
presence(AAA-repair)
presence(endarterectomy)
presence(AAA-repair)
presence(endarterectomy)
presence(AAA-repair)
time(mortality)
Spresence(MI)
- time(mortality)
- presence(stroke)
presence(MI)
iC-, presence(stroke)
time(mortality)
J-+ presence(stroke)
presence(MI)
Table C.2: Qualitative synergies in the SUDO-PLANNER KB.
presence(CABG)
presence(endarterectomy) Wz
extent (CAD-event)
extent (CVD-event)
Table C.3: Markov influences in the SUDO-PLANNER KB.
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